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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (hereafter 
"TEDRA"). The TEDRA statute permits parties to a trust dispute to enter into a 
Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Agreement ("TEDRA Agreement") to resolve their 
disputes without court intervention. The case involves the ability of a party to enforce a 
TEDRA Agreement when the other party breaches it. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In October 2014, Edwin De Young ("Edwin") 1 and all the beneficiaries of the 
Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust ("Frizzell Trust") entered into a Nonjudicial 
Dispute Resolution Agreement ("TEDRA Agreement") pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8-
302. (R. 8, 73 - 93).2 Darlene De Young ("Darlene") and Donald C. Frizzell ("Frizzell") 
were among those beneficiaries. (R. 8). On October 29, 2014, Edwin petitioned the 
District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of 
Kootenai to adopt the Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8-304. (R. 95 - 117). 
The Agreement modified certain provisions of the Frizzell Trust and directed 
Edwin to transfer certain real and personal property, along with rental income (less 
expenses) and management responsibilities to Frizzell by October 1, 2014. (R. 4-5). On 
1 First names are being used where needed to avoid confusion. 
2 A true and correct copy of the TEDRA Agreement is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
1 
October 6, 2016, Frizzell filed a complaint seeking enforcement of that TEDRA 
Agreement for Edwin's failure to perform under the precise terms of the TEDRA 
Agreement. (R. 4). The case was assigned to the Honorable John T. Mitchell, District 
Court Judge. (R. 4). The case was reassigned to the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer on 
November 10, 2016, after the De Youngs moved to disqualify Judge Mitchell. (R. 4). 
The De Youngs filed a Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") for failure to state a claim on 
November 9, 2016. (R. 4). The Motion was heard on December 13, 2016. Jd. On January 
20, 2017, Judge Meyer issued her Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's (sic) 
Motion to Dismiss ("Order"), granting a dismissal to the De Youngs. (R. 15 8 - 17 6). 3 In 
her ruling, Judge Meyer stated: 
There were remedies available to [Frizzell] through the provisions of the 
TEDRA Act and the failure to utilize those remedies is troubling to the 
Court, particularly when all parties entered into the agreement knowingly, 
voluntarily, and with the aid of counsel. It makes little sense to enter into an 
agreement to resolve matters related the administration of a trust through a 
prescribed course of conduct, only to argue that the agreement does not 
apply to matters that originate after the agreement was signed. At that 
point the agreement is of no utility and rather than creating efficiencies it 
becomes burdensome to the courts. 
(R. 164) (emphasis added). In granting the DeYoungs' Motion, the Court ruled that the 
scope of the Release in the Agreement was not limited to just claims "up to the date [the] 
Agreement is executed," but also "all future claims that might arise between [Frizzell] 
-----------
3 A true and correct copy of that Order is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
2 
and [Edwin]." (R. 170-171). In effect, the district court held the TEDRA Agreement itself 
barred its own enforcement. (R. 164). 
The Court further held that by signing the TEDRA Agreement, Frizzell "agreed to 
non-judicial dispute resolution regarding matters related to the administration of the 
Trust." (R. 172). The Court acknowledged that "[t]he Policy of the Act is to promote non-
judicial resolution of trust disputes, efficiency in trust administration, and judicial 
resolution of disputes where non-judicial efforts fail." (R. 172) (italics in original). 
The district court made clear, "The TEDRA Agreement is not a waiver of 
Plaintiffs day in court." (R. 172). Further adding, "If the parties were unable to do so 
[resolve disputes in a binding non-judicial manner] TEDRA provided judicial remedies 
for those disputes." (R.174). The district court ultimately deemed Frizzell's suit to 
enforce the TEDRA Agreement as "unreasonable, lacking foundation, and ... brought and 
pursued frivolously." (R. 175). 
The district court granted the De Youngs' request for an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to the enforcement provision of the Agreement and the TEDRA statute. (R. 17 4-
175). 
Final Judgment was entered on March 9, 2017. (R. 177). Frizzell filed his Notice 
of Appeal on March 17, 2017. (R. 179). His Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on 
March 20, 2017. (R. 183). Frizzell now submits this brief in support of his appeal. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 30, 2009, Clifton G. and Majorie J. Frizzell created the Frizzell Trust. (R. 
7). Clifton and Majorie were the grantors and original trustees of the trust. Id. Together, 
Clifton and Majorie had one child, Frizzell. (R. 43). Both Clifton and Majorie had 
children from prior marriages (R. 42-43). One of Majorie's children was Darlene, 
Frizzell's half-sister. (R. 43). Clifton and Majorie also had a number of grandchildren. (R. 
43). Clifton died on September 4, 2011. Id. Majorie died on October 24, 2011. Id. 
Upon the death of Clifton and Majorie, Haley Baker was appointed as successor 
trustee of the Trust. (R. 8). Baker declined to serve. Id. On October 29, 2011, Edwin was 
appointed the successor Trustee. Id. 
In 2013, Frizzell brought suit to enforce the Trust in Kootenai County Cause No. 
CV-2013-3998. (R. 80). In October 2014, Edwin, Darlene, Frizzell, Baker, Tyler 
De Young, Darryl De Young, Craig Frizzell, and Dean Frizzell, as vested remaindermen 
beneficiaries of the Trust entered into a TEDRA Agreement pursuant to I.C. § 15-8-302. 
(R. 74-75). Baker, Tyler, Darryl, Craig, and Dean were all Clifton and Majorie's 
grandchildren.4 (R. 43). 
The TEDRA Agreement specifically states that it "is intended to be a binding 
agreement to resolve certain issues that have arisen ... between the Parties." (R. 75). 
4 Distributions to the grandchildren are included in the Agreement, but are not within the scope of this appeal. (R. 
77). 
4 
Pursuant to the TEDRA Agreement, among other changes to the Frizzell Trust, Darlene 
and Frizzell were to receive "their equal residuary share of the trust estate from the 
Survivor's Trust and the Bypass Trust outright rather than continue it in trust." (R. 76). 
The Agreement provided that the following assets were to be distributed to 
Frizzell "free of trust": 
a. 39th Street Apartments, Phoenix, Arizona ["39th Street Property"] 
b. 4828 Brayton Avenue, Long Beach, California ["Brayton Property"] 
c. 265 Selmar Way, Sylva, North Carolina ["Selmar Property"] 
d. 375 Redondo Avenue, Long Beach, California ["Redondo 
Property"] 
e. All personal property and contacts located at all of the above listed 
properties, including specifically the household goods at the 265 Selmar 
Way, North Carolina property. 
f. Any and all vehicles in Don's possession, including specificially the 
Model A, Chevroley pick up, and Rolls Royce. 
(R. 78). As of October 1, 2014, "all income from the real properties [were] to be 
distributed to" Frizzell, "less expenses relate to such properties." Id. Management of all 
properties was to be distributed to Frizzell as of October 1, 2014 as well. Id. 
Pursuant to the Agreement, Frizzell agreed to indemnify Edwin against "any 
claims, lawsuits or other actions ... advanced against" Edwin by Frizzell or Frizzell' s 
children related to Edwin's administration of the Trust up to the date of execution of the 
5 
TEDRA Agreement. (R. 79). The Parties agreed to the binding nature of the TEDRA 
Agreement. Id. 
All beneficiaries to the Agreement agreed to a "Release and Hold Harmless," 
which provided: 
The Beneficiaries ... release, discharge, and indemnify ED ... from any and 
all actual or potential claims or causes of action, of whatsoever kind or 
nature, whether at law or in equity, whether known or unknown, accrued or 
yet to arise or accrue, including but not limited to any claims of negligence 
or breach of fiduciary duty o breach of contract, which relate to or arise out 
of any act, omission of conduct of ED in his capacity as Trustee that the 
Releasors no have, ever had, may have had, or may thereafter have from the 
inception of the [Trust] .. . up to the date this Agreement is executed. Such 
release is limited to claims that were asserted or that could have been 
asserted ... arising out of or related in any way to [the Trust]. 
(R. 80) ( emphasis added). Edwin agreed to release Frizzell from any claims "as of the 
date of execution of [the] Agreement." (R. 81). The Release explicitly does not include 
any claims arising from the performance of obligations under or the enforcement of the 
Agreement itself. (R. 81). 
Among the Agreement's "General Provisions" was an enforcement clause, which 
stated: "If any dispute between the Parties concerning this Agreement hereto results in 
litigation, the prevailing Party shall be reimbursed and indemnified by the Party not 
prevailing for all costs and expenses." (R. 82). The Agreement explicitly defined breach: 
Each party agrees to do all acts and sign any and all documents necessary to 
carry out the terms and provisions of this Agreement and acknowledges 
that any failure to do so will be considered a breach of this Agreement. 
6 
(R. 82) (emphasis added). All Parties executed the Agreement in October 2014. (R. 8). 
The Agreement did not terminate the Trust. (R. 74-93). 
After the parties executed the Agreement, Edwin petitioned the Court to adopt the 
Agreement pursuant to LC. § 15-8-304. (R. 95). 
Edwin provided Frizzell with an "accounting" of the net rental income for the 
properties to be transferred to Frizzell for the time period of October 1, 2014 through 
December 31, 2015. (R. 10). 5 The net rental income for that time period was $54,956, of 
which Edwin paid to himself $49,303 as "Trustee management fees." Id. Frizzell only 
received $6,123.28. Id. 
Edwin relinquished all management rights in the Selmar Property in August 2015. 
Id. On March 1, 2016, Edwin relinquished all management responsibilities in the 
Redondo Property to Frizzell. Id. On that same date, March 1, 2016, Edwin relinquished 
all management responsibility in the 39th Street Property to Frizzell. Id. 
On September 13, 2016, Frizzell received a Notice of Delinquency for unpaid 
property taxes incurred on the Brayton Property. (R. 11). A portion of the taxes listed on 
the Notice were reported as paid on the "accounting" provided by Edwin for November 
2015. (R. 11, 13 2 ). The Brayton Property was not an asset of the Trust as of October 6, 
5 A true and correct copy of the "accounting" is attached hereto as Appendix C. 
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2016. (R. 6, 11). An attempt to transfer the Brayton Property into the Trust via litigation 
in California failed. (R. 11 ). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the district court err in granting the De Youngs' motion to dismiss 
against Frizzell seeking enforcement of a TEDRA Agreement through the filing of a 
complaint and initiation of a new lawsuit? 
2. Did the district court err in ruling that the terms of the TEDRA Agreement 
barred Frizzell's action to enforce it? 
3. Is Frizzell entitled to his attorneys' fees m successfully bringing this 
action? 
ill. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
A district court's dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P 12(b)(6) shall be 
reviewed de novo. Coalition for Agriculture's Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142, 
369 P.3d 920, 923 (2016) (italics in original). The Court's standard of review for an order 
of the district court dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the 
summary judgment standard of review. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672-673, 
183 P.3d 758, 760-761 (2008); relying on Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 
P.3d 756, 758 (2005). 
8 
In addition, the Court "exercises free review over the issues of law decided by the 
district court to determine whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law." 
State v. Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 277, 311 P. 3d 286, 289 
(2013) ("Slane"). The interpretation of unambiguous contracts or statues is a question of 
law subject to free review by the Court. Idaho Wool Growers Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154 
Idaho 716, 302 P.3d 341,345 (2012). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANT IDAHO LAW REGARDING TRUST 
AND ESTATE DISPUTES (TEDRA) 
In Idaho, disputes arising from trust and estates are governed by the Trust and Estate 
Dispute Resolution Act ("TEDRA"), codified at LC. 15-8-101, et seq. LC.§ 15-8-101(1). 
The statute explicitly provides that its purpose is to "set forth generally applicable 
statutory provisions for the resolution of disputes and other matters involving trusts and 
estates." LC.§ 15-8-101(2). The chapter also provides judicial resolution of disputes, and 
clearly states that "the provisions of [TEDRA] shall not supersede, but shall supplement, 
any otherwise applicable provisions and procedures contained in title 15, Idaho Code, or 
other Idaho law." Id. 
TEDRA overtly acknowledges the "plenary power of the court," stating: "It is the 
intent of the legislature that the courts shall have full and ample power and authority 
9 
under this chapter to administer and settle ... all trusts and trust matters." I.C. § 15-8-
102(1 )(b ). Importantly, the statue makes clear that 
[I]fthis title 15, Idaho Code, should in any case or under any circumstances 
be inapplicable, insufficient or doubtful with reference to the administration 
and settlement of matters [ related to trusts and trust matters] ... the court 
nevertheless has full power and authority to proceed with such 
administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the court 
seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously 
administered and settled by the court. 
LC.§ 15-8-102(2). 
TEDRA provides that any "party" may have a judicial proceeding with relation to 
any case or controversy arising under the Idaho Code "under this chapter." LC. § 15-8-
201 (b ). The definition of party in the statutory scheme is broad, and it includes heirs and 
beneficiaries. LC. § 15-8-103(3)(d) & (e). Under LC. § 15-8-202, a judicial proceeding 
under TEDRA may be commenced as a new action or "as an action incidental to an 
existing judicial proceeding related to the same trust." All judicial proceedings under 
TEDRA are governed by the Idaho rules of civil procedure. LC.§ 15-8-203. 
TEDRA includes provisions for parties to enter into "binding nonjudicial" "written 
agreements among the parties." LC. § 15-8-301. The nonjudicial resolution process is a 
supplement to, not a derogation from, the provisions authorized by statute or common 
law. Id. If all parties agree to the nonjudicial resolution, it must be in writing and signed 
by all parties. I.C. § 15-8-302. Upon signing, it shall be binding and conclusive upon 
10 
those parties for the subject matter of the dispute. Id. Parties to such an agreement have 
the option to file the same with the court, but filing is not required. LC. § 15-8-303. Upon 
filing, the agreement is deemed approved by the court and is equivalent to a final order. 
Id. 
TEDRA is silent as to specific enforcement of a nonjudicial agreement should a 
party believe such agreement has been breached. LC. § 15-8-101, et seq. Nor is there 
direction regarding the enforcement of filed or unfiled TEDRA Agreements, both of 
which are binding on the parties. Id. No Idaho case has yet addressed that issue, so it is 
one of first impression for this Court. 
The Frizzell Trust's TEDRA Agreement arose from issues related to both the 
administration of the trust, as well as a desire to modify the terms of the trust to benefit 
certain heirs and beneficiaries. (R. 100-104). The TEDRA Agreement is silent as to 
required enforcement mechanisms, other than defining breach: "Each party agrees to do 
all acts and sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of 
this Agreement and acknowledges that any failure to do so will be considered a breach of 
this Agreement." (R. 107). In addition, disputes or enforcement actions shall result in 
reimbursement and indemnification by the prevailing party for all costs and reasonable 
expenses "including without limitation court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." (R. 
I 07). The TEDRA Agreement does not dictate or require additional "nonjudicial" 
11 
resolution attempts to seek enforcement, nor does it prescribe a specific means of 
enforcement for breach. (R. 106-107). The district court admitted that by entering into the 
TEDRA Agreement, Donald and the De Youngs agreed to "subject resolution of Trust 
disputes to the provisions of Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq." (R.163). Not just to a sole 
provision of the TEDRA statute, i.e. nonjudicial resolution. 
Frizzell, a party to the TEDRA Agreement (and the Trust), sought enforcement via 
a civil suit initiated in the First Judicial District in Kootenai County, by filing and serving 
a Complaint alleging various breaches of duties owed by Edwin under the Trust, the 
TEDRA Agreement, and relevant statutes. The De Youngs filed a successful Motion to 
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which the Court granted on January 20, 2017. (R. 158). For 
the reasons stated herein, the district court erred in granting that motion. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEYOUNGS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The district court granted the De Youngs' Motion to Dismiss based on the position 
that once Frizzell signed the TEDRA Agreement, he was bound to continue to "submit 
disputes related to the administration of the Trust to non-judicial dispute resolution" -not 
the filing of a Complaint. (R. 163, 172). The district court reached this conclusion by 
assuming facts, or lack thereof, about Frizzell's pre-suit conduct related to the TEDRA 
Agreement, stating "it is not clear what efforts, if any, were made to utilize non-judicial 
dispute resolution to resolve the issues that are now before the Court." (R. 163). The 
12 
district court assumed that Frizzell did not take steps to enforce the Agreement, viewing 
the allegations in a light that is not most favorable to the non-moving party. 
A court ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must treat all 
allegations in the complaint as true. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 278, 796 P.2d 
150, 155 (App. 1990). "After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of 
the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been 
stated." Losser, 145 Idaho at 672-673, 183 P.3d at 760-761; citing Coghlan v. Beta Theta 
Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). The issue for the Court is 
not whether the plaintiff "will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to 
offer evidence to support the claims."' Id.; quoting Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 
Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.2d 680, 682 (2004). 
A complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "does not need 
detailed factual allegations." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 
S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)6; criticized on other grounds, Starr v. BACA, 652 F. 3d 1202, 
1213 (9th Cir. 2011)7• To survive the motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
allegations, which accepted as true "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. 
at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the trial court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleg,ed conduct. Id. at 
6 Attached hereto as Appendix D. 
7 Attached hereto as Appendix E. 
13 
556. The standard is not one of "probability," but more than a sheer possibility of the 
defendant's liability. Id. "Every doubt must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor." Gardner 
v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609,611,533 P.2d 730, 731-732 (1975). 
Frizzell's complaint outlined the origins of the Frizzell Trust and the subsequent 
TEDRA Agreement. It included a number of exhibits, including the original Trust and the 
full Agreement. (R. 36 - 157). It described in detail a pattern of conduct by Edwin 
alleging breaches of not only the TEDRA Agreement entered, but also underlying laws 
related to trust administration. If all the allegations to the complaint were viewed as true, 
it is certainly plausible that Edwin is liable for the alleged conduct for which Frizzell, a 
party to a binding TEDRA Agreement, would be entitled to relief. 
1. The District Court arbitrarily limited the remedies available under the 
TEDRA Statute. 
The district court repeatedly stated in its Memorandum Decision that once Frizzell 
entered into the TEDRA Agreement, then he was bound to continue to seek nonjudicial 
remedies to handle disputes arising from the TEDRA Agreement or from the trust itself. 
(R. 163, 174). Rather than being permitted to seek a judicial remedy, the district court 
asserted that Frizzell "agreed to non-judicial dispute resolution" relating to the trust- not 
just at the time of the TEDRA Agreement, but at all times moving forward. (R. 172). 
Reluctantly, the district court contended that the TEDRA statute does "allow for parties 
to seek enforcement of the TEDRA agreement by petition," referencing both the entire 
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statutory scheme and specifically I. C. §§ 15-8-301-03. (R. 163). The district court held 
this up as the sole remedy available after continued nonjudicial efforts. (R. 174). The 
district court concluded that by filing a complaint to enforce the TEDRA Agreement, 
Frizzell "slept on his right to bring his claims" and "attempt[ ed] to circumnavigate the 
agreement and continue litigating issues related to [Edwin's] administration of the trust." 
(R. 173). 
Despite repeated vague references to the statutory scheme by the district court, 
none of the provisions in LC. §§ 15-8-301-03 identify any process by which a party can 
seek enforcement of a TEDRA Agreement. Nor are there any Idaho cases addressing the 
same. I.C. § 15-8-303 permits parties to petition the court to file the agreement with the 
effect that "the agreement will be deemed approved by the court and is equivalent to a 
final court order binding on all persons interest in the estate or trust." I.C. § 15-8-303(2). 
Filing the agreement with the Court is permissive- the language in the statute is "may" 
and not "shall." The TEDRA Agreement is binding on all parties upon signing, however, 
regardless of filing it with the district court. I.C. § 15-8-302. That provision does not 
discuss or direct petitioning the Court to enforce a TEDRA Agreement. Id. 
The TEDRA statute contains no such limitations on remedies to enforce TEDRA 
Agreements or any other matters related to the administration of trusts. I.C. § 15-8-101, et 
seq. Quite the contrary, the TEDRA statute provides multiple remedies to parties seeking 
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trust enforcement, including but not limited to filing a new lawsuit. I.C. § 15-8-202. The 
language of the statute is incredibly broad, and as the district court noted, "TEDRA goes 
so far to give courts 'full power and authority to proceed with such administration and 
settlement in any manner and way that to the court seems right and proper. '" (R.162), 
quoting I.C. § 15-8-102(2) (italics in original; emphasis added). 
Despite the breadth in the statute, the district court gave Frizzell two options -
continue to seek nonjudicial resolution of a failed nonjudicial resolution or "petition" the 
court. Frizzell did petition the court via a new lawsuit permitted by I.C. § 15-8-202, but 
the district court with all of its plenary power, deemed that option "burdensome" on the 
Court. (R. 164). The district court erred in giving Donald no option to enforce the 
directives of the TEDRA Agreement and underlying trust. 
2. The District Court should have permitted Frizzell to amend his 
complaint. 
Dismissing a complaint pursuant to a 12(b)(6) Motion is a severe remedy that 
should be sparingly applied. The district court was particularly harsh on Frizzell in 
bringing this complaint, calling it "burdensome," "unreasonable," "lacking foundation," 
and "brought and pursued frivolously" (R. 164, 175). The crux of this frivolity is the 
court's assumption that Frizzell did not seek to resolve matters through nonjudicial 
resolution prior to filing the complaint at issue. (R. 175). This repeated assumption is not 
in the complaint, and instead of drawing inference in favor of Frizzell as required in 
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ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court drew this inference in opposition to 
Frizzell. 
This Court has expressed a "preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the 
federal rules. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834, 
839 (2008). The Idaho rule 12(b)(6) and the federal rule 12(b)(6) are identical. I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6); F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Under analysis of the federal rule, a dismissal without leave 
to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint "could not be saved by 
amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009),8 criticized, but 
upheld by Sadid v. ISO, 837 F.Supp.2d 1168 (D.Idaho 2011). 9 The Ninth Circuit has 
consistently held that a district court should grant leave to amend "even if no request to 
amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 
be cured by allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern 
California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F .2d 242, 24 7 (9th Cir. 1990).10 
If the district court's major concern was the assumption that Frizzell did not seek a 
nonjudicial remedy to enforce the TEDRA Agreement, the district court should have 
assumed that he did. In fact, under the district court's plenary authority under the TEDRA 
8 Attached hereto as Appendix F. 
9 Attached hereto as Appendix G. 
1 O Attached hereto as Appendix H. 
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statute and common law, the district court could have and should have permitted Frizzell 
to amend his complaint to include factual allegations regarding the same. Instead, the 
district court viewed the missing facts in the case in a light favoring the De Youngs and 
dismissed the case entirely. The district court assumed that in the two years that passed 
between the TEDRA Agreement and the filing of the complaint, that no self-help 
communications occurred between the parties or their counsel. 
Frizzell did not have an affirmative obligation to plead every single fact to support 
his complaint. Frizzell did not have a duty to request an opportunity to amend the 
pleadings to add additional facts that would appease the district court's misplaced focus 
on a nonjudicial resolution of this matter. The district court had an obligation to draw all 
inferences in Frizzell's favor or to permit him to amend his complaint to cure any 
presumed deficiency in the complaint. 
The district court erred by not granting Frizzell leave to amend his complaint. 
3. The district court could have sought contempt against the DeYoung for 
breaches of the TEDRA Agreement. 
In its ruling, the district court repeatedly referenced the broad plenary authority 
granted courts under the TEDRA statute. (R. 162); I.C. § 15-8-102(2). The district court 
also referenced the ability of a party to "petition" the court to enforce a TEDRA 
Agreement, but did not point to a specific part of the statutory scheme that defines such 
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petition beyond petition a court for filing of a nonjudicial agreement pursuant to LC. § 
15-8-302; (R. 163). 
The district may have meant contempt proceedings, which are not explicitly 
defined in TEDRA. LC.§ 15-8-101, et seq. Because the issue of breach of a settlement 
agreement governed by Idaho's TEDRA is a case of first impression, a Washington State 
dispute arising under identical TEDRA provisions is instructive. See In re Guardianship 
of Wells, 150 Wash. App. 491, 208 P.3d 1126 (2009). 11 There, the appellate court ruled 
that a trial court's order issued in a guardianship proceeding governed by TEDRA could 
support a contempt order against a claimed interest holder in a subsequent proceeding. Id. 
at 494, 208 P.3d at 1128. In that matter, the interest holder in the guardianship estate had 
failed to abide by the settlement agreement directing payment to the ward's estate. Id. at 
495-496, 208 P.3d at 1129. The estate beneficiaries did not receive funds from the 
interest holder as ordered. Id. Accordingly the lower court sua sponte invoked its inherent 
powers to order contempt for breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at 497, 208 P.3d at 
1130. The appellate court upheld the lower court's invocation of its inherent powers and 
ruled that "[a] judge or commissioner of the supreme court, the court of appeals, or the 
superior court, a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction, and a commissioner of a court of 
11 Attached hereto as Appendix I. 
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limited jurisdiction may impose a sanction for contempt of court under this chapter 
(RCW 7.21.020]." Id. at 501, fn. 17,208 P.3d at 1131-1132. 
Contempt in Idaho is either of a civil or criminal nature and can arise from different 
authorities. Idaho Code § 7-601, et seq., provides statutory authority, addressing certain 
acts or omissions which rise to the level of contempt of court. This includes 
"[ d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the Court." § 7-601 ,rs. The 
statute fails to embrace the separate judicial contempt power which arises from the Idaho 
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2. Further, contempt in Idaho can also arise from the 
common law. Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 566, 671 P .2d 473, 479 (1983). TEDRA 
explicitly states that "the provisions of [TEDRA] shall not supersede, but shall 
supplement, any otherwise applicable provisions and procedures contained in title 15, 
Idaho Code, or other Idaho law." I.C. § 15-8-101(2) 
The district court failed to address the obvious inchoate issue which, is whether a 
party to a TEDRA Agreement can be summarily denied his right to enforce the 
provisions of the TEDRA Agreement without first being extended further resolution 
recourse. Effectively, the Order served as ratification of Edwin's breach of his fiduciary 
and contractual duties. The district court ad full plenary authority under TEDRA, statute, 
and common law to enforce the TEDRA Agreement using its contempt powers, it if 
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believed such "petition" was required. Instead, the district court rejected Frizzell's 
attempt to enforce the TEDRA Agreement in its entirety. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TEDRA 
AGREEMENT BARRED FRIZZELL'S COMPLAINT. 
This district court ruled that the TEDRA Agreement barred Frizzell from seeking 
judicial enforcement of the trust. (R. 164). Inexplicably, this district court took that bar to 
include Frizzell's attempt to enforce the provisions of the TEDRA Agreement itself. (R. 
164 ). In a confusing position, the district court commented, "It makes little sense to enter 
into an agreement to resolve matters related to the administration of a trust through a 
prescribed course of conduct, only to argue that the agreement does not apply to matters 
that originate after the agreement was signed." (R. 64). What makes little sense is barring 
a party from enforcing an agreement when the other party to the agreement intentionally 
fails to follow through with that "prescribed course of conduct." Frizzell did not file a 
lawsuit to revisit actions occurring prior to execution of the TEDRA Agreement. He filed 
suit to address actions following the execution of the TEDRA Agreement; specifically, 
actions dictated by the TEDRA Agreement itself. 
1. The district court inferred contractual intent unsupported by the 
express language of TEDRA Agreement. 
The district court correctly noted that "[t]he parties executed the TEDRA 
agreement to resolve certain issues between the parties that had arisen prior to the 
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execution of the TEDRA agreement, modify the trust, and subject resolution of Trust 
disputes to the provisions of Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq." (R. 163). Despite that, the 
district court incorrectly ruled that "[t]he TEDRA Agreement serves as a bar to 
[Frizzell's] claims in the present case." (R. 164). 
This Court "exercises free review over the issues of law decided by the district 
court to determine whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law." Slane, 155 
Idaho at 277, 311 P. 3d at 289. The interpretation of unambiguous contracts or statues is a 
question of law subject to free review by the Court. Idaho Wool Growers Ass 'n, Inc., 154 
Idaho at 716, 302 P.3d at 345. A TEDRA Agreement is merely a settlement contract, 
which a court must construe by "considering all parts in light of the entire instrument." 
Salfeety v. Seidman (In re Estate of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817,827,907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995); 
Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 672, 249 P.3d 857, 865 (2011) (a settlement 
agreement "stands on the same footing as any other contract and is governed by the same 
rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally"). 
Contractual intent is inferred by "viewing the document in its entirety." Bondy v. 
Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). A contract is ambiguous if it is 
"reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Bondy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 
1326. A contract must be construed from the plain meaning of the contract's own words." 
McCallum v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 166, 349 P.2d 986, 990 
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(1960). The Court should construe the agreement "so as to give force and effect to every 
part of the agreement." Palomo v. JR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 314, 317, 955 P.2d 1093, 
1096 (1998). 
Frizzell and the De Youngs agree that paragraph nine of the TEDRA Agreement is 
dispositive of the issue. (R. 169). The paragraph explicitly states that the beneficiaries to 
the Trust will release Edwin and hold him harmless 
[F]rom any and all actual or potential claims or causes of action, of 
whatsoever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, accrued or yet to 
arise or accrue, including by not limited to any claims of negligence or 
breach of fiduciary duty or breach of contract, which relate to or arise out of 
any act, omission or conduct of [Edwin] in his capacity as Truste that the 
Releasors now have, ever had, may have had, or may there after have from 
the inception of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust and 
the OTIP Trust up to the date this Agreement is executed. Such release 
is limited to claims that were asserted or could have been asserted ... 
(R. 80) (emphasis added). The express release not only includes a temporal limitation "up 
to the date this Agreement is executed," but also a limitation on claims "that were 
asserted or could have been asserted." Id. "Were asserted" and "could have been 
asserted," in their plain meaning, are events occurring in the past or that could have 
occurred in the past. Reading this limitation is consistent with the inclusion of an express 
end date for the release "up to the date the Agreement is executed." 
The same end date for release is applied to Edwin's release of claims against 
Frizzell contained in the same paragraph. (R. 80-81). Specifically, Edwin agreed to 
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"release and hold [Frizzell] harmless from any and all claims that [Edwin] brought or 
could have brought in the litigation .... and any and all claims [Edwin] has against 
[Frizzell] related to the Family Trust. . . as of the date of execution of this Agreement." 
(R. 80-81) ( emphasis added). 
The TEDRA Agreement also includes a precise definition of breach of the 
agreement as "failure" to "do all acts and sign any and all documents necessary to carry 
out the terms and provisions of this Agreement." (R. 82). Ironically, the word "breach" is 
directly above Edwin's signature on the TEDRA Agreement (R. 82). Immediately 
preceding the breach paragraph, the TEDRA agreement includes enforcement language 
for "any dispute arising between or among the Parties" that results in "litigation." (R. 81). 
The prevailing party to such a dispute is entitled to costs, expenses, and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. (R. 81-82). The inclusion of the word "litigation" cannot be rendered 
meaningless by a ruling precluding litigation. 
And yet, the district court chose to render the temporal limitation of the release 
and deem the TEDRA Agreement a carte blanche approval of any action that Edwin 
wished to take as the Trustee, including breaches of fiduciary duties after the date of 
execution of the TEDRA Agreement and breach of the TEDRA Agreement itself. (R. 
175). The district court held that the temporal language was "not dispositive" and 
completely ignored the enforcement provision and breach language. (R. 170). The district 
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court correctly noted that Edwin's failure to administer the Trust based on the express 
provisions of the TEDRA Agreement as the basis for Frizzell' s claim, but then held that 
the TEDRA Agreement itself bars enforcement of the terms of the Agreement. (R. 175) 
("The TEDRA Agreement at issue released [Edwin] from all liability in the 
administration of the Trust.") 
The district court's view of TEDRA Agreements certainly is not "burdensome" on 
courts- because once a TEDRA Agreement is executed, a party can never enforce its 
terms. The TEDRA Agreement signed by Frizzell would be entirely meaningless if this 
were true, and Frizzell would have no recourse for Edwin's failure to properly transfer 
real and personal property as dictated by the express terms of the TEDRA Agreement. 
The district court's interpretation of the TEDRA Agreement effectively "whites out" the 
enforcement and breach clauses that immediately precede the parties' signatures, as if 
they were never included. (R. 82). 
The district court erred in ruling that the TEDRA Agreement barred Frizzell's 
action to enforce the TEDRA Agreement. 
2. If the TEDRA Agreement's release did prohibit enforcement, it would 
be void as against public policy. 
The district court asserted that the TEDRA Agreement waived Frizzell's right to 
ever seek enforcement of the TEDRA Agreement or the underlying Trust that it modified. 
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Were that to be true, that provision of the TEDRA Agreement would be void as against 
public policy. 
Idaho, and the majority of jurisdiction, permit parties to a contract to release 
themselves form "certain duties and liabilities subject to certain limitations." Anderson & 
Nafziger v. G.T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979). 
Reviewing courts disfavor such waivers and will construe such provisions against the 
party relying on them. Id. 
Idaho Code §29-110 provides that "every stipulation or condition in a contract, by 
which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho 
tribunals .. .is void as it is against the public policy of Idaho." Idaho amended the TEDRA 
statute in 2009 to permit parties to seek non-judicial, binding resolutions pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 15-8-302. However, a contract that is void cannot be binding on the parties 
regardless of the parties' compliance with I.C. §15-8-302. 
While a party may bargain for exemption from liability for negligence, a bargain 
for exemption from liability for the consequences of a willful breach of duty is illegal. 
Rawlings v. Layne Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 500, 465 P.2d 107, 111 (1970); 
Restatement of Contracts §§574 & 575. Whether a contract violates public policy is a 
question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each 
case. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 
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(2005). Idaho courts have regularly found that all-encompassing exculpatory clauses are 
too broad and unenforceable. Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 77, 233 P.3d 1, 8 (2008). 
At first read, the "indemnification" provisions of the TEDRA Agreement appear to 
be just that. The Idaho Supreme Court has identified the prima facie elements of 
indemnity as: (1) an indemnity relationship; (2) actual liability of an indemnitee to a third 
party; and (3) a reasonable settlement amount. R. W Beck and Assocs., Inc. v. Job Line 
Constr., Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 95, 831 P.2d 560, 563 (1992). The obligation to indemnify is 
to be strictly construed, and the status of the indemnitee is interpreted narrowly. Id. at 96, 
831 P.2d at 564. The indemnification clause in the Frizzell Trust purports to have both 
first party and third-party indemnification. The lack of a third-party relationship between 
Frizzell and De Young makes the indemnification provision unenforceable as to Frizzell's 
claims against Edwin. 
The indemnification provision is clearly an exculpatory clause encompassing such 
affirmative duties as the Trustee's breach of his fiduciary duties to the Trust. An 
indemnity provision requires one party to compensate another party for losses that may 
occur as the result of a suit from a third-party- it does not function to relieve blame or 
liability arising out of another party's wrongdoing. The latter is an exculpatory clause, 
which includes all of Edwin's conduct in his capacity as Trustee. This clause seeks to 
exclude not only negligent acts, or those acts which do not inure liability under the trust 
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code, but also breaches of fiduciary duty. If the district court's position is accepted, then 
even Edwin's intentional breaches of the TEDRA Agreement would be free from 
liability. Such an interpretation would make binding agreements under TEDRA the get 
out of jail free card for whatever breaches a Trustee makes in his or her fiduciary role. 
If the indemnification or exculpatory clause is construed against Edwin, the clause 
1s unenforceable to the extent it absolves liability for acts other than the trustee's 
negligence or those that accrued or could have accrued prior to the execution of the 
TEDRA Agreement. A TEDRA Agreement cannot make enforcement of itself 
unenforceable, as would happen if the district court's ruling is upheld. 
D. FRIZZELL IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS' FEES IN 
SUCCESSFULLY BRINGING THIS APPEAL. 
The district court granted the De Youngs an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-201, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) & (e), and Idaho Code§ 15-8-208. (R. 204-205). 
The district court erred in granting both the motion to dismiss and the attorneys' fees 
request. 
This Court has held that parties bringing a cause of action under the TEDRA 
statute are entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8-208. Quemada v. 
Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 288 P.3d 826 (2009). Not only are Frizzell's claims routed in 
enforcement of a TEDRA Agreement (under the TEDRA statute), but the TEDRA 
28 
Agreement itself provides for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any 
enforcement action. LC.§ 15-8-301; (R. 81-82); I.A.R. 41. 
Frizzell is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees in successfully bringing this 
appeal of the district court's ruling. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court, when given the broad powers under the TEDRA statute, 
declined to exercise even the narrowest powers to enforce a contract-any contract-
when presented with factual allegations, if accepted as true- would infer a breach of that 
contract. With a narrow view of a broad statute and a broad view of a narrow release, the 
district court dismissed Frizzell's case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted and ordered Frizzell to pay attorneys' fees and costs to the breaching party. The 
district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss, and this Court must reverse the 
district court's decision and remand this matter for further proceedings below. In 
reversing the decision, this Court should also grant Frizzell his reasonable attorneys' fees 
in conjunction with this appeal. 
DATED this /#1 ay of July, 2017. 
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9 Attor-ney for Defendcmt Edw;n De Youni, Trustee 
of the Clifton qnd Marjorie Frizzell Family Trus1 
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IN THE· DT:STRICT COURT OF THE 'FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FO~ THE COUNTY OF KOOtBNAI 
DONALD CRAIG =FR.IZZELL, 
13 
P:I aintiff. 
rs v. 
NONJUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
AGREEMENT 
'16 EDWLN DEYOUNG, Tttt$te~ of the Clifton 
:1 7 :and Marjorie Frizzell F.amily Trust of June 
S:0;.2009, 
(1.C. § 15-8~302) 
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Defendant. 
20 I . Parties. The Pa1ties to this Noajuclic:ial Dispute ResQiut.i,0:0 A:gre.ement 
(the ''Agreement") are EDWIN J. DEYOUNG (he11ei:nafter "ED") as Trustee oHhe CLIFTON 
AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMfLY !RUST U/A 06/30/09 (he:reinaftet the '"Family 
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· .T.r.us.t11).; ED as Tnist.ee of the SURVIVOR'·S TRUST of the CLIFTON ANO MARlOlUE 
·21 
FRIZZELL FAMiLY TRUST U/A 06/30/09 (het!ei:nafter the "S·urvi'Vot\~ Tmst'1}; l3D ·as 
?4: 
- . Trustee of the BY-PASS TRUST of the CtIFTON AND MARJORlB FRIZZELL FAMILY 
~ TRUST ULA 061301@9 (heYeinafter the ttBypas-s Trust")i .ED as Trustee of the· QTIP '.tRUST :of 
Z.6.• · theCLLFTON AND MARJORlE FR1ZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/A Q~/)(}/09 (l.1-ereinafterthe 
27- 11 Q'.1"JP Trust11); DARLENE D. (FELTY) DEYOUNG (he1'einafter "DARLENE"), a ve,st¢.d 
·· . 
. Z8 · r!,}rrtah:rderman beneficiary and virtual reptesentative of her issue of the S:uwsivor's Trust). 
~;Y.PMS Tr:ust and QTIP Trust; DONALD C. FRIZZELL (hereinafter ''DON") a v.estoo . 
. NPNJOOlCIAL DJSPUTE .RESQL.UTION - Page .1 
: cil-l 0111$6.000 
Donald Craig Frizzell, eta! vs Edwin DeYoung, eta! Docket No. 44975 99 of 212 
.l 5,6 DON and DARLENE'S r.esp.eotive <,ounsel shaH prepare the de.eds t0 
2 ·co)1vey the real property assets to be distributed to DARLENE and DON pursuant to See.tions 
3 5.2 and 5.3 above. DON and DARLENE shall each pay the fees and other c;osts associaterl 
4 
5 
6 
7 
.8 
9 
11 
12 
15 
with 11ecording the respective deeds and any other Fe<quired documents te distribute the r\!31 
property assets to DARLENE and DON pursuant to Se.ctions 5.2 and 5.3 ab0fe. 
5.7 ED s:hall he responsible fot pr-eparation of the trust tax rep0r.ting due 
September 30, 2014 and th~ preparation fee shatl be paid by DARLENE. 
5.8 This Agreement reflects the ft)ll agreement of the Parties- and mayn~ be 
m©i:ii.fied unless done in writing signeq by all the Parties. In all other respects1 the family 
!rust, the Survivst"'s Trust, the Bypass Trust and the QTIP Trust of the CLIFTON and 
MARJORIE FRJZZEt.L FAMILY TRUSTU/A 06/30/09 are hereby ratified andconfimv:d, 
6. Donald C. Fri1.zell's Indemnification of :Kdwin J. De Young. t:>dN, on·h~h~lf 
of hims~Lf and as custodian for CRAIG J. FRIZZELL and DEAN J. FRIZZELL agrees to 
i114emnify, defend and hold ED harmless ag~inst any clain1s, lawsuits or pthe-r actions, 
including all costs and attorney foes incurred in defonse of such claims, lawsuits or other 
actiQns, advanced against ED by DON or DONS children or heirs relating to EI)'S 
16 administration of the Family Trust, Survivor!s Trust, Bypass Trnst and QTLP Trust.; 
l7 
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7. F!Ung of and Binding Nature of Agreement. The Parties agre~ Jhat this 
A.gr~em~n'l: may he file'd with the Kooterlai County Disttict Court a$ provided by I.C. § 15~8~ 
303 py MY Party to the Agreement. All Parties to this Agreenient understand and 
19; 
2('l 
21 
acknowl-e<:lge that if this Agreement is filed With the co:urt then its terms wHJ b.eGome. finaiand 
bindfog and the equivalent of a fh1al court oid'e.r hin.ding on all 0-f the Parties who have :.ii.gn~d 
the same pursuant to LC. § 15-8-303; Furthermore, this Agreement shall be bipdjng tlpon 1:µ1d 
inure to the benefit of the Pm-ties; th~ir heitf$;, a,s&lgns; ~ue.cessors in .intere;;t, .and any otl::ier.s that 
may claim through them, and shall have the et'fect .0f a final court ol'der pursuant to LC. c§ l5A~-
30_3. However, even if none of the Partte:s dec.i<de to fifo the Agreement, the Agreement shall 
be ·effective· immediately upon its execution by a.Jl the Parties and shall rernaLn· h1 :effect 
26 notwithstanding that i.t has not been :filed with any court. Furthe1~more, the B.eneJ:i~i:f,~ries 
27 . spriiflcally ·agree that this Agreement shall ~e fuHr blading up0.n them even jf it may he 
, ,, 
18 · d{}:tern.:tined l:aterthat this Agreement is not an Agreement under I.C. § 15-8-.303 and/i:>r that.any 
11e.ces.sary Party for such an Agreement was o·mitted or not virtually r.epres~nted . 
. NONJUbl:C:lA-L D1SPUT.E RESOLUTION -.P·age.6 
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8. Beneficiary Reuresentation. This document was prepar1$d by M. GREOdRY 
EMBREY of the firm of Witherspoon Kel.l~y at the request of ED.. By executing l.bfa 
Agreem~nt, as shown by their respectt\Je signatures, the Parties hereto cio hereby acknowledge 
~eipt of a copy of this entire Agreement, state that the. provisions contarned herein ba:v-e been 
read by ihem in thefr entirety, and ackra<:rwl~dge that they understand the sam~ qnd th1'.t said 
Agreemei:tt and each of its provision& h~ve by them been fully and entirely ap-cepte.d. 
IN ADDITION EACH. BENEFICIARY ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES 
THAT BEFORE EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT HE OR SHE HAS HAD THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT W.ITll H1S Otl HER OWN ATTORNEY. 
9.. Release and Hold Harndess. The Bitne:ffoiarie~ on behalf ofthemsetves, thett 
heirs an9, s1;1coe~sors-rn-iuterest (including unborn and unaseer:tained descendants), .~ir agents 
and assigns (hereinafter collectively refotted. to in this Section as the "Releasorst'j rele€!;.se; 
discharge, and indemnify ED, and ED1S heirs, sticcessors-in-interest, agents. and e§iigns. 
(hereinafter oollective}y referred to in this paragraph as the "Releasees"), frort1 ruzy and all 
actual or potential clai1ns or causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature, whether-at taw or· 
in ;equity, whether known or unknown, acct11ed or yet to arise or acctue,i iI1cludiag but ruit 
· limite.d to. 1;my cl&ims of ne.gtigenee or breach. of :fidqciary duty or breach of contrract, whioh 
relate to or arise out of any act, omission or conduct of ED in his. capacity as Tnµitee that the 
Rel.easers now have,. ever bad, may ha.ve had,- or may thereafter have frm.11 th~ inc~p;tion-;p,f the 
FamHy Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust an.d the QTIP Trust tip to the da,t!;) tllis Agreement 
i.s ~x.eQ.ut~o. Such r~hmse is limited to claims tha;t were asserted or that cotild have ocet1 
as$erted by the Releasors a.gainst the R.eleasees aris5ng out of or related in arty way to the 
administration of the Family Trust, Sw·vivor's Trust, Bypass Tmst and the QTJP Trusti the 
the QTIP Trust, and aU liability relating to the Family Trust, Stirvi,vor's Trust; .I3ypa.si Trt1s.t 
; aI'id the: QTIP Trust mat might afrse between th~ Releasqrs and the Releas~~;s now ot il'l th~ 
~\l;tui:e, 
Additiona.Jly •. by this Agreement ED agre·es to releas.e and hold DON hamnl:ess:.:tfuowi·.any 
and alt elm.ms that ED br.augbt o.r could .have brought in the Httg.atio11 captioned ,as Donald 
Craig Frizzell v. Edwin De. Young, Trustee of the C1ifton and Marjorie fai~ell :F1llITily -ot J'ulle: 
30, 2.009, Ko0ter.1.ai Cou.n:ty Case Nwiiber cv.:2013.39:(l8 and any ijtrd all ¢lah11s .Eb has: . 
N9.NHJ9JCML DJS.PUTS RESOLUTION -- Page 7 
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r 
against DON -relating to th.e Fam.Uy Trust; Survivoris Trust, B·.ypass Trust l:tnd QTIP Trust as.of 
2 · the date of execution of this Agreement. 
3 10. Virtual Representation. All Parties to thi:s Agreement aolmowledg~ that each 
4 
5 
8 
l'O 
Beneficiary is signing on behalf of the entire class of per-sl\ms who woiild lake tey, or th.rough 
them if Chey were t-o predecease the Beneficiary and that each Beneficiary has, lli,e power·to 
~ind th.eir respective descendants under the com.mun law doctri'ne of virtual r~presentatlo:r.i. .am:l 
pqt~uant to Idaho Code § 15-8-205, E.acb. Sli.Ch Beneficiary acknowledges and affinns that he 
or she is unaware of aoy actual o:r threatenerl .conflict of interest between.. the named 
Benefi.ciaties and the persons whom they virtually represent. 
11. General Provisions. The terms, provisions, und conditions. of thi~ Ag:i:-eemept 
shall be binding u,pon, and inure to the benefit of e.ach of the Parties hereto and b.iS;, her or its 
n respective legal represeJ:1t~tives, heirs, successors and assigns. 
n. a. This Agreen'l.ent sha11 be c0nstrued in acoordanee with and :governed by 
13 'the laws of the State of Idaho. 
14 b. The captions and headings of various SeGtions of this Agreemeut are for 
15 convel)ience only, apd are not to be coMidered as defining or limiting in nny way the -scepe or 
'1nt"'nt of the. p· r.ovisio.ns hereof. rn ... 
J7 
1:8 
19· 
c. To expedite the exec.ution of this Agreement, this Agreement may· b~ 
e~eimted thrtnrgh the use of multiple or#ginal c;oun~erp~rts. The signature on one,J~t mote~ but 
less than all, of the. original counterparts shal.t be: suffici-ent to oincl a Party to thtsAgi'eement~ 
'and the Parties :a_gree that copies of the original signature pug.es from eaGh original e.ounter.part 
'20 
, ma.y be attacb~d to the other ot-iginaJ counterparts so that each of the original co.unt.erpa:rts will 
21 have signature pages bearing either original sigpatutes or a Gopy of original signatures for all@f 
22 
. the Parties. 
23 d. A signed copy of this Agreement may be transmitt~d by facsimil¢' i;ttid 
2:4 $hall ·be cfoemed" an executed original of this Agre1;1nent for a.11 purposes h.ereo-t: and the P.ru.:ty 
is so: providing such signed copy shall, thereafter, promptly deliver t0 the other Party actual 
26: od.ginal oopies, of this Agre.ement or such other document. 
27 e. If any -dispute be.tween m a:m01_1g the Parties concerning this ,Agreem~nt 
.PR . her.eto r-esults in litigation, the prevailing Pai.:ty shalJ be reimbursed and inden1nifr~cl by the 
F!:frty· a:ot prevailing for all costs and expenses· tea:sonably incurred by th.e prevailing Party in 
NONJUDJClAL DISPUTE RES0LUT10N ~ Page'.8 
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r 
enfotdng or .e-stabli&'hing his or her rights hereunder, u1cluding without lim1E&tion, court costs 
1 2 and<r:easonable attorney~' fees. 
I ' 
:--. 
J [ Each Ptirty agrees to do all .c~cts and 8-ign any ~d all docmnents 
.4 i~oe*sary ·to car.cy 0_ut the tea'ns antl pra:visiep.s, of l'his Agteement aiia, aekfiowte4g.es thaf$y 
s fa.Htwe t~ de so wi f J be cons:kl.er.ed a b1·each of this Agreement. 
6-
7 EDWIN J. D~ OUNG;~~ ~J~
8 F.amtly Tru~ Survivor, s Trust. Bypass 
Trust and the QTTP Ttust 
g 
10 
t 1 .DONALD C. FRIZZELL, 
; ::vi.1'&ted R¢n1ainderrri'an· Beneficiary S1.J.d 
12, Vir.tuaLRepresenta.tive of his: lssµe of'the 
F~mily Trustf Survivqr's TrU$t·; Bypt\ss Tnist 
11 :and :QTIP Trust 
14 
l·.$ 
J'l .. 
•, .luu) /1, 
DAlltENE Q. (FEL tY) DEYO~G, 
Vested Remainderm~n Sene.tici&'Y and 
2:i · Virtual Repi;esentative of her is,~ue 0f 
:24 
the Family Trust, Survivor's T11.1st; Bypass 
Trust and QTIP Trust 
15. ; J"'.>ON_ALD C. FRizZELL as custodian 
· ror CRAIG l FRIZfl£LLi under the 
26 · California Vnifom1 Transfers to Minors 
.Aet. Specifre Di~trlbutee of the Survivor's 
2-r · Trust 
28 
NQNJUP1GJAL D}-SPVTE .&ESOLUTION - Page~ 
C(ifQ7~SIS;OO¢ 
Date of Signature: 10/ ·w f 1.#JLY 
l l 
Date of Sign~tµre:. ________ _ 
Date 0f Signature: I.of :io_b~ 
ID !.:2 u __ / J LJ Date of Signature: _ __,_l-..i._.:...J..r........._ 
Date of Signa:ture;. ___ --'------
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2 
3 
4 
5 
DONALD C. FRIZZELL as custodian for 
DEAN J. FRlZZELL, under the California 
Dnif 6nn Transfers to Minors Act, Specific 
Distrlbutee of the Survivor's Trust 
6 . HALEY (WARR) BAKER) Specific 
· Distributee of the Survivor's Trust 
1 
B 
9. 
1.0 
l l 
12 STATEOFIDAHO 
13 County of Kootenai 
stributee 
) 
) ss. 
) 
Date ofSignatute: _____ _ 
Date of Signature: _______ _ 
Date of Signature: \0-4>\:% 
14 
On this ,,l/J!!:__ day of {dtdokr , 2014, before me~ the 
f5 undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, person.atty ap.peared EDWJN J. 
ngYQIJNG, known or identified to me to be the person who name is s~bscribed to the. wi.tA.itl 
16 instmment as Trustee of the Family Trust, the Survivor's Trust, the Bypass Trost and the QTIP· 
17 Trust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/A 06/30/09, and 
Mkf1t.1wledged to me that he executed the same as Trustee. 
19 
10 
21 
22 
23 
24 
27 
18 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have heI!@.Unto set my hand Md sea:1 the day and year in 
this· certificate first above written. 
NQNJUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION- Page 10 
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~u- .. 
Notary PubHc in and for the State of ldl\ho 
Residing at: UJJud_~ Jd.411a _ 
Comm. Exp.: Ji/~ 
I 
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,· 
· S1'ATEOFCALIFORNIA ) 
2 ) ss. Co.1.U1fy of ) 
On the ___ day of 1 20·14, before m~, tft~ 
·
4 
·Hndersignecl Notary Public, personally appeared DONALD C. FIUZZ.BI,;:L, -a Y.est~d 
,5 · Rernai:nd(trman Bene:flciary and Virtual Representative of his issne of tire Fa:n1ily Trost, flle . 
. S~tvivofs Trust, the Bypass Trust and the QTlP Trust of the CLIFTON AND .MARJORIE 
6. ]{RlttELL FAMILY TRUST U/A 06/30/09,.known or-identified oo me tobJ:th-ep~nwb."1se 
· '.name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me tht1t he. e*eeuted the 
... 
I. $ill'll~. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, r have hereunto s~t my hand and seal the day and year in 
9 · tthkcertificate :first above written. · · 
8 
10 
11 ' 
12: • 
14 
15 
:Co\:mty of Kootenai 
) 
) ss. 
) 
·----·--------Notary P1.1blic in and for the State of 
California 
Residing at: --------"------
Comm. Exp-.=--~-----
. . On the 21),µ.. day of t2c.trJ6'er: . , 20l4i before me, the 
JG µn.d~r~ign~d Notacy Public, p·e:r,sonaHy appeared DARLENE D, (FEL'fY) DBYOUNO as 
PT :c.tistgdim1 fw DARRYL DEYOUNG under the Idaho Uniform Transfots, to M.lnors-Act, a 
. s¢cifie :distrftjutee of the S.urvi vor' s Trust of tne CLIFTON AND MA.FU(?Rl.B. F.RI~ZBL'L 
;ls · FAMILY TRUST U/ A 06130/09, known 01, identHled to me to be the pe.i;sqit wbo~ ,Q~e is. 
·sabscr.ibed to-tli.e Within instrument, .and acknowhidgeG to .me that s-fle executed the: same,. · · Hl 
20 • IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereitnto set my hand and seal the dSIY and year in . 
.tl#s certificate first above written. 
·21 
rkh1&14~ 
Notary Public in and for- the State ofidaho 
Residing at: ~, /ekl,. 
Comm. Exp.: . .· . 
Tl> 
l ~Q~JJi9JCJ~ DISPUTE RES.OLtJTli:;)N - Pilge l I 
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2 
j 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Ii 
14 
STATEOFIDAHO 
County ofKo.otenai 
) 
) ss. 
) 
On the tlJ+':'_ day of Ocm~ , 2014~ !Jefore me, the 
undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared DARLENE D. (FELTY) DEYOUNG, a 
Vested Rema.inderman Beneficiary and Virtual Representative of her issue of the Family Trust, 
the Survivor's Trust, the Bypass Trust and the QTTP Trust of th~ CLIFTON AND M,.i\RJOJUE 
FRIZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/ A 06/30/09, knoV1n or identi.fied to me to be th~ person WhQse 
. nrune is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she execut~d the 
same. 
reunto set my hand and seal the day and year in 
this certificate first above 
f1ch1ndlt m~ 
Notary Public )n and tor the State 9fldaho 
Residing at: {g_~-4.. =~~ L~ 
Comm. Exp.;-----¥-"""-"""~"""· "'""~=·e-..· _____ _ 
County of ____ _ 
ts On the day of ___ , 2014, before m~, the 
: .und~ji,:ned .No.tary Public, personaJl.y appeared DONALD C. FRIZZELL as etlst0dian for 16:, ~ CRAI§J J. FRIZZELL under the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, a specific 
17 qistributee of .the Survivor's Ttust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORfE FRIZZELL FAMlL Y 
'J'RU.ST U/A 06/30/09, known or identified t0 me to be the person whose narn~ is subscribed te 
I& the withininstrilmetit, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
!9 
10 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
IN W!TNESS WHEREOF, J have hereunto set 111y hand and seal the day and year in 
this certificate first above written. 
N,O'tfJY.D!CIAL DiS.PUTE RESOLUTION - Page 12 
CO I ()J.35~. 000 
Notary Public in a111<l for the ·State. of 
California 
Residing at---------
Conun .. Exp.:---------
' 
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r-[ i. 
:STATE O.F CALIFORNIA 
2 
·CO.Unty of ____ _ 
) 
) ss. 
) 
On the day of , 2014, b¢fere m.e, tile 
4 . ~de.rs.igned Notary Pub1ic, p.ersonally appe.ared DONALD C. FRIZZELL as: custodian for 
-s: D.EAN J. FRIZZELL under the California Unifonn Transfers to Minors AGtr a specific 
di$tpbute.e of the Survivor>s Trust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRWmL FAM1L Y 
ii TRUST U/ A 06/30/09, kaown or identified to m.e tQ be the person whose (la{ll~ is ~bscd~li;, 
the within.instrumentt artd aek.nowledged to· me that he executed the same. 
7 
.8' IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have h~r-eunta i{et my hand and seal the: day an.tt year in 
this certificate flrst;above written. · 
9. 
ib 
n 
1:$: 
Notary P"Ublic i:n and fo:r the State of 
Calif~mia 
Jle·~iding at: ---------
Comm. Exp.:---------'-
·ot, . STATE OF ) 
) ss-. 
15· :county of_____ ) 
1'6. 
11· 
18 
19-
20 
·z:1 
21 
23 
ill-
25 
2:6 
27 
2"8 
On, the clay o.f • 2.Q14, before me, the 
1.mderstg11ed Notary P\t.blic) personally ap~a1:.~,d HALEY (WARR) BAU:R, a specific 
distributee ,of the Surviv.or's Trust of the CLlFTQN AND MARJORIE FRIZZHLL FAM!L:Y 
TRUST U/A 06/3-0/0~1 knewn or identified to me to 'Be thtt, perse:n whes~ na.m~·:$. £1:fb~cribe.dcJ,t} 
.the within instrument., an:d acknowledged: to m1 that she executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hexeimto -set 111,y hand aµd seal the <;lay and.year in 
thLs-,.certiifoate :tlrst above written. 
, N91'lJt1,D~CU,L- D'tSiPUTE R;'ESOL:UT.(ON - Page. ·13 
C.OH>7S56,00C 
Notary Public in and for the Star~, 
of! 
Residing at: --------------
Comm. Exp .. :~-------------
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ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
2 ) ss . 
. County of Ko0tenai ) 
3 . 5+ 
On the J. / day of {X)b)J;>lf , 2014, before m~, th~ 
4 unclers\gned Notary Public, personally appeared TYLER DEYOUNG, a specme dist-riWt~e of 
.. the Survivor's Trnst of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAM1L Y TRUST lJ!A 
:i ('}6/3'0/09, ki1own or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the Within 
6 instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
7 
8 
ro 
Ii 
14 
IS 
17 
18 
19 
2-0. 
rt 
24 
21 
28 
LN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my !land and seal the day and 
~his c~11ifiGate first above ;.:vritten. 
l1111iL yt{. t~ 
.in 
NICHOLE M. CANSINO 
NOTARY PUBUC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Not?r~' Publl1b1 and for the State of Id.aho 
Res1d1ngat: ~-
~ONJt,JD,tCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTlON - Page· 14 
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L, 
\ , 
i 
~~l~ -...PJOiJNO, 
liurvlv.or'1 
QllP TnJlt 
8onoffciaey 
ftoprMonta1ivo of hi• of the 
1. t, hmHy Trns&. Survivor•• Trust, Bypu, 
r" Ind QTiP Trust 
PARU!Ne o. (Pm.TY) DHY' 
~U.tndhm for DARRY:L DEYO 0, 
th• J:~ah~ Urdform 'f ram,·ler1 to Mlnon Aet. 
it**'c Qhnntnuoo of th~ turviv.:M'1. Trust 
.D·· Pl ,UC · · ZZ. .. as custodian 
ft1r CRAl<l J. · lZZEl.L. und.er tho 
,;, . CAiifornia lln.i:fonn Tr~1fera kl Minors 
31 A1,1l, S~Hlc -0:istribuloo or tho SutVivor's Tr"1n 
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\ 
i· · "~E custodian tw 
l)EI\N t FRl , ~lh~ Ca!H'om\u 
l U~il~fln T~~~ to Mi001'$.At~ S~Ulg 
Di:ftnbu~ of the Surviv.of's Trust 
+ 
S· 
·6 BALEY ( WARR) BAKER .. Speoltk 
Dis\ri-but~ ofthi: Survivor's Tr~ 
., 
t 
9· _ 1'¥'U~ DEYOUNG, Specific Distrihu\ee 
oi"the Survi-v.or's T~l to 
ll STATE OF IDAHO ) ) ss. 
) 
,_. 
/ 
this _ day of _ •. 2.0\4. tklforo. _me, the 
l:S undersigned, a Notary Pl.Ablic in and for said State~ pc!fSOttully at,~ared snwtN J. 
-~ pS¥0U'NO, kno,vn or tdcntH1ed to me to be the person who mm1c is subscrihed to tho wlthin 
:ans~• as Tru.~ of lhe Family Trust\ the Survivor's Trust. tho 'B!f'pn&S Trust and4h, QTIP 
n Trust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/A 06130/tl9t end 
l8 
ll 
l6 
ac~owredged to me that executed the sru.11e as Trusti,,. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I 
this. <;ertifieate first .above written. 
Donald Craig Frizzell, etal vs Edwin DeYoung, etal 
Notary Public in and t'br the State ot' Idaho 
Residing 
Comm. Exp,: 
Docket No. 44975 
114 of2 2 
t STATE Of CAUfOR.NlA ) 
} ss. 
) 
Oft the _J;J_ day of QG'f~ 20t<t, before me, the 
" ~ ~, Poblic.. personally ap~ DONALD C. FRIZZELL, a V~ 
s. a~ ~im:y Ind Virtual Representative of his issue of the Family Trust, the 
&lin'"'8f's TmS.t, d'f¢ .~ Trust and the QTTP Trust of the CLir!ON AND MARJOR.UZ. 
to FIUZZFil fAM.U.Y TRUST UIA 0600/09, known or identified to m(:c to be the person. whose 
~ is ~bed ro the \\<ithin instrument, and acknowledged to me that ne executetl the 
"'·~ 
·IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto ffl mY h~d \\lld' seat the day and'year tn 
' dus~nrstabo\;ewritten. 
,STATE OF IDAHO ) 
~ )• 
County of K00teoai ) 
Notary Public in and for the State of 
California 
Residing at: f4 111, ,.,.r-h1.{ if,t.~ 
Comm. Exp., _:1iJ J t f<t', '«ii S' 
On me day of 20'14, before mi,, the 
1
~ ~. Not.u}' Public, personally appeared DARLENE D. (FELTY) D'EY01Jr,{O as 
n  fur DARRYL DEYOUNG under the Idaho Uniform Transfers to Mino{$ Act, a 
~ilk: dism~ of Survivor's Trust of the CUFTON AND MARJOIUE FRIZZELL 
if FAMlL Y TR\JST U/A 06/30/09, knowp or identified to me to be the person whose name ls 
ii ~·cott1e·\ltitmn instrument. and·acknowl'edged tome that she executed the same. 
IN ~lTNESS WHEREOF, l have h~reunto s.et mr hand and seal the day tmij year ~ 
oerlifi(::aie first above written. 
Notary Public in and for the State'ofldaho 
Residing at:-_______ _ 
Comm~ Exp.:--------
1 STATE OF 1DAHO 
· 1 . Cou;nty of Kootenai 
} 
) II. 
) 
IN WITNESS WHFJ(BQ.P~ I 
writt.n. 
H ~~tlttty liuhlfi, imJ',~if or hi.thtt 
STA TE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
V.· 
tt,11ltHf1~ Htl ____ .:_......_ ........ ·- . 
t\nuni, lfaJM ___ . -·- -- . _"., .... 
day - ~<.,14~r -~------r·' 2011 hllltN pi.t:t'IOM.Uy appearod l)ON Au, t!. 1t~,11,i'.I r, ,I, tit uu1HlU1HJlft 
dw Catlft,mta Uniform lrnn1f\m1 itJ MitmtM /Wt, 
Ow tUYl'ON ANU MAKJOlt!n J1JU1,/JHl,L 
lo mt to Uw r,cr1n.tt1 whijMf mutt• ~ 11uki11ii1rlbild· 
ml that 41~t'1UtOJ I hi 
hand 1ettt 
,_),;~ •.. ·. 
""""'"'" Puhlh..i In tunl: tbr HU1··lilllltt"2 ur 
C.tHrornht 
Rt1ldtn1i& at! 
0.1mm. H14t,.! 
. · :NO.M .. ·. J(;.tAt.t'ftSPU.TE f\EffOtUlfON .. ¥qt ll 
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APPENDIXB 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DONALD CRAIG FRIZZELL, 
individually and as beneficiary of the 
CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL 
FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN DEYOUNG, individually and in 
his capacity as TRUSTEE OF THE 
CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL 
FAMILY TRUST; and DARLENE 
DEYOUNG, individually and in her 
capacity as beneficiary of the CLIFTON 
AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMILY 
TRUST; and. on behalf of the marital 
community of EDWIN DEYOUNG and 
DARLENE DEYOUNG, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
1/,- 735D 
CASE NO • .CR li 9425 ,, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the Honorable Cynthia K.C. 
Meyer on December 13, 2016. Defendant was represented by Scot D. Nass, Lake City Law 
Group, PLLC, and Plaintiff was represented by Robin L. Haynes, McNeice Wheeler, PLLC. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 
Clifton G. Frizzell and Marjorie J. Frizzell created the Clifton and Marjorie Frizzell 
Family Trust ("Trust") on June 30, 2009, which included a Bypass Trust, a Survivor's Trust and 
a QTIP Trust. Clifton and Marjorie were the grantors and original trustees of the Trust. Clifton 
died on September 4, 2011, and Marjorie died on October 24, 2011. The Trust named Haley 
Baker as successor trustee of the Trust. However, Ms. Baker declined the appointment and 
Edwin De Young ("Defendant") was appointed successor trustee of the Trust on October 29, 
2011. 
Donald Frizzell ("Plaintiff') commenced litigation regarding the Trust in 2013, 1 and 
pursuant to that litigation, Plaintiff and Defendant (along with Darlene De Young) entered into a 
Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act ("TEDRA") agreement to resolve disputes related to the 
administration of the Trust. The TEDRA agreement was filed in District Court on October 31, 
2014. The TEDRA agreement contains a release and hold harmless clause as well as a clause 
purporting to indemnify Defendant against any claims, lawsuits or other actions. 
Plaintiff filed the present Complaint alleging thirteen causes of action relating to the 
administration of the Trust: 1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty for failing to provide 
infonnation, 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Distribute Assets, 3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for 
directly competing with Plaintiff, 4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty based on negligent supervision of 
the Trust, 5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to make Trust property productive, 6) Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty for failure to protect Trust property, 7) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to 
1 This Court has declined Defendant's request to take judicial notice of the underlying case (Kootenai County Case 
No. CV 2013-3998) based on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6) and the holding in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) (holding the only facts a Court may consider in ruling on a 12(bX6) motion for 
failure to state a claim are those appearing in the complaint and it would not be proper to take judicial notice of an 
underlying case that lies outside of the pleadings). There is no reference to Kootenai County Case No. CV 2013-
3998 in the complaint, therefore, this Court will not take judicial notice, nor consider the underlying case in this 
decision. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 2 
Donald Craig Frizzell, etal vs Edwin DeYoung, etal Docket No. 44975 159 of 212 
-, protect Trust property, 8) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to provide infonnation, 9) Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty for engaging in self-dealing, 10) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to 
remain impartial, 11) Breach of the Duty of Loyalty for failure to file insurance claims, 12) 
Claim for Punitive Damages, and 13) a Claim for Damages for Lost Income. Plaintiff filed the 
Complaint on October 6, 2016. Defendant filed this motion to dismiss arguing the TEDRA 
agreement shields Defendant from liability for his administration of the Trust. 
This Court is asked to determine if the language contained in the TEDRA agreement 
serves as a bar to Plaintiff's present claims, and if so, whether Defendant is entitled to attorney 
fees and costs associated with defending Plaintiff's claims. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim must be read in 
conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim and calls for 
'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and a 
demand for relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l), (2)). A court may only consider matters within the 
pleadings as part of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 
150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)). If matters outside the 
pleadings are "[p )resented to and considered by the court it is the duty of the court to treat such 
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment." Id. ( citing Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 
Idaho 337,399 P.2d 635 (1965)) (emphasis in original). 
A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b) "[u]nless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief." Dumas v. Ropp, 
98 Idaho 61, 62, 558 P.2d 632, 633 (1977) (citing Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 353 
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Defendant argues the clauses contained in the TEDRA agreement preclude any action 
against Defendant arising out of the administration of the Trust. Defendant argues the language 
is plain and unambiguous and, based upon the plain language of the TEDRA agreement, Plaintiff 
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
It is important to note that a TEDRA agreement is a non-judicial dispute resolution tool 
governed by Idalia Code § 15-8-101 et seq. It is not clear what efforts, if any, were made to 
utilize non-judicial dispute resolution to resolve the issues that are now before the Court. 
However, it is clear from a reading of the statutes that a TEDRA agreement is binding on the 
parties to such an agreement and a party seeking to enforce a provision of a TEDRA agreement 
may do so in much the same manner as one would petition a court to enforce a court order. See 
Idaho Code§§ 15-8-301-03. A judge hearing a TEDRA dispute has plenary power to facilitate 
the resolution of any dispute regarding all matters related to a trust "in any manner and way that 
to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered 
and settled by the court." Idaho Code § 15-8-102. 
The parties executed the TEDRA agreement to resolve certain issues between the parties 
that had arisen prior to the execution of the TEDRA agreement, modify the Trust, and subject the 
resolution of Trust disputes to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 15-8-101 et seq. All parties to the 
TEDRA agreement were represented by counsel and signed the agreement. Complaint, Exhibit 
B, p. 7. The TEDRA agreement was filed with the court on October 31, 2014. Id at 1. The clear 
import of the parties' entering into the TEDRA agreement was to submit disputes related to the 
administration of the Trust to non-judicial dispute resolution. Further, the TEDRA provisions 
under Idaho Code 15-8-101 et seq. allow for parties to seek enforcement of the TEDRA 
agreement by petition. None of that was done here. 
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It appears counterintuitive that the parties are before this Court seeking resolution of 
disputes relating to the administration of the Trust when the parties entered into a binding 
TEDRA agreement, the proper and efficient resolution of which could have (and likely should 
have) been resolved pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Having read the Complaint in this 
matter it is clear the present claims originate from the administration of the Trust. The path 
chosen by the parties is neither expeditious nor efficient and renders the TEDRA agreement itself 
relatively meaningless. 
There were remedies available to Plaintiff through the provisions of the Act and the 
failure to utilize those remedies is troubling to the Court, particularly when all parties entered 
into the agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and with the aid of counsel. It makes little sense to 
enter into an agreement to resolve matters related to the administration of a trust through a 
prescribed course of conduct, only to argue that the agreement does not apply to matters that 
originate after the agreement was signed. All conduct arising after execution would be exempted 
from the provisions of the agreement. At that point the agreement is of no utility and rather than 
creating efficiencies it becomes burdensome on the courts. However, as the parties have 
presented this issue to the Court, the merits of Defendant's motion to dismiss will be addressed. 
B. The TEDRA Agreement Serves as a Bar to Plaintiff's Claims in the Present Case. 
1. Viewing the TEDRA Agreement in its entirety there is no ambiguity in the 
language of the Agreement. 
The court construes a trust instrument, a TEDRA agreement, and all other contracts as a 
whole, considering all parts in light of the entire instrument. See Salfeety v. Seideman (In re 
Estate of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817,827,907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995). The Court's primary objective is 
to discover the intent of the parties through viewing the document in its entirety. See Bondy v. 
Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). When a document is clear and 
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unambiguous, interpretation of its meaning is a question of law. See id at 996, 829 P.2d at 1345; 
see also Allen v. Dennie (In re Inter Vivos Trust by Turner), 116 Idaho 913, 916, 782 P.2d 36, 39 
(Ct.App.1989). 
"The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court 
as a question of law." Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P .2d 1048, 1052 (1983). "If, 
however, the instrument of conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter 
of fact for the trier of fact." Id. 
In .JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006), the Idaho 
Supreme Court enunciated the process by which a court will evaluate the language of a contract: 
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the 
interpretation of a contract, as under the objective law of contract 
interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of 
the contract without regard to what the parties to the contract 
thought it meant or what they actually intended for it to mean. The 
court will not attempt to ascertain the actual mental processes of 
the parties in entering into the particular contract; rather the law 
presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract 
and that they had the intention which its terms manifest. 
JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). Similarly, when a 
court attempts to determine the intent behind a trust agreement, it must construe the trust 
agreement as a whole, considering all parts in light of the entire instrument. See In re Estate of 
Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 907 P.2d 794 (1994). The court's primary objective is to discover the intent 
of the parties through viewing a document in its entirety. See Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 
996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). When a document is clear and unambiguous, interpretation of 
its meaning is a question of law. See id at 996, 829 P.2d at 1345. In determining whether a 
document is ambiguous, the Court seeks to determine whether it is "reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation." Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346. While a patent 
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ambiguity is apparent on the face of the trust, a latent ambiguity is not evident until there is an 
attempt to apply the trust's provisions to the existing facts. Kirk, 127 Idaho at 824, 907 P .2d at 
801. 
Defendant asserts the following provisions of the TEDRA agreement provide evidence of 
the indemnity, hold-harmless, and release clauses demonstrating the intent of the parties to 
release Defendant from all liability in perpetuity regarding his administration of the trust. 
i. Paragraph two of the TEDRA agreement. 
Nature of this Agreement. This Agreement is intended to 
be a binding agreement to resolve certain issues that have arisen 
or could arise in the future between the Parties in a manner that 
will avoid the necessity of further litigation or court proceedings in 
this matter to resolve such issues and further will serve as written 
documentation to third Parties of the Parties Agreement. 
TEDRA Agreement p. 2, ,r2 ( emphasis added). Paragraph two of the agreement purports to 
define the nature of the agreement and the intent of Plaintiff and Defendant to resolve certain 
issues that have arisen, and those issues that could arise in the future. The plain reading of this 
clause supports Defendant's position that the TEDRA agreement is not merely a resolution of 
those issues that were being contested at the time, but also issues that may arise related to the 
administration of the trust in the future. "Arise," as that term is commonly understood, means to 
come about, or originate. "Could," as that word is commonly used, denotes something that may, 
or may not, come to :fruition. "Issue" is used to denote a dispute between parties. The plain 
reading of the provision demonstrates an intent to encompass disputes related to the Trust that 
may come about at any point in the future. 
The express statement regarding the nature of the agreement is not ambiguous. It clearly 
denotes that the parties intended the agreement to address not only those issues that were the 
basis of the prior litigation, but those issues that may arise at a future point in time. The nature 
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of this provision does not contain operative language, but the language does demonstrate the 
TEDRA agreement envisioned a scenario where a dispute could arise in the future related to the 
administration of the trust. The Court certainly agrees that it addresses those issues that existed 
prior to the execution of the agreement. However, if that was all that was intended the remaining 
language identified above would be unnecessary. The Court's determination is also predicated 
on a reading of the agreement as a whole. 
ii. Paragraph 5.5 of the TEDRA agreement. 
Paragraph 5.5 reads in pertinent part: 
DON shall indemnijy, defend, and hold harmless ED as Trustee 
against any claims, lawsuits or other actions, including all costs of 
attorney fees incurred in defense of such claims, lawsuits, or other 
actions, arising as a result of DON" S management of the real 
properties described in Section 5. 3 above. During such 
management and before distribution of the properties to DON, 
DON is prohibited from terminating and unreasonably interfering 
with the existing manager of the real property 39th St. in Phoenix, 
Arizona. 
TEDRA Agreement p. 5, 11f5.5. The real property listed in section 5.3 of the TEDRA agreement 
was to remain in the Trust until it was distributed to Plaintiff at a later date. However, paragraph 
5 .5 specifically holds Defendant, as the trustee, harmless for any actions taken by Plaintiff after 
the execution of the TEDRA agreement. The paragraph contemplates that the distribution of all 
trust assets has not taken place as of the date of the execution of the agreement. This provision 
contains operative language dealing with specific assets of the Trust. Specifically, it obligates 
Plaintiff and Defendant to waive certain rights pursuant to actions that may, or may not, occur in 
the future. It does not restrict a cause of action to only matters that arose prior to the execution 
of the agreement and it acknowledges that certain assets of the Trust have not been distributed at 
the time of the execution of the TEDRA agreement. 
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The operative language indicates that Plaintiff shall indemnify, defend, and hold 
Defendant harmless. The Court determines that the plain language of this paragraph is clear and 
unambiguous and demonstrates the obligation of the parties, at least relating to certain real 
property, to indemnify and hold Defendant harmless for future claims arising out of Defendant's 
administration of the Trust. 
iii. Paragraph six of the TEDRA agreement. 
Paragraph six of the TEDRA agreement reads: 
Donald C. F:rizzell's Indemnification of Edwin J. DeYoung. 
DON, on behalf of himself and as custodian for CRAIG J. 
FRIZZELL and DEAN J. FRIZZELL agrees to indemnify, defend 
and hold ED harmless against any claims, lawsuits or other 
actions, including all costs and attorney fees incurred in defense of 
such claims, lawsuits or other actions, advanced against ED by 
DON or DON's children or heirs relating to ED'S administration 
of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust and QTIP 
Trust. 
TEDRA Agreement p. 6, ,-r6. It is clear from paragraph six that Plaintiff intended to indemnify, 
defend, and hold Defendant harmless against any "claims, lawsuits or other actions ... relating 
to [Defendant's] administration of the [Trust]." Id. Whereas paragraph 5.5 obligates Plaintiff to 
hold Defendant harmless regarding specific real property held in the Trust, paragraph six 
specifically obligates Plaintiff to indemnify, defend and hold Defendant harmless against any 
acts related to Defendant's administration of the Trust. 
The language is clear and unambiguous. A plain reading of the language demonstrates 
that Plaintiff is agreeing to hold Defendant harmless from any claim relating to Defendant's 
administration of the Trust. Plaintiff's argument that the TEDRA agreement only applied to 
actions taken prior to the execution of the agreement withers when confronted with the language 
of paragraph six. Specifically, it is clear that at the time of the execution of the agreement there 
were still assets to be distributed from the Tmst and Defendant was still acting as the Trust 
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2. Defendant is released from all liability from the point of the 
execution of the TEDRA agreement until he is no longer 
serving as the trust administrator based on the following: 
and all liability relating to the Family Trust, Survivor's 
Trust, Bypass Trust and the QTIP Trust that might arise 
between the Releasors and the Releasees now or in the 
future. 
TEDRA Agreement p. 7, if9 (emphasis added). The conjunction "and" located at the end of the 
provision is clear and unambiguous. The plain meaning provides that: in addition to a release for 
all prior claims related to Defendant's administration of the Trust, all future claims that might 
arise between Plaintiff and Defendant are encompassed by the release. Specifically, the 
language states that Defendant is released from liability from any claims that were, or could have 
been, asserted from the inception of the Trust until the execution of the TEDRA agreement. 
Then the provision states Defendant is released from liability from claims related to Defendant's 
administration of the Trust that might arise now or in the future. Moreover, when the language 
of the provision obligates Plaintiff to release Defendant from liability for potential claims and 
claims that have yet to accrue it appears from the plain language of the document that it 
necessarily includes future actions related to the administration of the Trust. 
If Plaintiffs argument were correct the language at the end of the provision would be 
repetitive and unnecessary. The Court cannot subscribe to Plaintiff's position when the entirety 
of the TEDRA agreement is read. The language is clear and unambiguous and the Court 
determines the TEDRA agreement releases Defendant from all liability arising from Defendant's 
administration of the Trust. 
v. Paragraph seven of the TEDRA agreement. 
Paragraph seven of the TEDRA agreement provides: 
All Parties to this Agreement understand and acknowledge that if 
this Agreement is filed with the court then its terms will become 
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final and binding and the equivalent of a final court order binding 
on all of the Parties who have signed the same pursuant to LC. § 
15-8-303 .... Furthermore, the Beneficiaries specifically agree that 
this Agreement shall be fully binding upon them even if it may be 
determined later that this Agreement is not an Agreement under 
LC. § 15-8-303 and/or that any necessary Party for such an 
Agreement was omitted or not virtually represented. 
TEDRA Agreement p. 6, 17. The Plaintiff was a party to the TEDRA agreement and is bound by 
its terms regardless of Plaintiff's subjective intent. See .Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509,512,211 
P.3d 118, 121 (2009) (quoting 17A Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts§ 91 (2d ed. 2008)). 
It is the general rule of this state and the majority of jurisdictions that parties may 
contract to release themselves from "certain duties and liabilities under a contract subject to 
certain limitations/' Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709 
(1979). Courts generally disfavor such waivers and will construe such provisions against the 
party relying on them. Id. "Clauses which exclude liability must speak clearly and directly to 
the particular conduct of the defendant which caused the harm at issue." Id. 
At oral argument on Defendant's motion Plaintiff remarked that the TEDRA agreement, 
as interpreted by Defendant, would be void as against public policy because a contract cannot 
waive someone's day in court. However, this statement ignores the nature of the TEDRA 
statutes. Plaintiff did not waive his day in court, rather, Plaintiff agreed to non-judicial dispute 
resolution regarding matters related to the administration of the Trust. Further, Plaintiff had 
every opportunity to seek enforcement of the TEDRA agreement through the plenary power of 
the court to resolve disputes related to the agreement. That cannot be considered a waiver of 
Plaintiffs day in court. The policy behind the Act is to promote non-judicial resolution of trust 
disputes, efficiency in trust administration, and judicial resolution of disputes where non-judicial 
efforts fail. Idaho Code§ 15-8-101. The TEDRA agreement is not a waiver of Plaintiff's day in 
court. 
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As this Court noted above, Plaintiff had a vehicle to assert his rights under the TEDRA 
agreement and the administration of the Trust. Plaintiff could have filed a petition with the 
Court to execute the terms of the TEDRA agreement. See Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq. 
Plaintiff did not waive his rights, rather, Plaintiff contracted to have his rights administered 
pursuant to the TEDRA statutes. That is something different than an absolute waiver of a right 
to assert a claim in court. Plaintiff slept on his right to bring his claims under the TEDRA statute 
and here is attempting to circumvent the agreement and continue litigating issues related to 
Defendant's administration of the Trust. This is precisely the action that TEDRA was designed 
to avoid. The provisions of the TEDRA holding Defendant harmless from actions taken as the 
Trust administrator speak clearly, directly, and release Defendant from all liability related to the 
administration of the Trust. 
This Court determines there is no ambiguity in the provisions contained within the 
TEDRA agreement, and the intent of the parties was to release, indemnify, and hold Defendant 
harmless from any and all claims arising from Defendant's administration of the Trust. 
C. Defendant's Request for Attorney Fees. 
Defendant has requested attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l), and 54(e). Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides: "In any civil action, the 
judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties .... " Idaho Code§ 
12-121. "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed as a matter of right to 
the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.'' Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(l)(A). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) instructs: 
(1) Pursuant to Contract or Statute. In any civil action the 
court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, 
to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B), 
when provided for by any statute or contract. 
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(2) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121. Attorney fees 
under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by the court 
only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which finding 
must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the award. 
No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
12-121 on a default judgment. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l-2). TEDRA does provide a statute for the recovery of 
attorney fees at Idaho Code§ 15-8-208. Idaho Code§ 15-8-208 reads: 
(1) Either the district court or the court on appeal may, in its 
discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be 
awarded to any party: 
(a) From any party to the proceedings; 
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the 
proceedings; or 
( c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the 
proceedings. The court may order the costs to be paid in 
such amount and in such manner as the court 
determines to be equitable. 
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this chapter 
including, but not limited to, proceedings involving trusts, 
decedent's estates and properties, and guardianship matters. Except 
as provided in section 12-117, Idaho Code, this section shall not be 
construed as being limited by any other specific statutory provision 
providing for the payment of costs, unless such statute specifically 
provides otherwise. 
Idaho Code § 15-8-208. In Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 288 P.3d 826 (2012), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that attorney fees were appropriate under Idaho Code § 15-8-208 
where a plaintiff had asserted TEDRA as a basis for the claim. Id. 
In the present case the parties executed the TEDRA agreement for the express purpose of 
resolving all disputes relating to the administration of the Trust in a binding non-judicial manner. 
If the parties were unable to do so TEDRA provided judicial remedies for those disputes. 
Plaintiff filed this cause of action seeking relief related to alleged impropriety in the 
administration of the Trust. This is precisely the type of matter addressed by the TEDRA 
agreement. Plaintiff cites to the TEDRA agreement and the failure to Defendant to administer the 
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Trust as modified by the TEDRA agreement as the basis for the claim. The TEDRA agreement 
at issue released Defendant from all liability in the administration of the Trust. Plaintiff entered 
into a binding agreement to resolve matters related to the administration of the Trust through the 
TEDRA statutes and neglected to do so. Bringing this cause of action in this manner 
circumvents and defeats the purpose of the TEDRA agreement. Therefore, the Court determines 
Plaintiffs claim is unreasonable, lacking foundation, and was brought and pursued frivolously. 
Defendant is awarded reasonable attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court determines the TEDRA agreement is clear and unambiguous. The Court 
determines the TEDRA agreement indemnifies, releases, and holds Defendant harmless from all 
claims from the inception of the Trust to the execution of the TEDRA agreement and from all 
claims whatsoever in his position as trust administrator. Defendant is awarded reasonable 
attorney fees. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 
DATED this.20 ~of January, 2017. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Plaintifs portion of Cllff & Marge Frizzell Family Trust 
For Period Ending October 31, 2015 
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Plaintif's portion of Cliff & Marge Frizzell Family Trust 
For Period Ending November 30, 2015 
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127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 
BELL ATLANTIC CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
William TWOMBLY et al. 
No. 05-1126. 
United States Supreme Court 
May 21, 2007 
Argued Nov. 27, 2006. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[127 S.Ct 1958] SYLLABUS 
The 1984 divestiture of the American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company's (AT&T) local telephone business left 
a system of regional service monopolies, sometimes called 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), and a separate 
long-distance market from which the ILECs were excluded. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 withdrew approval of 
the ILECs' monopolies, "fundamentally restructur[ing] local 
telephone markets" and "subject[ing] [ILECs] to a host of 
duties intended to facilitate market entry." AT&T Corp. v. 
IowaUtilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142 
L.Ed.2d 835. It also authorized them to enter the 
long-distance market. "Central to the [new] scheme [was 
each ILEC's] obligation ... to share its network with 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs)." 
VerizonCommunications Inc.v. law Offices of Curtis v. 
Trinka, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,402, 124 S.Ct. 872, 157 L.Ed.2d 
823. 
Respondents (hereinafter plaintiffs) represent a class of 
subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed Internet 
services in this action against petitioner ILECs for claimed 
violations of § l of the Sherman Act, which prohibits 
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations." The 
complaint alleges that the ILECs conspired to restrain trade 
(1) by engaging in parallel conduct in their respective 
service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs; and 
(2) by agreeing to refrain from competing against one 
another, as indicated by their common failure to pursue 
attractive business opportunities in contiguous markets and 
by a statement by one ILEC's chief executive officer that 
competing in another ILEC's territory did not seem right 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that 
parallel business conduct allegations, taken alone, do not 
state a claim under § l; plaintiffs must allege additional facts 
tending to exclude independent self-interested conduct as an 
explanation for the parallel actions. Reversing, the Second 
Circuit held that plaintiffs' parallel conduct allegations were 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss because the 
ILECs failed to show that there is no set of facts that would 
permit plaintiffs to demonstrate that the particular 
parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than 
coincidence. 
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Held: 
I. Stating a § l claim requires a complaint with enough 
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement 
was made. An allegation of parallel conduct and a bare 
assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Pp. 553-563. 
(a) Because § l prohibits "only restraints effected by a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy," CopperweldCorp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775, 104 S.Ct. 
2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628, "[t]he crucial question" is whether 
the challenged anticompetitive conduct "stem[s] from 
independent decision or from an agreement," Theatre 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 
346 U.S. 537, 540, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 273. While a 
showing of parallel "business behavior is admissible 
circumstantial evidence from which" agreement may be 
inferred, it falls short of "conclusively establish[ing] 
agreement or . . . itself constitut[ing] a Sherman Act 
offense." Id., at 540-541, 74 S.Ct 257. The inadequacy of 
showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, 
[127 S.Ct. 1959] mirrors the behavior's ambiguity: 
consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a 
wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy 
unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the 
market. Thus, this Court has hedged against false inferences 
from identical behavior at a number of points in the trial 
sequence, e.g., at the summary judgment stage, see 
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538. Pp. 553-554. 
(b) This case presents the antecedent question of what a 
plaintiff must plead in order to state a § l claim. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice 
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 
L.Ed.2d 80. While a complaint attacked by a Rule l2(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, 
ibid., a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his 
"entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's 
elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the 
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true. 
Applying these general standards to a § l claim, stating a 
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter to 
suggest an agreement. Asking for plausible grounds does 
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; 
it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 
agreement. The need at the pleading stage for allegations 
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement 
reflects Rule 8(a)(2)'s threshold requirement that the "plain 
statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader 
is entitled to relief." A parallel 
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conduct allegation gets the § l complaint close to stating a 
claim, but without further factual enhancement it stops short 
of the line between possibility and plausibility. The 
requirement of allegations suggesting an agreement serves 
the practical purpose of preventing a plaintiff with " 'a 
largely groundless claim' " from " 'tak[ing] up the time of a 
number of other people, with the right to do so representing 
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.' " 
DuraPharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347, 
125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577. It is one thing to be 
cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in 
advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that 
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive. That 
potential expense is obvious here, where plaintiffs represent 
a putative class of at least 90 percent of subscribers to local 
telephone or high-speed Internet service in an action against 
America's largest telecommunications firms for unspecified 
instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over 
a 7-year period. It is no answer to say that a claim just shy 
of plausible entitlement can be weeded out early in the 
discovery process, given the common lament that the 
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse 
has been modest. Plaintiffs' main argument against the 
plausibility standard at the pleading stage is its ostensible 
conflict with a literal reading of Conley's statement 
construing Rule 8: "a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 
S.Ct. 99. The "no set of facts" language has been 
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough by 
courts and commentators, 
[127 S.Ct. 1960) and is best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a 
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by 
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in 
the complaint. Conley described the breadth of opportunity 
to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the 
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a 
complaint's survival. Pp. 554-563. 
2. Under the plausibility standard, plaintiffs' claim of 
conspiracy in restraint of trade comes up short. First, the 
complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § I claim 
on descriptions of parallel conduct, not on any independent 
allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs. The nub 
of the complaint is the ILECs' parallel behavior, and its 
sufficiency turns on the suggestions raised by this conduct 
when viewed in light of common economic experience. 
Nothing in the complaint invests either the action or 
inaction alleged with a plausible conspiracy suggestion. As 
to the ILECs' supposed agreement to disobey the 1996 Act 
and thwart the CLECs' attempts to comp..:.te, the District 
Court correctly found that nothing in the complaint 
intimates that resisting the upstarts was anything more than 
the natural, unilateral reaction of each 
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ILEC intent on preserving its regional dominance. The 
complaint's general collusion premise fails to answer the 
point that there was no need for joint encouragement to 
resist the 1996 Act, since each ILEC had reason to try and 
avoid dealing with CLECs and would have tried to keep 
them out, regardless of the other ILECs' actions. Plaintiffs' 
second conspiracy theory rests on the competitive reticence 
among the ILECs themselves in the wake of the 1996 Act to 
enter into their competitors' territories, leaving the relevant 
market highly compartmentalized geographically, with 
minimal competition. This parallel conduct did not suggest 
conspiracy, not if history teaches anything. Monopoly was 
the norm in telecommunications, not the exception. Because 
the ILECs were born in that world, doubtless liked it, and 
surely knew the adage about him who lives by the sword, a 
natural explanation for the noncompetition is that the 
former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting 
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same. Antitrust 
conspiracy was not suggested by the facts adduced under 
either theory of the complaint, which thus fails to state a 
valid § l claim. This analysis does not run counter to 
Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 S.Ct. 
992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1, which held that "a complaint in an 
employment discrimination lawsuit [ need] not contain 
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination." Here, the Court is not requiring heightened 
fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the 
plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line 
from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be 
dismissed. Pp. 1970-1974. 
425 F.3d 99, reversed and remanded. 
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, 
BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, except 
as to Part IV, post, p. 570. 
(127 S.Ct. 1961] COUNSEL 
Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for petitioners. With 
him on the briefs were Mark C. Hansen, Aaron M. Banner, 
Richard G. Taranto, Stephen M. Shapiro, Kenneth S. 
Geller, Richard J. Favretto, Timothy Beyer, J. Henry 
Walker, Marc W. F. Galonsky, John Thome, Paul J. Larkin, 
Jr., David E. Wheeler,, Dan K. Wehh, Cynthia P. Delaney, 
Javier Aguilar, and William M. Schur. 
Assistant Attorney General Barnett argued the cause for 
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With 
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him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Deputy 
Solicitor General Hungar, Deanne E. Maynard, Catherine 
G. O'Sullivan, James J. O'Connell, Jr., and Hill B. Wellford. 
J Douglas Richards argued the cause for respondents. With 
him on the brief was Michael M. Buchman.[*] 
OPINION 
Souter, Justice. 
Liability under §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1, 
requires a "contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce." The question in this 
putative class action is whether a § I complaint can survive 
a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major 
telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel 
conduct unfavorable to 
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competition, absent some factual context suggesting 
agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action. 
We hold that such a complaint should be dismissed. 
The upshot of the 1984 divestiture of the American 
Telephone & Telegraph Company's (AT&T) local 
telephone business was a system of regional service 
monopolies (variously called "Regional Bell Operating 
Companies," "Baby Bells," or "Incumbent Local Exchange 
Carriers" (ILECs)), and a separate, competitive market for 
long-distance service from which the ILECs were excluded. 
More than a decade later, Congress withdrew approval of 
the ILECs' monopolies by enacting the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), 110 Stat. 56, 
which "fundamentally restructure[d] local telephone 
markets" and "subject[ed] [ILECs] to a host of duties 
intended to facilitate market entry." AT&T Corp. v. 
IowaUti/ities Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 371, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142 
L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). In recompense, the 1996 Act set 
conditions for authorizing ILECs to enter the long-distance 
market. See 47 U. S. C. §271. 
"Central to the [new] scheme [was each ILEC's] obligation 
. . . to share its network with competitors," Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402, 124 S.Ct. 872, 157 L.Ed.2d 823 
(2004), which came to be known as "competitive local 
exchange carriers" (CLECs), Pet. for Cert. 6, n. I. A CLEC 
could make use ofan ILEC's network in any of three ways: 
by (1) "purchas[ing] local telephone services at wholesale 
rates for resale to end users," (2) "leas[ing] elements of the 
[ILEC's] network 'on an unbundled basis,' " or (3) 
"interconnect[ing] its own facilities with the [ILEC's] 
network." Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 371, 119 S.Ct. 72 l 
(quoting 47 U. S. C. §251(c)). Owing to the "considerable 
expense and effort" required to make unbundled network 
elements available to rivals at wholesale prices, Trinko, 
supra, at 410, 124 S.Ct. 872, the ILECs vigorously litigated 
the scope of the sharing obligation imposed by the 1996 
Act, with the result that the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) three times 
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revised its 
[127 S.Ct. 1962] regulations to narrow the range of network 
elements to be shared with the CLECs. See 
CovadCommunications Co. v. FCC. 450 F.3d 528, 533-534 
(CA.D.C.2006) (summarizing the IO-year-long regulatory 
struggle between the ILECs and CLECs ). 
Respondents William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus 
(hereinafter plaintiffs) represent a putative class consisting 
of all "subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed 
internet services ... from February 8, 19% to present." 
Amended Complaint in No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL) (SDNY) 
1 53, App. 28 (hereinafter Complaint). In this action against 
petitioners, a group of ILECs, [l] plaintiffs seek treble 
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for claimed 
violations of §1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 
as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1, which prohibits "[e]very [2] 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations." 
The complaint alleges that the ILECs conspired to restrain 
tra<;ie in two ways, each supposedly inflating charges for 
local telephone and high-speed Internet services. Plaintiffs 
say, first, that the ILECs "engaged in parallel conduct" in 
their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart 
CLECs. Complaint 1f 47, App. 23-26. Their actions 
allegedly included making unfair agreements with the 
CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing inferior 
connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in 
ways designed to sabotage the CLECs' relations with their 
own customers. Ibid. According to the complaint, the 
ILECs' 
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"compelling common motivatio[n]" to thwart the CLECs' 
competitive efforts naturally led them to form a conspiracy; 
"[h]ad any one [ILEC] not sought to prevent CLECs ... from 
competing effectively ... , the resulting greater competitive 
inroads into that [ILEC's] territory would have revealed the 
degree to which competitive entry by CLECs would have 
been successful in the other territories in the absence of 
such conduct." Id., 1f 50, App. 26-27. 
Second, the complaint charges agreements by the ILECs to 
refrain from competing against one another. These are to be 
inferred from the ILECs' common failure "meaningfully 
[to] pursu[e]" "attractive business opportunit[ies]" in 
contiguous markets where they possessed "substantial 
competitive advantages," id., ff 40-41, App. 21-22, and 
from a statement of Richard Notebaert, chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the ILEC Qwest, that competing in the 
territory of another ILEC " 'might be a good way to turn a 
quick dollar but that doesn't make it right,' " id., 1f 42, App. 
22. 
The complaint couches its ultimate allegations this way: 
"In the absence of any meaningful competition between 
the [ILECs] in one another's markets, and in light of the 
parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent 
competition from CLECs within their respective local 
telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and 
the other facts and market circumstances alleged above, 
Plaintiffs allege upon information 
(127 S.Ct. 1963) and belief that [the ILECs] have entered 
into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent 
competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or 
high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to 
compete with one another and otherwise allocated 
customers and markets to one another." Id., 'I[ 51, App. 27. 
Page552 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court 
acknowledged that "plaintiffs may allege a conspiracy by 
citing instances of parallel business behavior that suggest an 
agreement," but emphasized that "while '[c]ircumstantial 
evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made 
heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward 
conspiracy[, ... ] "conscious parallelism" has not yet read 
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.' " 313 
F.Supp.2d 174, 179 (2003) (quoting Theatre Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 
541, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 273 (1954); alterations in 
original). Thus, the District Court understood that 
allegations of parallel business conduct, taken alone, do not 
state a claim under § l; plaintiffs must allege additional facts 
that "ten[d] to exclude independent self-interested conduct 
as an explanation for defendants' parallel behavior.'' 313 
F.Supp.2d, at 179. The District Court found plaintiffs' 
allegations of parallel ILEC actions to discourage 
competition inadequate because "the behavior of each ILEC 
in resisting the incursion ofCLECs is fully explained by the 
ILEC's own interests in defending its individual territory." 
Id., at 183. As to the ILECs' supposed agreement against 
competing with each other, the District Court found that the 
complaint does not "alleg[e] facts ... suggesting that 
refraining from competing in other territories as CLECs was 
contrary to [the ILECs'] apparent economic interests, and 
consequently [does] not rais[e] an inference that [the 
ILECs'] actions were the result of a conspiracy." Id., at 188. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that the District Court tested the complaint by the 
wrong standard. It held that "plus factors are not required to 
be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel 
conduct to survive dismissal." 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2005) 
( emphasis in original). Although the Court of Appeals took 
the view that plaintiffs must plead facts that "include 
conspiracy among the realm of 'plausible' possibilities in 
order to survive a motion to dismiss," it then said that "to 
rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail 
to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have 
to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism 
asserted was the product of collusion rather than 
coincidence." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for 
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of 
parallel conduct, 547 U.S. 903, 126 S.Ct. 2965, 165 
L.Ed.2d 949 (2006), and now reverse. 
[127 S.Ct 1964] II 
A 
&cause §1 of the Sherman Act "does not prohibit [all] 
unreasonable restraints of trade . . . but only restraints 
effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy," 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 
752, 775, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), "[t]he 
crucial question" is whether the challenged anticompetitive 
conduct "stem[s] from independent decision or from an 
agreement, tacit or express," Theatre Enterprises, 346 U.S. 
at 540, 74 S.Ct. 257. While a showing of parallel "business 
behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which 
the fact finder may infer agreement," it falls short of 
"conclusively establish[ing] agreement or . . . itself 
constitut[ing] a Sherman Act offense." Id., at 540-541, 74 
S.Ct. 257. Even "conscious parallelism," a common 
reaction of "firms in a concentrated market [that] 
recogniz[ e] their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions 
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is "not in itself unlawful." Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227, 113 S.Ct 
2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993); see 6 P. Areeda & H. 
Hovenkarnp, Antitrust Law ,r 1433a, p. 236 (2d ed. 2003) 
(hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp) ("The courts are nearly 
unanimous in saying that mere interdependent parallelism 
does not establish the contract, combination, or conspiracy 
required by Sherman Act § l "); Turner, The Definition of 
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 672 (l %2) 
("[M]ere interdependence of basic price decisions is not 
conspiracy"). 
The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or 
interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of 
the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much 
in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive 
business strategy unilaterally prompted by common 
perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss 
Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact from Fantasy, Related 
Publication 06-08, pp. 3-4 (2006) (discussing problem of 
"false positives" in §1 suits). Accordingly, we have 
previously hedged against false inferences from identical 
behavior at a number of points in the trial sequence. An 
antitrust conspiracy plaintiff with evidence showing nothing 
beyond parallel conduct is not entitled to a directed verdict, 
see Theatre Enterprises, supra; proof of a § l conspiracy 
must include evidence tending to exclude the possibility of 
independent action, see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 
(1984); and at the summary judgment stage a §1 plaintiff's 
offer of conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the 
possibility that the defendants were acting independently, 
see Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). 
B 
This case presents the antecedent question of what a 
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under § l of the 
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Sherman Act. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) 
requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to 
"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). While a 
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Saryuan v. 
American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 
247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 
[127 S.Ct. 1965) "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, 
see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 
92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are 
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. 
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1216, 
pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) 
("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... 
a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a 
legally cognizable right of action"), [3] on the assumption 
that all the allegations in the complaint are true ( even if 
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 
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534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 
(2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 
1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) ("Rule I2(b)(6) does not 
countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a 
complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a 
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that 
a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). 
In applying these general standards to a § I claim, we hold 
that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough 
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement 
was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an 
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the 
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence 
of illegal agreement. [4] And, of course, a well-pleaded 
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that 
actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and "that a 
recovery is very remote and unlikely." Ibid. In identifying 
facts that are suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy 
plausible, we have the benefit 
[127 S.Ct. 1%6] of the prior rulings and considered views 
of leading commentators, already quoted, that lawful 
parallel conduct fails to be- speak unlawful agreement. It 
makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of parallel 
conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. 
Without 
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more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a 
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified 
point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. 
Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in 
order to make a § l claim, they must be placed in a context 
that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not 
merely parallel conduct that could just as well be 
independent action. 
The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly 
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects 
the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the "plain 
statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader 
is entitled to relief." A statement of parallel conduct, even 
conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting 
suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § l claim; 
without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting 
of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial 
efforts stays in neutral territory. An allegation of parallel 
conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in 
a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a 
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it 
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
"entitle[ment] to relief." Cf. DM Research, Inc.v.College of 
Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (C.A. l 1999) ("[T]erms 
like 'conspiracy,' or even 'agreement,' are border-line: they 
might well be sufficient in conjunction with a more specific 
allegation-for example, identifying a written agreement or 
even a basis for inferring a tacit agreement, ... but a court 
is not required to accept such terms as a sufficient basis for 
a complaint''.) .. [5] 
We alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 
entitlement requirement in DuraPharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 
(2005), when we explained that something beyond the mere 
possibility ofloss causation must be 
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alleged, lest a plaintiff with " 'a largely groundless claim' " 
be allowed to " 'take up the time of a number of other 
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem 
increment of the settlement value.' " Id., at 347, 125 S.Ct. 
1627 ( quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 741, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975)). So, 
when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could 
not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, " 'this basic 
deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum 
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.' 
" 5 Wright & Miller §1216, at 233-234 (quoting Daves v. 
Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 
(D.Hawail953)); see also Dura, supra, at 346, 125 S.Ct. 
1627;Asahi Glass Co. v. PentechPharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 
F.Supp.2d 986, 995 (N.D.Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by 
designation) ("[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be 
crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be 
permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted 
discovery phase"). 
Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an 
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, cf. Poller v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 
S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d458 (1962) 
[127 S.Ct. 1967) , but quite another to forget that 
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive. As we 
indicated over 20 years ago in Associated Gen. Contractors 
of Cal., Inc.v.Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528, n. 17, 103 
S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983), "a district court must 
retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading 
before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to 
proceed." See also Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (C.A.7 1984) ("[11he costs of modern 
federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the 
federal courts counsel against sending the parties into 
discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in 
the complaint"); Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee 
Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 
78 N. Y. & U. L. Rev. 1887, 1898-1899 (2003) (discussing 
the unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases); 
Manual for Complex Litigation 
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, Fourth, §30, p. 519 (2004) (describing extensive scope of 
discovery in antitrust cases); Memorandum from Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to 
Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F. R. D. 354, 
357 (2000) (reporting that discovery accounts for as much 
as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is actively 
employed). That potential expense is obvious enough in the 
present case: plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 
90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or 
high-speed Internet service in the continental United States, 
in an action against America's largest telecommunications 
firms (with many thousands of employees generating reams 
and gigabytes of business records) for unspecified (if any) 
instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over 
a period of seven years. 
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible 
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early 
in the discovery process through "careful case 
management," post at 573, given the common lament that 
the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery 
abuse has been on the modest side. See, e.g., Easterbrook, 
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989) 
("Judges can do little about impositional discovery when 
parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct 
the discovery themselves"). And it is self-evident that the 
problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by "careful 
scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage," much 
less "lucid instructions to juries," post, at 573; the threat of 
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to 
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. 
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require 
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that 
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of 
discover; in cases with no " 'reasonably founded hope that 
the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' " to 
support a § I claim. Dura, 
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supra, at 347, 125 S.Ct 1627 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 
supra, at 741, 95 S.Ct. 1917; alteration in Dura). [61 
[127 S.Ct. 1968] Plaintiffs do not, of course, dispute the 
requirement of plausibility and the need for something more 
than merely parallel behavior explained in Theatre 
Enterprises, Monsanto, and Matsushita, and their main 
argument against the plausibility standard at the pleading 
stage is its ostensible 
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conflict with an early statement of ours construing Rule 8. 
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Conley v. Gibson 
spoke not only of the need for fair notice of the grounds for 
entitlement to relief but of "the accepted rule that a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. This 
"no set of facts" language can be read in isolation as saying 
that any statement revealing the theory of the claim will 
suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown from 
the face of the pleadings; and the Court of Appeals appears 
to have read Conley in some such way when formulating its 
understanding of the proper pleading standard, see 425 
F.3d, at 106, 114 (invoking Conley's "no set of facts" 
language in describing the standard for dismissal). (7] 
On such a focused and literal reading of Conley's "no set of 
facts," a wholly conclusory statement of claim would 
survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left 
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish 
some "set of [undisclosed] facts" to support recovery. So 
here, the Court of Appeals specifically found the prospect 
of unearthing direct evidence of conspiracy sufficient to 
preclude dismissal, even though the complaint 
(127 S.Ct 1969) does not set forth a single 
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fact in a context that suggests an agreement. 425 F.3d, at 
106, 114. It seems fair to say that this approach to pleading 
would dispense with any showing of a " 'reasonably 
founded hope' " that a plaintiff would be able to make a 
case, see Dura, 544 U.S. at 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627 (quoting 
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741, 95 S.Ct. 1917); Mr. 
Micawber's optimism would be enough. 
Seeing this, a good many judges and commentators have 
balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a 
pleading standard. See, e.g., Car Carriers, 745 F.2d, at 
1106 ("Conley has never been interpreted literally" and, 
"[i]n practice, a complaint ... must contain either direct or 
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements 
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal 
theory" (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis and 
omission in original); AsconProperties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil 
Co., 866 F.2d ll49, ll55 (C.A.9 1989) (tension between 
Conley's "no set of facts" language and its acknowledgment 
that a plaintiff must provide the "grounds" on which his 
claim rests); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546, n. 3 
(C.A. l 1976) ("(W]hen a plaintiff ... supplies facts to 
support his claim, we do not think that Conley imposes a 
duty on the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts that might 
tum a frivolous claim of unconstitutional . . . action into a 
substantial one"); McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 
Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (C.A.6 1988) (quoting O'Brien's 
analysis); Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 
Tex. L. Rev. 1665, 1685 (1998) (describing Conley as 
having "turned Rule 8 on its head"); Marcus, The Revival 
of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 463-465 (1986) (noting 
tension between Conley and subsequent understandings of 
Rule 8). 
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further 
citations to show that Conley's "no set of facts" language 
has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long 
enough. To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should 
be understood in light of the opinion's preceding summary 
of the complaint 
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's concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably 
understood as amply stating a claim for relief. But the 
passage so often quoted fails to mention this understanding 
on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession 
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its 
retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a 
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by 
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in 
the complaint. See Sanjuan, 40 F.3d, at 251 (once a claim 
for relief has been stated, a plaintiff "receives the benefit of 
imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with 
the complaint"); accord, Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 
S.Ct. 992; National Organization for Women, Inc. v. 
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 
99 (1994); H J. Jnc.v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
492 U.S. 229, 249-250, 109 S.ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 
(1989); Hishon v. King &Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 
S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Conley, then, described 
the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate 
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate 
pleading to govern a complaint's survival. [8] 
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III 
(127 S.Ct. 1970) 
When we look for plausibility in this complaint, we agree 
with the District Court that plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy in 
restraint of trade comes up short. To begin with, the 
complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim 
on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any 
independent allegation of actual agreement among the 
ILECs. Supra, at 550-551. Although in form a few stray 
statements speak directly of agreement,[9]on fair reading 
these are merely legal conclusions resting on the prior 
allegations. Thus, the complaint 
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first takes account of the alleged "absence of any 
meaningful competition between [the ILECs] in one 
another's markets," "the parallel course of conduct that each 
[ILEC] engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs," 
"and the other facts and market circumstances alleged 
[earlier]"; "in light of' these, the complaint concludes "that 
[the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or 
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry into their . . . 
markets and have agreed not to compete with one another." 
Complaint ,i 51, App. 27.(10] The nub of the 
(127 S.Ct. 1971] complaint, then, is the ILECs' parallel 
behavior, consisting of steps to keep the CLECs out and 
manifest disinterest in becoming CLECs themselves, and its 
sufficiency turns on the suggestions raised by this conduct 
when viewed in light of common economic experience. [ 11] 
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We think that nothing contained in the complaint invests 
either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible 
suggestion of conspiracy. As to the ILECs' supposed 
agreement to disobey the 1996 Act and thwart the CLECs' 
attempts to compete, we agree with the District Court that 
nothing in the complaint intimates that the resistance to the 
upstarts was anything more than the natural, unilateral 
reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional 
dominance. The 1996 Act did more than just subject the 
ILECs to competition; it obliged them to subsidize their 
competitors with their own equipment at wholesale rates. 
The economic incentive to resist was powerful, but resisting 
competition is routine market conduct, and even if the 
ILECs flouted the 1996 Act in all the ways the plaintiffs 
allege, see id, ,i 47, App. 23-24, there is no reason to infer 
that the companies had agreed among themselves to do 
what was only natural anyway; so natural, in fact, that if 
alleging parallel decisions to resist competition were 
enough to imply an antitrust conspiracy, pleading a §1 
violation against almost any group of competing businesses 
would be a sure thing. 
The complaint makes its closest pass at a predicate for 
conspiracy with the claim that collusion was necessary 
because success by even one CLEC in an ILEC's territory 
"would have revealed the degree to which competitive entry 
by CLECs would have been successful in the other 
territories." Id, ,i 50, App. 26-27. But, its logic aside, this 
general premise still fails to answer the point that there was 
just no need for joint encouragement to resist the 1996 Act; 
as the District Court said, "each ILEC has reason to want to 
avoid dealing with CLECs" and "each ILEC would attempt 
to keep CLECs out, regardless of the actions of the other 
ILECs." 313 F.Supp.2d, at 184; cf. Kramer v. 
Pollock-Krasner Foundation, 890 F.Supp. 250, 256 
(S.D.N.Y.1995) (while the plaintiff "may believe the 
defendants conspired . . ., the defendants' allegedly 
conspiratorial actions 
Page 567 
could equally have been prompted by lawful, independent 
goals which do not constitute a conspiracy").[12] 
[127 S.Ct. 1972] Plaintiffs' second conspiracy theory rests 
on the competitive reticence among the ILECs themselves 
in the wake of the 1996 Act, which was supposedly passed 
in the " 'hop[e] that the large incumbent local monopoly 
companies ... might attack their neighbors' service areas, 
as they are the best situated to do so.' " Complaint ,r 38, 
App. 20 ( quoting Consumer Federation of America, 
Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation 
Before Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster, 
p. 12 (Feb. 2000)). Contrary to hope, the ILECs declined " 
'to enter each other's service territories in any significant 
way,' " Complaint ,r 38, App. 20, and the local telephone 
and high speed Internet market remains highly 
compartmentalized geographically, with minimal 
competition. Based on this state of affairs, and perceiving 
the ILECs to be blessed with "especially attractive business 
opportunities" in surrounding markets dominated by other 
ILECs, the plaintiffs assert that the ILECs' parallel conduct 
was "strongly suggestive of conspiracy." Id., ,r 40, App. 21. 
But it was not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history 
teaches anything. In a traditionally unregulated industry 
with low barriers to entry, sparse competition among large 
firms dominating separate geographical segments of the 
market could very well signify illegal agreement, but here 
we have an obvious alternative explanation. In the decade 
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preceding the 1996 Act and well before that, monopoly 
was the norm in telecommunications, not the exception. See 
VerizonCornrnunications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 
477-478, 122 S.Ct. 1646, 152 L.Ed.2d 701 (2002) 
(describing telephone service providers as traditional public 
monopolies). The ILECs were born in that world, doubtless 
liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage 
about him who lives by the sword. Hence, a natural 
explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the 
former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting 
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing. 
In fact, the complaint itself gives reasons to believe that 
the ILECs would see their best interests in keeping to their 
old turf. Although the complaint says generally that the 
ILECs passed up "especially attractive business 
opportunit[ies]" by declining to compete as CLECs against 
other ILECs, Complaint ,r 40, App. 21, it does not allege 
that competition as CLECs was potentially any more 
lucrative than other opportunities being pursued by the 
ILECs during the same period,[13]and 
[127 S.Ct. 1973) the complaint is replete with indications 
that any CLEC faced nearly insurmountable barriers to 
profitability owing to the ILECs' flagrant resistance to the 
network sharing requirements of the 1996 Act, id., ,r 47; 
App. 
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23-26. Not only that, but even without a monopolistic 
tradition and the peculiar difficulty of mandating shared 
networks, "[t]irrns do not expand without limit and none of 
them enters every market that an outside observer might 
regard as profitable, or even a small portion of such 
markets." Areeda & Hovenkamp ,r 307d, at 155 (Supp. 
2006) (commenting on the case at bar). The upshot is that 
Congress may have expected some ILECs to become 
CLECs in the legacy territories of other ILECs, but the 
disappointment does not make conspiracy plausible. We 
agree with the District Court's assessment that antitrust 
conspiracy was not suggested by the facts adduced under 
either theory of the complaint, which thus fails to state a 
valid §1 clairn.[14] 
Plaintiffs say that our analysis runs counter to 
Swierkiewicz v. SorernaN. A., 534 U.S. at 508, 122 S.Ct. 
992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), which held that "a complaint in 
an employment discrimination lawsuit [need] not contain 
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the framework set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792[, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 
L.Ed.2d 668] (1973)." They argue that just as the prima 
facie case is a "flexible evidentiary standard" that "should 
not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for 
discrimination cases," Swierkiewicz, supra, at 512, 122 
S.Ct. 992, "transpos[ing] 'plus factor' summary judgment 
analysis woodenly into a rigid Rule 12(b)(6) pleading 
standard ... would be unwise," Brief for Respondents 39. 
As the District Court 
Page570 
correctly understood, however, "Swierkiewicz did not 
· change the law of pleading, but simply re-emphasized ... 
that the Second Circuit's use of a heightened pleading 
standard for Title VII cases was contrary to the Federal 
Rules' structure of liberal pleading requirements." 313 
F.Supp.2d, at 181 (citation and footnote omitted). Even 
though Swierkiewicz's pleadings "detailed the events 
leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and 
included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the 
relevant persons involved with his termination," the Court 
of Appeals dismissed his complaint for failing to allege 
certain additional facts that Swierkiewicz would need at the 
trial stage to support his claim in the absence of direct 
evidence of discrimination. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 
122 S.Ct. 992. We reversed on the ground that the Court of 
Appeals had impermissibly applied what amounted to a 
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that 
Swierkiewicz allege "specific facts" beyond [127 S.Ct. 
1974] those necessary to state his claim and the grounds 
showing entitlement to relief. Id., at 508, 122 S.Ct. 992. 
Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact 
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs 
here have not nudged their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins 
except as to Part IV, dissenting. 
In the first paragraph of its 23-page opinion the Court 
states that the question to be decided is whether allegations 
that "major telecommunications providers engaged in 
certain 
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parallel conduct unfavorable to competition" suffice to 
state a violation of§ l of the Sherman Act. Ante, at 548-549. 
The answer to that question has been settled for more than 
50 years. If that were indeed the issue, a summary reversal 
citing Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film 
Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 
273 (1954), would adequately resolve this case. As Theatre 
Enterprises held, parallel conduct is circumstantial evidence 
admissible on the issue of conspiracy, but it is not itself 
illegal. Id., at 540-542, 74 S.Ct. 257. 
Thus, this is a case in which there is no dispute about the 
substantive law. If the defendants acted independently, their 
conduct was perfectly lawful. If, however, that conduct is 
the product of a horizontal agreement among potential 
competitors, it was unlawful. Plaintiffs have alleged such an 
agreement and, because the complaint was dismissed in 
advance of answer, the allegation has not even been denied. 
Why, then, does the case not proceed? Does a judicial 
opinion that the charge is not "plausible" provide a legally 
acceptable reason for dismissing the complaint? I think not. 
Respondents' amended complaint describes a variety of 
circumstantial evidence and makes the straightforward 
allegation that petitioners 
"entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to 
prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone 
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed 
not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated 
customers and markets to one another." Amended 
Complaint in No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL) (SDNY) i! 51, App. 
27 (hereinafter Complaint). 
The complaint explains that, contrary to Congress' 
expectation when it enacted the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act, and consistent with their own economic self-interests, 
petitioner Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) 
have assiduously avoided infringing upon each other's 
markets and have 
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refused to permit nonincumbent competitors to access their 
networks. The complaint quotes Richard Notebaert, the 
former CEO of one such ILEC, as saying that competing in 
a neighboring ILEC's territory "might be a good way to turn 
a quick dollar but that doesn't make it right." Id., ,i 42, App. 
22. Moreover, respondents allege that petitioners 
"communicate amongst themselves" through numerous 
industry associations. Id., ,i 46, App. 23. In sum, 
respondents allege that petitioners entered into an 
agreement that has long been recognized as a classic per se 
violation of the Sherman Act. See Report 
(127 S.Ct. 1975) of the Attorney General's National 
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 26 ( 1955). 
Under rules of procedure that have been well settled since 
well before our decision in Theatre Enterprises, a judge 
ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint, 
"must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained 
in the complaint." Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN. A., 534 U.S. 
506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); see 
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 127, 63 
S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943). But instead of requiring 
knowledgeable executives such as Notebaert to respond to 
these allegations by way of sworn depositions or other 
limited discovery--and indeed without so much as requiring 
petitioners to file an answer denying that they entered into 
any agreement--the majority permits immediate dismissal 
based on the assurances of company lawyers that nothing 
untoward was afoot. The Court embraces the argument of 
those lawyers that "there is no reason to infer that the 
companies had agreed among themselves to do what was 
only natural anyway," ante, at 566; that "there was just no 
need for joint encouragement to resist the 1996 Act," Ibid.; 
and that the "natural explanation for the noncompetition 
alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned 
monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to 
do the same thing," ante, at 568. 
The Court and petitioners' legal team are no doubt correct 
that the parallel conduct alleged is consistent with the 
absence 
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of any contract, combination, or conspiracy. But that 
conduct is also entirely consistent with the presence of the 
illegal agreement alleged in the complaint. And the charge 
that petitioners "agreed not to compete with one another" is 
not just one of"a few stray statements," ante, at 564; it is an 
allegation describing unlawful conduct. As such, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, our longstanding 
precedent, and sound practice mandate that the District 
Court at least require some sort of response from petitioners 
before dismissing the case. 
Two practical concerns presumably explain the Court's 
dramatic departure from settled procedural law. Private 
antitrust litigation can be enormously expensive, and there 
is a risk that jurors may mistakenly conclude that evidence 
of parallel conduct has proved that the parties acted 
pursuant to an agreement when they in fact merely made 
similar independent decisions. Those concerns merit careful 
case management, including strict control of discovery, 
careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, 
and lucid instructions to juries; they do not, however, justify 
the dismissal of an adequately pleaded complaint without 
even requiring the defendants to file answers denying a 
charge that they in fact engaged in collective 
decisionmaking. More importantly, they do not justify an 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
that seems to be driven by the majority's appraisal of the 
plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather than its 
legal sufficiency. 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules requires that a complaint 
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief." The rule did not come 
about by happenstance and its language is not inadvertent. 
The English experience with Byzantine special pleading 
rules--illustrated by the hypertechnical Hilary rules of 
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1834[l]made obvious 
[127 S.Ct. 1976) the appeal of a pleading standard that was 
easy for the common litigant to understand and sufficed to 
put the defendant on notice as to the nature of the claim 
against him and the relief sought. Stateside, David Dudley 
Field developed the highly influential New York Code of 
1848, which required "[a] statement of the facts constituting 
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, 
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a 
person of common understanding to know what is 
intended." An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, 
Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch. 
379, §120(2), 1848 N. Y. Laws pp. 497, 521. Substantially 
similar language appeared in the Federal Equity Rules 
adopted in 1912. See Fed. Equity Rule 25 (requiring "a 
short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which 
the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of 
evidence"). 
A difficulty arose, however, in that the Field Code and its 
progeny required a plaintiff to plead "facts" rather than 
"conclusions," a distinction that proved far easier to say 
than to apply. As commentators have noted, 
"it is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among 
'ultimate facts,' 'evidence,' and 'conclusions.' Essentially any 
allegation in a pleading must be an assertion that certain 
occurrences took place. The pleading spectrum, passing 
from evidence through ultimate facts to conclusions, is 
largely a continuum varying only in the degree of 
particularity with which the occurrences are described." 
Weinstein & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: 
Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 518, 520-521 
(1957). 
See also Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the 
Codes, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 416, 417 (1921) (hereinafter 
Cook) ("[T]here is no logical distinction between statements 
which are grouped by the courts under the phrases 
'statements of 
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fact' and 'conclusions of law' "). Rule 8 was directly 
responsive to this difficulty. Its drafters intentionally 
avoided any reference to "facts" or "evidence" or 
"conclusions.'' See 5 C. Wright & A Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §1216, p. 207 (3d ed. 2004) 
(hereinafter Wright & Miller) ("The substitution of 'claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief for the code 
formulation of the 'facts' constituting a 'cause of action' was 
intended to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes 
among 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate facts,' and 'conclusions' . 
.. "). 
Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, 
the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to 
keep them in. The merits of a claim would be sorted out 
during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, 
through the crucible of trial. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 
514, 122 S.Ct. 992 ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 
8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, 
which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a 
claim"). Charles E. Clark, the "principal draftsman" of the 
Federal Rules,[2]put it thus: 
"Experience has shown ... that we cannot expect the proof 
of the case to be made through the pleadings, and that such 
proof is really not their function. We can expect a general 
statement distinguishing the case from all others, so that the 
manner and form of trial and remedy expected are clear, 
and so that a permanent judgment will result." The 
[127 S.Ct. 1977] New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some 
of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A. B. A. 
J. 976, 977 (1937) (hereinafter Clark, New Federal Rules). 
The pleading paradigm under the new Federal Rules was 
well illustrated by the inclusion in the appendix of Form 9, 
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a complaint for negligence. As relevant, the Form 9 
complaint states only: "On June 1, 1936, in a public 
highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, 
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against 
plaintiff who was then crossing said highway." Form 9, 
Complaint for Negligence, Forms App., Fed. Rules Civ. 
Proc., 28 U. S. C. App., p. 829 (hereinafter Form 9). The 
complaint then describes the plaintiff's injuries and 
demands judgment. The asserted ground for relief-namely, 
the defendant's negligent driving-would have been called a 
" 'conclusion of law' " under the code pleading of old. See, 
e.g., Cook 419. But that bare allegation suffices under a 
system that "restrict[ s] the pleadings to the task of general 
notice-giving and invest[s] the deposition-discovery process 
with a vital role in the preparation for trial."[3]Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 
(1947); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513, n. 4, 122 
S.Ct. 992 ( citing Form 9 as an example of " 'the simplicity 
and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate' "); 
Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (C.A.7 2004) 
(Posner, J.) ("The federal rules replaced fact pleading with 
notice pleading"). 
II 
It is in the context of this history that Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), must be 
understood. The Conley plaintiffs were black railroad 
workers who alleged that their union local had refused to 
protect them against discriminatory discharges, in violation 
of the National Railway Labor Act. The union sought to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground that its general 
allegations of discriminatory treatment by the defendants 
lacked sufficient specificity. Writing 
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for a unanimous Court, Justice Black rejected the union's 
claim as foreclosed by the language of Rule 8. Id, at 47-48, 
78 S.Ct. 99. 1n the course of doing so, he articulated the 
formulation the Court rejects today: "In appraising the 
sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief." Id .. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 
99. 
Consistent with the design of the Federal Rules, Conley's 
"no set of facts" formulation permits outright dismissal only 
when proceeding to discovery or beyond would be futile. 
Once it is clear that a plaintiff has stated a claim that, if 
true, would entitle him to relief, matters of proof are 
appropriately relegated to other stages of the trial process. 
Today, however, in its explanation of a decision to dismiss 
a complaint that it regards as a fishing expedition, the Court 
scraps Conley's "no set of facts" language. Concluding that 
the phrase has been "questioned, criticized, and explained 
away long enough," ante, at 562, the Court dismisses it as 
careless composition. 
[127 S.Ct. 1978] If Conleys "no set offacts" language is to 
be interred, let it not be without a eulogy. That exact 
language, which the majority says has "puzzl[ed] the 
profession for 50 years," ante, at 563. has been cited as 
authority in a dozen opinions of this Court and four separate 
writings.[4]In not one of 
Page578 
those 16 opinions was the language "questioned," 
"criticized," or "explained away." Indeed, today's opinion is 
the first by any Member of this Court to express any doubt 
as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation. Taking their 
cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of 
Columbia utilize as their standard for dismissal of a 
complaint the very language the majority repudiates: 
whether it appears "beyond doubt" that "no set of facts" in 
support of the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief.[5] 
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[127 S.Ct. 1979] Petitioners have not requested that the 
Conley formulation be retired, nor have any of the six amici 
who filed briefs in support of petitioners. I would not 
rewrite the Nation's civil procedure textbooks and call into 
doubt the pleading rules of most of its States without far 
more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so. 
Congress has established a process--a rulemaking 
process-for revisions of that order. See 28 U. S. C. 
§§2072-2074 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). 
Today's majority calls Conley's " 'no set of facts' " 
language "an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted 
pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, 
it may 
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be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with 
the allegations in the complaint" Ante, at 563. This is not 
and cannot be what the Conley Court meant. First, as I have 
explained, and as the Conley Court well knew, the pleading 
standard the Federal Rules meant to codify does not require, 
or even invite, the pleading of facts.[6]The "pleading 
standard" label the majority gives to what it reads into the 
Conley opinion--a statement of the permissible factual 
support for an adequately pleaded complaint--would not, 
therefore, have impressed the Conley Court itself. Rather, 
that Court would have understood the majority's remodeling 
of its language to express an evidentiary standard, which the 
Conley Court had neither need nor want to explicate. 
Second, it is pellucidly clear that the Conley Court was 
interested in what a complaint must contain, not what it may 
contain. In fact, the Court said without qualification that it 
was "appraising the sufficiency of the complaint" 355 U.S. 
at 45, 78 S.Ct. 99 
[127 S.Ct. 1980] (emphasis added). It was, to paraphrase 
today's majority, describing "the minimum standard of 
adequate pleading to govern a complaint's survival," ante, at 
563. 
We can be triply sure as to Conley's meaning by examining 
the three Court of Appeals cases the Conley Court cited as 
support for the "accepted rule" that "a complaint should not 
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be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 3 5 5 
U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. In the first case, Leimer v. State 
Mut.Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, Mass., 108 F.2d 302 
(C.A.8 1940), the plaintiff alleged that she was the 
beneficiary of a life insurance plan and that the insurance 
company was wrongfully withholding proceeds from her. In 
reversing the District Court's grant of the defendant's 
motion to dismiss, the Eighth Circuit noted that court's own 
longstanding rule that, to warrant dismissal, " 'it should 
appear from the allegations that a cause of action does not 
exist, rather than that a cause of action has been defectively 
stated.' "Id., at 305 (quoting Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 
326, 329 (C.A.8 1934)). 
The Leimer court viewed the Federal Rules--specifically 
Rules 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6), I2(e) (motion for a more definite 
statement), and 56 (motion for summary judgment)--as 
reinforcing the notion that "there is no justification for 
dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, 
except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 
would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of the claim." 108 F.2d, at 306. 
The court refuted in the strongest terms any suggestion that 
the unlikelihood of recovery should determine the fate of a 
complaint: "No matter how improbable it may be that she 
can prove her claim, she is entitled to an opportunity to 
make the attempt, and is not required to accept as final a 
determination of her rights based upon inferences drawn in 
favor of the defendant from her amended complaint." Ibid. 
The Third Circuit relied on Leimer's admonition in 
Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (1942), 
which the Conley Court also cited in support of its "no set 
of facts" formulation. In a diversity action the plaintiff 
alleged breach of contract, but the District Court dismissed 
the complaint on the ground that the contract appeared to be 
unenforceable under state law. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, 
Page582 
concluding that there were facts in dispute that went to the 
enforceability of the contract, and that the rule at the 
pleading stage was as in Leimer: "No matter how likely it 
may seem that the pleader will be unable to prove his case, 
he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to try 
to prove it." 130 F.3d, at 635. 
The third case the Conley Court cited approvingly was 
written by Judge Clark himself. In Dioguardi v. Durning, 
139 F.2d 774 (C.A.2 1944), the prose plaintiff, an importer 
of "tonics," charged the customs inspector with auctioning 
off the plaintiffs former merchandise for less than was bid 
for it--and indeed for an amount equal to the plaintiffs own 
bid--and complained that two cases of tonics went missing 
three weeks before the sale. The inference, hinted at by the 
averments but never stated in so many words, was that the 
defendant fraudulently denied the plaintiff his rightful claim 
to the tonics, which, if true, would have violated federal 
law. Writing six years after the adoption of the Federal 
Rules he held the lead rein in drafting, Judge Clark said that 
the defendant 
"could have disclosed the facts from his point of view, in 
advance of a trial if he 
[127 S.Ct. 1981] chose, by asking for a pre-trial hearing or 
by moving for a summary judgment with supporting 
affidavits. But, as it stands, we do not see how the plaintiff 
may properly be deprived of his day in court to show what 
he obviously so firmly believes and what for present 
purposes defendant must be taken as admitting." Id., at 775. 
As any civil procedure student knows, Judge Clark's 
opinion disquieted the defense bar and gave rise to a 
movement to revise Rule 8 to require a plaintiff to plead a " 
'cause of action.' " See 5 Wright & Miller § 120 I, at 86-87. 
The movement failed, see ibid.;Dioguardi was explicitly 
approved in Conley; and "[i]n retrospect the case itself 
seems to be a 
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routine application of principles that are universally 
accepted," 5 Wright & Miller § 1220, at 284- 285. 
In light of Leimer, Continental Collieries, and Dioguardi, 
Conley's statement that a complaint is not to be dismissed 
unless "no set of facts" in support thereof would entitle the 
plaintiff to relief is hardly "puzzling," ante, at 562-563. It 
reflects a philosophy that, unlike in the days of code 
can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants 
have violated the antitrust laws in ways that have not been 
alleged"); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 383 (1961) 
("ln the absence of ... an allegation [that the arrest was 
made without probable cause] the courts below could not, 
nor can we, assume that respondents arrested petitioner 
without probable cause to believe that he had committed ... 
a narcotics offense"). Nor are we reaching out to decide this 
issue in a case where the matter was not raised by the 
parties, see post, at 579, since both the ILECs and the 
Government highlight the problems stemming from a literal 
interpretation of Conley's "no set of facts" language and 
seek clarification of the standard. Brief for Petitioners 
27-28; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22-25; see 
also Brief for Respondents 17 (describing "[p]etitioners and 
their amici" as mounting an "attack on Conley's 'no set of 
facts' standard"). 
The dissent finds relevance in Court of Appeals precedents 
from the 1940s, which allegedly gave rise to Conley's "no 
set of facts" language. See post, at 580-583. Even indulging 
this line of analysis, these cases do not challenge the 
understanding that, before proceeding to discovery, a 
complaint must allege facts suggestive of illegal conduct. 
See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mut.Life Assur. Co., l 08 F.2d 302, 
305 (CA8 1940) (" '[I]f, in view of what is alleged, it can 
reasonably be conceived that the plaintiffs ... could, upon a 
trial, establish a case which would entitle them to ... relief, 
the motion to dismiss should not have been granted' "); 
Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 
(CA3 1942) ("No matter how likely it may seem that the 
pleader will be unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon 
averring a claim, to an opportunity to try to prove it"). 
Rather, these cases stand for the unobjectionable 
proposition that, when a complaint adequately states a 
claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court's 
assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary 
support for his allegations or prove his claim to the 
satisfaction of the factfinder. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (a district court weighing a motion to 
dismiss asks "not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail 
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to 
support the claims"). 
[9]See Complaint ,r ,r 51, 64, App. 27, 30-31 (alleging that 
ILECs engaged in a "contract, combination or conspiracy" 
and agreed not to compete with one another). 
[IO]If the complaint had not explained that the claim of 
agreement rested on the parallel conduct described, we 
doubt that the complaint's references to an agreement 
among the ILECs would have given the notice required by 
Rule 8. Apart from identifying a seven-year span in which 
the § 1 violations were supposed to have occurred (i.e., 
"[b]eginning at least as early as February 6, 1996, and 
continuing to the present," id., ,r 64, App. 30), the pleadings 
mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the 
alleged conspiracies. This lack of notice contrasts sharply 
with the model form for pleading negligence, Form 9, 
which the dissent says exemplifies the kind of "bare 
allegation" that survives a motion to dismiss. Post, at 576. 
Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck 
the plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a 
particular highway at a specified date and time, the 
complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the four 
· ILECs (much less which of their employees) supposedly 
agreed, or when and where the illicit agreement took place. 
A defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact 
pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a 
defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory 
allegations in the § l context would have little idea where to 
begin. 
[I !]The dissent's quotations from the complaint leave the 
impression that plaintiffs directly allege illegal agreement; 
in fact, they proceed exclusively via allegations of parallel 
conduct, as both the District Court and Court of Appeals 
recognized. See 313 F.Supp.2d 174, 182 (SONY 2003); 425 
F.3d 99, 102-104 (CA 2005). 
[12]From the allegation that the ILECs belong to various 
trade associations, see Complaint ,r 46, App. 23, the dissent 
playfully suggests that they conspired to restrain trade, an 
inference said to be "buttressed by the common sense of 
Adam Smith." Post, at 591, 594. If Adam Smith is peering 
down today, he may be surprised to learn that his 
tongue-in-cheek remark would be authority to force his 
famous pinmaker to devote financial and human capital to 
hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and otherwise fend off 
allegations of conspiracy; all this just because he belonged 
to the same trade guild as one of his competitors when their 
pins carried the same price tag. 
[13]The complaint quoted a reported statement of Qwest's 
CEO, Richard Notebaert, to suggest that the ILECs declined 
to compete against each other despite recognizing that it " 
'might be a good way to tum a quick dollar.' " ,r 42, App. 22 
(quoting Chicago Tribune, October 31, 2002, Business 
Section, p. 1 ). This was only part of what he reportedly 
said, however, and the District Court was entitled to take 
notice of the full contents of the published articles 
referenced in the complaint, from which the truncated 
quotations were drawn. See Fed. Rule Evid. 201. 
Notebaert was also quoted as saying that entering new 
markets as a CLEC would not be "a sustainable economic 
model" because the CLEC pricing model is "just ... nuts." 
Chicago Tribune, October 31, 2002, Business Section, p. l 
(cited at Complaint ,r 42, App. 22). Another source cited in 
the complaint quotes Notebaert as saying he thought it 
"unwise" to "base a business plan" on the privileges 
accorded to CLECs under the 1996 Act because the 
regulatory environment was too unstable. Chicago Tribune, 
December 19, 2002, Business Section, p. 2 (cited at 
Complaint ,r 45, App. 23). 
[14]In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any 
"heightened" pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden 
the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can 
only be accomplished " 'by the process of amending the 
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.' " 
Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) 
(quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 
(1993)). On certain subjects understood to raise a high risk 
of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual 
allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires. 
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 9(b)-(c). Here, our concern is not that 
the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently 
"particular[ized]", ibid.; rather, the complaint warranted 
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs' 
entitlement to relief plausible. 
[1] See 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 324-327 
(1926). 
[2] GulfstreamAerospace Corp. v. MayacamasCorp., 485 
U.S. 271,283 (1988). 
[3]The Federal Rules do impose a "particularity" 
requirement on "all averments of fraud or mistake," Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 9(b ), neither of which has been alleged in 
this case. We have recognized that the canon of 
expresiounius est exclusio alterius applies to Rule 9(b). See 
Leather-man v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
[4]SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818 (2002); Davis v. 
MonroeCountyBd.of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999); 
HartfordFire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 
(1993); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 
(1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) {per 
curiam); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 
444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
106 (1976); Hospital Building Co.v. Trustees 
ofRexHospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 
319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 521 (1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 
U.S. 411, 422 (1969) (plurality opinion); see also Cleveland 
Bd. of Ed.v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 554 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc.v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 
561, n. I (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Simon v. Eastern 
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 55, n. 6 
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring injudgment). 
(5]See, e.g., EB Invs., LLC v. Atlantis Development, Inc., 
930 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala 2005); Department of Health & 
Social Servs.v. NativeVillageofCuryung, 151 P.3d 388, 396 
(Alaska 2006); Newman v. Maricopa Cty., 167 Ariz. 501, 
503, 808 P.2d 1253, 1255 (App. 1991); Public Serv. Co. of 
Colo.v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 385-386 (Colo. 2001) (en 
bane); Clawson v. St. LouisPost-Dispatch, LLC, 906 A.2d 
308, 312 (D. C. 2006); Hillman Constr. Corp.v. Wainer, 
636 So.2d 576, 578 (Fla. App. 1994); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 
266 Ga 612, 613, 469 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1996); Wright v. 
HomeDepotUS. A., 111 Haw. 401, 406, 142 P.3d 265, 270 
(2006); Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P.3d 156, 
160 (2005); Fink v. Bryant, 2001-CC-0987, p. 4 (La. 
11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349; Gagne v. CianbroCorp., 
431 A.2d 1313, 1318-1319 (Me. 1981); Gasior v. 
Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 446 Mass. 645, 647, 846 
N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (2006); Ralph Walker, Inc.v. Gallagher, 
926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss. 2006); Jones v. 
MontanaUniv.System, 337 Mont I, 7, 155 P.3d 1247, __ 
(2007); Johnston v. NebraskaDept. of Correctional Servs., 
270 Neb. 987,989, 709 N.W.2d 321,324 (2006); Blackjack 
Bonding v. Las Vegas Munic.Ct., 116 Nev. 1213, 1217, 14 
P.3d 1275, 1278 (2000); Shepard v. OcwenFed.Bank, 361 
N.C. 137, 139, 638 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006); Rose v. United 
Equitable Ins. Co., 2001 ND 154, ,r 10, 632 N.W.2d 429, 
434; State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St.3d 561, 562, 
2007-0hio-814, ,r 5, 862 N.E.2d 104, 105 {per curiam); 
Moneypenney v. Dawson, 2006 OK 53, ,r 2, 141 P.3d 549, 
551; Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 659 (R. I. 1990); 
Os/oond v. Farrier, 2003 SD 28, ,r 4, 659 N. W.2d 20, 22 
{per curiam); Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 
S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tenn. 1986); Association of Haystack 
Property Owners v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 446, 494 A.2d 
122, 124 (1985); In re Coday, 156 Wash.2d 485,497, 130 
P.3d 809, 815 (2006) (en bane); Haines v. Hampshire Cty. 
Comm'n, 216 W.Va. 499,502,607 S.E.2d 828,831 (2004); 
Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 5ll, 512 (Wyo. 1987); see also 
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082-1083 (Del. 
200 I) (permitting dismissal only "where the court 
determines with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could 
prevail on no set of facts that may be inferred from the 
well-pleaded allegations in the com-plaint" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill.2d 
311, 318, 818 N.E.2d 311, 317 (2004) (replacing "appears 
beyond doubt" in the Conley formulation with "is clearly 
apparent"); In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. 1988) 
(per curiam) (replacing "appears beyond doubt" with 
"appears to a certainty"); Barkema v. Williams Pipeline Co., 
666 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a motion to 
dismiss should be sustained "only when there exists no 
conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to 
relief'); Pioneer Village v. Bullitt Cty., 104 S. W.3d 757, 
759 (Ky. 2003) (holding that judgment on the pleadings 
should be granted "if it appears beyond doubt that the 
nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts that would 
entitle him/her to relief'); Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 470 
Mich. 274, 277, 681 N.W.2d 342, 345 (2004) (per curiam) 
(holding that a motion for judgment on the pleadings should 
be granted only " 'if no factual development could possibly 
justify recovery' "); Oberkramer v. Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 
440, 441 (Mo. 1986) ( en bane) ( omitting the words "beyond 
doubt" from the Conley formulation); Colman v. Utah State 
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (holding that a 
motion to dismiss is appropriate "only if it clearly appears 
that [the plaintiff) can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim"); NRC Management Servs. Corp.v. First Va. 
Bank-Southwest, 63 Va Cir. 68, 70 (2003) ("The Virginia 
standard is identical [to the Conley formulation], though the 
Supreme Court of Virginia may not have used the same 
words to describe it"). 
[6]The majority is correct to say that what the Federal 
Rules require is a " 'showing' " of entitlement to relief. Ante, 
at 555, n. 3. Whether and to what extent that "showing" 
requires allegations of fact will depend on the particulars of 
the claim. For example, had the amended complaint in this 
case alleged only parallel conduct, it would not have made 
the required "showing." See supra, at 570-571. Similarly, 
had the pleadings contained only an allegation of 
agreement, without specifying the nature or object of that 
agreement, they would have been susceptible to the charge 
that they did not provide sufficient notice that the 
defendants may answer intelligently. Omissions of that sort 
instance the type of "bareness" with which the Federal 
Rules are concerned. A plaintiff's inability to persuade a 
district court that the allegations actually included in her 
complaint are "plausible" is an altogether different kind of 
failing, and one that should not be fatal at the pleading 
stage. 
[7]See also 5 Wright & Miller § 1202, at 89-90 
("[P]leadings under the rules simply may be a general 
summary of the party's position that is sufficient to advise 
the other party of the event being sued upon, to provide 
some guidance in a subsequent proceeding as to what was 
decided for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, 
and to indicate whether the case should be tried to the court 
or to a jury. No more is demanded of the pleadings than 
this; indeed, history shows that no more can be performed 
successfully by the pleadings" (footnotes omitted)). 
[8]0ur decision in DuraPharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336 (2005), is not to the contrary. There, the 
plaintiffs failed adequately to allege loss causation, a 
required element in a private securities fraud action. 
Because it alleged nothing more than that the prices of the 
securities the plaintiffs purchased were artificially inflated, 
the Dura complaint failed to "provide the defendants with 
notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of 
what the causal connection might be between that loss and 
the [alleged] misrepresentation." Id., at 347. Here, the 
failure the majority identifies is not a failure of 
notice-which "notice pleading" rightly condemns-but rather 
a failure to satisfy the Court that the agreement alleged 
might plausibly have occurred. That being a question not of 
notice but of proof it should not be answered without first 
hearing from the defendants (as apart from their lawyers). 
Similarly, in Associated Gen. Contractors ojCal., Inc. v. 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), in which we also found 
an antitrust complaint wanting, the problem was not that the 
injuries the plaintiffs alleged failed to satisfy some 
threshold of plausibility, but rather that the injuries as 
alleged were not "the type that the antitrust statute was 
intended to forestall." Id., at 540; see id., at 526 ("As the 
case comes to us, we must assume that the Union can prove 
the facts alleged in its amended complaint. It is not, 
however, proper to assume that the Union can prove facts 
that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated 
the antitrust laws in ways that have not been alleged"). 
[9]The Court suggests that the allegation of an agreement, 
even if credited, might not give the notice required by Rule 
8 because it lacks specificity. Ante, at 565, n. IO. The 
remedy for an allegation lacking sufficient specificity to 
provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule 12(e) motion 
for a more definite statement. See Swierkiewicz v. 
SoremaN. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Petitioners made 
no such motion and indeed have conceded that "[o]ur 
problem with the current complaint is not a lack of 
specificity, it's quite specific." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. Thus, the 
fact that "the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, 
or per-sons involved in the alleged conspiracies," ante, at 
565, n. l 0, is, for our purposes, academic. 
[lO]The Court describes my reference to the allegation that 
the defendants belong to various trade associations as 
"playfully" suggesting that the defendants conspired to 
restrain trade. Ante, at 567, n. 12. Quite the contrary: an 
allegation that competitors meet on a regular basis, like the 
allegations of parallel conduct, is consistent with-though 
not sufficient to prove-the plaintiffs' entirely serious and 
unequivocal allegation that the defendants entered into an 
unlawful agreement. Indeed, if it were true that the 
plaintiffs "rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel 
conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual 
agreement among the ILECs," ante, at 564, there would 
have been no purpose in including a reference to the trade 
association meetings in the amended complaint. 
[11 )It is ironic that the Court seeks to justify its decision to 
draw factual inferences in the defendants' favor at the 
pleading stage by citing to a rule of evidence, ante, at 568, 
n. 13. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 20l(b), a judicially 
noticed fact "must be one not subject to reasonable dispute 
in that it is either (I) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned." Whether Notebaert's 
statements constitute evidence of a conspiracy is hardly 
beyond reasonable dispute. 
[12]The Court worries that a defendant seeking to respond 
to this "conclusory" allegation "would have little idea where 
to begin." Ante, at 565, n. l 0. A defendant could, of course, 
begin by either denying or admit-ting the charge. 
[I3]The potential for "sprawling, costly, and hugely 
time-consuming" discovery, ante, at 560, n. 6, is no reason 
to throw the baby out with the bathwater. The Court vastly 
underestimates a district court's case-management arsenal. 
Before discovery even begins, the court may grant a 
defendant's Rule 12(e) motion; Rule 7(a) permits a trial 
court to order a plaintiff to reply to a defendant's answer, 
see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); and 
Rule 23 requires "rigorous analysis" to ensure that class 
certification is appropriate, General Telephone Co. of 
Southwest v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); see In re 
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 
(CA2 2006) (holding that a district court may not certify a 
class without ruling that each Rule 23 requirement is met, 
even if a requirement overlaps with a merits issue). Rule 16 
invests a trial judge with the power, backed by sanctions, to 
regulate pretrial proceedings via conferences and 
scheduling orders, at which the parties may discuss, inter 
alia, "the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses," Rule 
16( c )( 1 ); "the necessity or desirability of amendments to the 
pleadings," Rule 16(c)(2); "the control and scheduling of 
discovery," Rule 16(c)(6); and "the need for adopting 
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or 
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, 
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof 
problems," Rule 16(c)(12). Subsequently, Rule 26 confers 
broad discretion to control the combination of 
interrogatories, requests for admissions, production 
requests, and depositions permitted in a given case; the 
sequence in which such discovery devices may be 
deployed; and the limitations imposed upon them. See 523 
U.S. at 598-599. Indeed, Rule 26(c) specifically permits a 
court to take actions "to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense" by, for example, disallowing a particular 
discovery request, setting appropriate terms and conditions, 
or limiting its scope. 
In short, the Federal Rules contemplate that pretrial 
matters will be settled through a flexible process of give and 
take, of proffers, stipulations, and stonewalls, not by having 
trial judges screen allegations for their plausibility vel non 
without requiring an answer from the defendant. See 
Societeinternationale pour Participations Industrielles et 
Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206 (1958) 
("Rule 34 is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the 
exigencies of particular litigation"). And should it become 
apparent over the course of litigation that a plaintiffs :filings 
bespeak an in terrorem suit, the district court has at its call 
its own in terrorem device, in the form of a wide array of 
Rule 11 sanctions. See Rules l l(b), (c) (authorizing 
sanctions if a suit is presented "for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation"); see Business Guides, Inc. 
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 
533 (1991) (holding that Rule 11 applies to a represented 
party who signs a pleading, motion, or other papers, as well 
as to attorneys); Atkins v. Fischer, 232 F. R. D. 116, 126 
(DC 2005) ("As possible sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, the 
court has an arsenal of options at its disposal"). 
[14]Given his "background in antitrust law," ante, at 560, 
n. 6, Judge Easterbrook has recognized that the most 
effective solution to discovery abuse lies in the legislative 
and rulemaking arenas. He has suggested that the remedy 
for the ills he complains of requires a revolution in the rules 
of civil procedure: 
"Perhaps a system in which judges pare away issues and 
focus on investigation is too radical to contemplate in this 
country-although it prevailed here before 1938, when the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. The change 
could not be accomplished without abandoning notice 
pleading, increasing the number of judicial officers, and 
giving them more authority .... If we are to rule out 
judge-directed discovery, however, we must be prepared to 
pay the piper. Part of the price is the high cost of 
unnecessary discovery-impositional and otherwise." 
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 635,645 (1989). 
[15]It would be quite wrong, of course, to assume that 
dismissal of an antitrust case after discovery is costless to 
plaintiffs. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d)(l) ("[C]osts other 
than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs"). 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California, George H. Wu, District 
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00508-GW-SH. 
Before: STEPHEN S. TROTT and WILLIAM A. 
FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and CHARLES R BREYER, 
District Judge.[*] 
Opinion by Judge WILLIAM A. FLETCHER; Dissent by 
Judge TROTT. 
ORDER 
The opinion filed on February 11, 2011, and published at 
633 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.2011 ), is withdrawn and replaced by 
the attached opinion. 
The petitions for rehearing and for rehearing en bane, filed 
February 25, 2011, are hereby denied as moot. 
No new petitions for rehearing or petitions for rehearing en 
bane shall be accepted in this case. However, any member 
of this court may make a sua sponte en bane call 
challenging the opinion filed today. 
OPINION 
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff Dion Starr brings a § 1983 action for damages 
resulting from a violent attack he allegedly suffered while 
he was an inmate in the Los Angeles County Jail. The 
district court dismissed Starr's supervisory liability claim 
for deliberate indifference against Sheriff Leroy Baca in his 
individual capacity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
l 2(b )( 6). Because we hold that Starr has adequately stated a 
claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
Starr's Third Amended Complaint alleges that on or about 
January 27, 2006, he was in custody in the Los Angeles 
County Jail. A group of inmates gathered at his cell door 
and threatened to inflict physical harm on him. He yelled 
for the deputies guarding the jail to come to his aid. Instead 
of protecting him, a deputy opened Starr's cell gate in order 
to allow the group of inmates to enter. The inmates entered 
the cell and repeatedly stabbed Starr and his cellmate with 
knife-like objects. They stabbed Starr twenty-three times 
while Starr screamed for help and protection. After the 
attacking inmates left the cell, several deputies went to 
Starr. Starr lay on the floor of his cell, seriously injured, 
bleeding and moaning in pain. One deputy yelled at him, " 
nigger lay down." While repeatedly yelling " shut up 
nigger," the deputy then kicked his face, nose, and body 
numerous times, causing pain, bleeding and a nose fracture. 
Other deputies stood by and watched. The deputy who 
kicked Starr subsequently interfered with his ability to 
obtain medical treatment for his injuries. Starr continues to 
suffer from and receive treatment for his injuries. 
Starr sued Sheriff Baca as well as the deputies directly 
involved in the attack. His claims against the deputies are 
not at issue in this appeal. In his claim against Sheriff Baca, 
Starr alleges unconstitutional conditions of confinement in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He 
alleges that Sheriff Baca is liable in his individual capacity 
because he knew or should have known about the dangers 
in 
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the Los Angeles County Jail, and that he was deliberately 
indifferent to those dangers. 
After giving Starr several chances to plead his claim 
against Sheriff Baca, the district court dismissed the claim 
with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court held 
when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can 
construct a claim from the events related in the complaint" 
)[.] 
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Id at 558, 127 S.Ct 1955. The Court wrote, further, " 
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require 
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that 
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of 
discovery in cases with no ' reasonably founded hope that 
the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to 
support a § l claim. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347, 125 S.Ct. 
1627." Id. at 559-60, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (some internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, in Iqbal, plaintiff Iqbal, a Muslim American man, 
brought a Bivens action alleging deliberate discrimination 
by Attorney General Ashcroft and F.B.I. Director Mueller. 
Applying Rule 8(a), the Court held that the allegations in 
Iqbal's complaint were insufficient. In the Court's view, 
some of Iqbal's allegations were " bare assertions" not 
entitled to the presumption of truth, and the remaining 
allegations, even assumed to be true, did not plausibly 
suggest an entitlement to relief. 
The Court first identified allegations not entitled to the 
presumption of truth. Iqbal's complaint alleged that 
defendants " ' knew of, condoned, and willfully and 
maliciously agreed to subject [him]' to harsh conditions of 
confinement ' as a matter of policy, solely on account of 
[his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest.'" Id. at 1951 (alterations in 
original). The complaint alleged, further, that " Ashcroft 
was the ' principal architect' of this invidious policy, ... and 
that Mueller was ' instrumental' in adopting and executing 
it[.]" Id. The Court held that these " bare assertions" " 
amount[ ed] to nothing more than a ' formulaic recitation of 
the elements' " of the constitutional claim. Id. (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Their " 
conclusory nature ... disentitle[ d] them to the presumption 
oftruth." Id. 
The Court then determined whether the remaining 
allegations, assumed to be true, " plausibly suggest[ed] an 
entitlement to relief." Id. The complaint alleged that the two 
defendants had caused the arrest and detention of " 
thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of [the 
government's] investigation of the events of September 11." 
Id. It alleged that the defendants had " purposefully 
designat[ ed] detainees ' of high interest' because of their 
race, religion, or national origin." Id The Court held that, 
assuming these facts to be true, they did not plausibly 
suggest Iqbal's entitlement to relief based on purposeful 
racial or religious discrimination because there was an " ' 
obvious alternative explanation' " for these facts. Id. 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In the 
Court's view, the obvious alternative explanation was that 
the " September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab 
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in 
good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist 
group." Id. " It should come as no surprise that a legitimate 
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain 
individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks 
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab 
Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to 
target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent 
alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and 
justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens 
who were illegally present in the United States and who had 
potential connections to those who committed terrorist 
acts." Id The Court concluded that this alternative 
explanation was so likely to be true that, as between the two 
explanations, Iqbal's explanation was not plausible: " [T]he 
purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to 
infer ... is not a plausible conclusion. " Id. at 1951-52 
( emphasis added). 
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In two cases decided during roughly the same period, the 
Court appears to have applied the original, more lenient 
version of Rule 8(a). In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 
U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Second 
Circuit had dismissed plaintiff's employment discrimination 
case for failure to plead facts establishing a prima facie case 
of discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, writing: 
[P]etitioner's complaint easily satisfies the requirements of 
Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair notice of the basis 
for petitioner's claims. Petitioner alleged that he had been 
terminated on account of his national origin in violation of 
Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the 
ADEA. His complaint detailed the events leading to his 
termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages 
and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons 
involved in his termination. These allegations give 
respondent fair notice of what petitioner's claims are and the 
grounds upon which they rest.... 
Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits based on 
conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward will 
burden the courts and encourage disgruntled employees to 
bring unsubstantiated suits. Whatever the practical merits 
of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a 
heightened pleading standard for employment 
discrimination suits .... Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading 
standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed on 
the merits. " Indeed it may appear on the face of the 
pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but 
that is not the test." Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236 [94 S.Ct. 
1683]. 
Id. at 514-15, 122 S.Ct. 992 (emphasis added) (some 
citations omitted). 
In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 
L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam), the Tenth Circuit had 
dismissed an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claim for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a). Plaintiff, 
an inmate in a Colorado state prison, had " alleged that a 
liver condition resulting from hepatitis C required a 
treatment program that officials had commenced but then 
wrongfully terminated, with life-threatening consequences." 
Id. at 89-90, 127 S.Ct. 2197. The Tenth Circuit deemed the 
allegations of the complaint II conclusory" and dismissed on 
the pleadings. Id. at 90, 127 S.Ct. 2197. The Court 
emphatically disagreed: 11 The holding departs in so stark a 
manner from the pleading standard mandated by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that we grant review." Id. The 
Court wrote, " [The complaint] alleged this medication was 
withheld ' shortly after' petitioner had commenced a 
treatment program that would take one year, that he was ' 
still in need of treatment for this disease,' and that the prison 
officials were in the meantime refusing to provide 
treatment. This alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)." 
Id. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (citations omitted). 
The juxtaposition of Swierkiewicz and Erickson, on the one 
hand, and Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal, on the other, is 
perplexing. Even though the Court stated in all five cases 
that it was applying Rule 8(a), it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading 
standard in Dura, Twombly and Iqbal. The Court in Dura 
and Twombly appeared concerned that in some complex 
commercial cases the usual lenient pleading standard under 
Rule 8(a) gave too much settlement leverage to plaintiffs. 
That is, if a non-specific complaint was enough to survive a 
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs would be able to extract 
undeservedly high settlements from deep-pocket 
companies. In Iqbal, by contrast, the Court was concerned 
that the usual lenient standard under Rule 8(a) would 
provide 
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too little protection for high-level executive branch 
officials who allegedly engaged in misconduct in the 
aftermath of September II, 2001. To the extent that we 
perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the 
two groups of cases, it is difficult to know in cases that 
come before us whether we should apply the more lenient 
or the more demanding standard. 
But whatever the difference between these cases, we can at 
least state the following two principles common to all of 
them. First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, 
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply 
recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 
sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 
and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. 
Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must 
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not 
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the 
expense of discovery and continued litigation. 
3. Evaluation of Starr's Complaint 
Viewed in the light of all of the Supreme Court's recent 
cases, we hold that the allegations of Starr's complaint 
satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a). We do not so hold merely 
because Starr's complaint, like the complaint in Erickson, 
alleges deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, we so hold because his 
complaint complies with the two principles just stated. 
First, Starr's complaint makes detailed factual allegations 
that go well beyond reciting the elements of a claim of 
deliberate indifference. These allegations are neither " bald" 
nor " conclusory,'' and hence are entitled to the presumption 
of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct at 1951. Starr specifically alleges 
numerous incidents in which inmates in Los Angeles 
County jails have been killed or injured because of the 
culpable actions of the subordinates of Sheriff Baca. The 
complaint specifically alleges that Sheriff Baca was given 
notice of all of these incidents. It specifically alleges, in 
addition, that Sheriff Baca was given notice, in several 
reports, of systematic problems in the county jails under his 
supervision that have resulted in these deaths and injuries. 
Finally, it alleges that Sheriff Baca did not take action to 
protect inmates under his care despite the dangers, created 
by the actions of his subordinates, of which he had been 
made aware. These incidents are sufficiently detailed to 
give notice to Sheriff Baca of the nature of Starr's claim 
against him and to give him a fair opportunity to defend 
against it. They are far from the " bare assertion" in Iqbal 
that defendants subjected Iqbal to harsh conditions of 
confinement " solely on account" of his " religion, race, 
and/or national origin." Id 
Second, the factual allegations in Starr's complaint 
plausibly suggest that Sheriff Baca acquiesced in the 
unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and was 
thereby deliberately indifferent to the danger posed to Starr. 
There is no " obvious alternative explanation,'' within the 
meaning of Iqbal, for why Sheriff Baca took no action to 
stop his subordinates' repeated violations of prisoners' 
constitutional rights despite being repeatedly confronted 
with those violations, such that the alternative explanation 
requires us to conclude that Starr's explanation " is not a 
plausible conclusion." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951, 1952. If 
there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by 
defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of 
which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion 
to dismiss under Rule l2(b)(6). Plaintiff's complaint may be 
dismissed only when defendant's plausible alternative 
explanation is so convincing that plaintiff's explanation is 
im plausible. The standard at this stage of the litigation is 
not that 
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plaintiff's explanation must be true or even probable. The 
factual allegations of the complaint need only " plausibly 
suggest an entitlement to relief." Id at I 951. As the Court 
wrote in Twombly, Rule 8(a) " does not impose a 
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence" to support the allegations. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (emphasis 
added). Starr's complaint satisfies that standard. 
Conclusion 
We hold that the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal did not 
alter the substantive requirements for supervisory liability 
claims in an unconstitutional conditions of confinement 
case under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where 
deliberate indifference is alleged. We further hold that Starr 
has sufficiently alleged under Rule 8(a) a supervisory 
liability claim of deliberate indifference against Sheriff 
Baca We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of 
Starr's claim against Sheriff Baca and remand for further 
proceedings. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
TROIT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
I respect my experienced colleagues' evaluation of Starr's 
final complaint, but my view of it is different. In the main, 
his complaint has all the hallmarks of an attempted end run 
around the prohibition against using the vicarious liability 
doctrine of respondeat superior to get at the boss. 
Judge Fletcher accurately describes what Starr must allege 
to support an actionable claim of individual supervisory 
liability for deliberate indifference, but I respectfully 
disagree that Starr's complaint measures up to that standard. 
Yes, we have held that " acquiescence or culpable 
indifference" may suffice to show that a supervisor " 
personally played a role in the alleged constitutional 
violations," Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 
(9th Cir.2005); but simply alleging generally that the 
Sheriff is " answerable for the prisoner's safe-keeping" 
doesn't cut it. Id. Plaintiffs complaint does nothing more 
than allege raw legal conclusions with insufficient facts to 
support them. Starr's complaint runs afoul of our Circuit's 
rule that to establish a claim for individual supervisory 
liability, a plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 
conclusions; and those facts must show that the individual 
sued was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of 
the plaintiff's civil rights. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 
1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998). Otherwise, the action fails for 
failure to state a viable claim. Id. Even if Judge Fletcher is 
correct that " supervisory liability" survives Iqbal, a 
plaintiff must still allege facts to get into court. 
Here, I pause for a moment to underscore and to highlight 
a critical aspect of the causation aspect of this issue that too 
often is lost in the undertow of the jailhouse activities of 
which the plaintiff complains: this part of Starr's case is a 
claim not under Monell for an actionable governmental 
policy or custom or practice, but a claim for individual 
responsibility- not agency or department or political unit 
responsibility, but individual responsibility. It follows as 
night the day that the individual under scrutiny must have 
personally engaged in identifiably actionable behavior, even 
with respect to a claim of deliberate indifference. As Judge 
Wu correctly explained, 
A supervisor may be liable if there exists either" (1) his or 
her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, 
or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 
supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 
violation." 
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... As the Ninth Circuit explained in Redman v. County of 
San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir.1991): 
This latter liability is not a form of vicarious liability. 
Rather, it is direct liability. Under direct liability, plaintiff 
must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which 
was the proximate cause of the injury. The Jaw clearly 
allows actions against supervisors under section 1983 as 
long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the 
plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally 
secured right. " The requisite causal connection can be 
established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others 
which the actor knows or reasonably should know would 
cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Johnson v. 
Dufjj;, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir.1978). 
We are evaluating Starr's revised third amended complaint. 
The district court gave him multiple opportunities factually 
to amend to articulate the Sheriffs personal involvement in 
this matter. In particular, the court requested on November 
6, 2006, that Starr " state precisely the basis for the claims 
as to defendant L. Baca in the [anticipated] revised third 
amended complaint." In response, Starr alleged only more 
conclusions and vague and insufficient allegations that the 
Sheriff (1)" knew or reasonably could have known," (2) " 
knew or reasonably should have known," and (3) was " 
aware or should have become aware" of the jail conditions 
of which Starr complains. He sums up his boilerplate 
allegations with a statement that the Sheriff is liable 
because he had either " personal knowledge or constructive 
knowledge" of all these conditions. Alleging that the Sheriff 
" could " have known, " should " have known, and " should 
" have become aware is tantamount to admitting that Starr 
had no facts to support his allegations. The test that governs 
this case consists of two words, not one. Indifference is not 
enough. For indifference to be actionable, it must be 
deliberate. Starr's conclusory allegations amount to no more 
than formulaic flak fired into the sky in an attempt to bring 
down the squadron leader. 
When we cease to look at the Los Angeles Sheriffs 
Department (LASD) as an abstraction and look at the 
reality, we see good reasons for requiring facts before 
permitting lawsuits against the Sheriff himself: the agency 
is gigantic. The LASO is the largest Sheriffs Department in 
the world. It covers 3,171 square miles, 2,557,754 residents, 
and by contract 42 of the 88 incorporated cities in Los 
Angeles County. The Department employs 8,400 law 
enforcement officers and 7,600 civilians and is responsible 
for 48 courthouses and 23 substations. The Men's Central 
Jail alone houses a revolving population of 5,000 inmates. 
In addition, the Department operates the Twin Towers 
Correctional Facility, the Mira Loma Detention Facility, the 
Pitchess Detention Center, and the North County 
Correctional Center. Persons charged with or convicted of 
crimes are in over one hundred different locations. The 
layers of administration and management between what 
happens in a jail are many and they are complex. To infer 
that specific incidents which occur in a jail are necessarily 
known by the Sheriff is to engage in fallacious logic. 
This complexity does not absolve the Department of 
responsibility for respecting the constitutional rights and 
general well-being of its charges, but it does show how 
inappropriate it is to sue the Sheriff individually unless in 
terms of causation the Sheriff can be personally tied to the 
actionable behavior at issue. Just being a disappointing or 
even an insufficiently engaged public servant is not enough. 
Those 
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issues are for the ballot box and the County Board of 
Supervisors, not the courts. 
Judge Wu was clear and correct in his articulation of the 
complaint's deficiencies: 
What you need to do is state precisely what it is that you 
are claiming other than he's the general supervisor of the 
jail facility, and therefore, he can be sued individually if 
anything bad happens, because bad things have happened in 
the past at the jail. It has to be something more than that to 
give rise to a claim. That's what I want. I want you to state 
what precisely it is that he supposedly did wrong, and if it's 
a failure to supervise it can't be just a general failure of 
supervision. It has to be something that is specific. That's 
what I want. 
Earlier in the same hearing, Starr's counsel said this, which 
is equally indicative of no facts, just " theory:" 
MR. PAZ: Your Honor, let me give you an analogy, Your 
Honor. All I can do is put it on the record and try to explain 
to the court the theory. 
It's no different than if we had the head of a hospital, and a 
surgeon five floors down below is killing people on a 
regular basis. If the head of the hospital doesn't act, then 
they will be liable. 
Another concession appeared when counsel said, " We're 
still at the pleading stage where we are just saying do we 
have a right to go to Mr. Baca and do discovery and try to 
prove our case." Counsel's statement here collides with 
what the Supreme Court said in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009): "Rule 8 ... 
does not unlock the doors for a plaintiff armed with nothing 
more than conclusions." Id at 1949-50. 
Sadly, bad things routinely happen in the best of jails. The 
same is true of hospitals, armies, churches, nursing homes, 
synagogues, boy scout troops, and legislatures. To attach 
personal legal liability to the leaders of these organizations, 
however, requires much more than, ' Well, she must have 
known and must have been deliberately indifferent, because 
after all, it happened on her watch.' 
Accordingly, although we review this issue de novo, 
agree with Judge Wu's end-of-the-process conclusion: 
The TAC [Third Amended Complaint], as compared to 
previous pleadings, adds no new allegations which 
adequately identifies [sic] the precise nature of Baca's 
misfeasance or nonfeasance or which establishes a 
sufficient causal link between Baca's actions or inaction and 
the alleged violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. 
Nor does Plaintiffs opposition memorandum point to any 
language in the TAC which demonstrates such a causal 
connection. Plaintiff does not allege that Baca himself 
directly participated in any way in the January 27, 2006 
incident or that he was involved in any review or 
investigation of it. Likewise, Plaintiff has not cited to any 
specific policy implemented by Baca which was the " 
moving force [in] the constitutional violation." Plaintiff 
simply argues that he " has amply satisfied the second ' 
causal connection' prong by alleging facts which put Baca 
on notice of ongoing unconstitutional conduct of his 
subordinates. " However, the mere fact that Baca may have 
known about prior incidents [that] allegedly occurred in the 
jail does not show that Baca has implemented a policy that 
is tantamount to a repudiation of constitutional rights. 
Judge Fletcher's Opinion, with all respect, is difficult to 
reconcile with Iqbal. I extract portions of the Iqbal Opinion 
to illustrate my point: 
The allegations against petitioners are the only ones 
relevant here. The complaint 
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contends that petitioners designated respondent a person of 
high interest on account of his race, religion, or national 
origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments 
to the Constitution. The complaint alleges that " the [FBI], 
under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and 
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its 
investigation of the events of September 11." It further 
alleges that " [t]he policy of holding post-September-I Ith 
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement 
until they were ' cleared' by the FBI was approved by 
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in 
the weeks after September 11, 2001." Lastly, the complaint 
posits that petitioners " each knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" respondent to 
harsh conditions of confinement " as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national 
origin and for no legitimate penological interest." The 
pleading names Ashcroft as the " principal architect" of the 
policy, and identifies Mueller as " instrumental in [its] 
adoption, promulgation, and implementation." 
Id. at 1944 (internal citations omitted) (alterations and 
omissions in original). 
Respondent [Iqbal] ... argues that, under a theory of " 
supervisory liability," petitioners can be liable for " 
knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates' use of 
discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions 
among detainees." That is to say, respondent believes a 
supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's 
discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor's 
violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. 
Respondent's conception of " supervisory liability" is 
inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners 
may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their 
agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action- where masters 
do not answer for the torts of their servants- the term " 
supervisory liability" is a misnomer. Absent vicarious 
liability, each Government official, his or her title 
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own 
misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a 
violation of [a] clearly established right to overcome 
qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is 
required to imposeBivensliability on the subordinate for 
unconstitutional discriminations; the same holds true for an 
official charged with violations arising from his or her 
superintendent responsibilities. 
Id. at 1949 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
Two working principles underlie our decision in [ Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly [550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ]. First, the tenet that a court must 
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Thread-bare recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 
1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we 
must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true, we " are not bound to accept as true a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation " (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and 
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading 
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of 
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a 
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 
for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
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draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But 
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 
has alleged- but it has not" show[n]" "that the pleader 
is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 
Id. at 1949-50 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) 
(second alteration in original). 
We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the 
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 
Respondent pleads that petitioners " knew of, condoned, 
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to 
harsh conditions of confinement " as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national 
origin and for no legitimate penological interest." The 
complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the " principal 
architect" of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was " 
instrumental" in adopting and executing it. These bare 
assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in 
Twombly, amount to nothing more than a " formulaic 
recitation of the elements" of a constitutional 
discrimination claim, namely, that petitioners adopted a 
policy " ' because of,' not merely ' in spite of,' its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group." As such, the allegations 
are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true. To be 
clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground 
that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. We do not so 
characterize them any more than the Court in Twombly 
rejected the plaintiffs' express allegation of a " ' contract, 
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry,' " 
because it thought that claim too chimerical to be 
maintained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent's 
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, 
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth. 
Id. at 1951 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) 
(alterations in original). 
Although Iqbal puts considerable meat on this wise rule's 
bones, it is not new. In 1988, for example, we said in Taylor 
v. List, a failed lawsuit against Nevada's Attorney General 
and the Director of the Nevada State Prison alleging their " 
knowledge of and failure to prevent the alleged 
constitutional violations by their subordinates," the 
following: 
Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of 
personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is 
only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates 
if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or 
knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. 
880 F.2d 1040, 1043, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis 
added) (internal citation omitted). 
The days of pleading conclusions without factual support 
accompanied by the wishful hope of finding something 
juicy during discovery are over. Wisely, we have moved up 
judgment day to the complaint stage rather than bog down 
the courts and parties with pre-summary judgment combat. 
This conclusion, of course, does not leave Starr without 
redress. He may sue the Sheriff in his official capacity, 
which is the same as suing the County of Los Angeles and 
the Sheriffs Department, and he may pursue his lawsuit on 
the ground of official policy or longstanding custom and 
practice- but he may not sue the Sheriff individually just 
because he is the Sheriff. SeePembaur v. City of Cincinnati. 
475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); 
Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 973 
(9th Cir.2010). The district court clearly understands this 
distinction: 
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In other words, any time anything goes wrong of any sort 
Baca gets blamed and he can be individually liable as 
opposed to being liable [in his official capacity] as the agent 
of the county. I can understand that claim. There is no 
problem with that one, but you are suing him on an 
individual basis. 
Given the amount of time and effort already devoted to 
trying to get the Sheriff into this case, I seriously doubt any 
additional facts will come forward. Thus, the next step is 
summary judgment. So be it. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
Notes: 
[*] The Honorable Charles R. Breyer, United States 
District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting 
by designation. 
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Before BETTY B. FLETCHER., RAYMOND C. FISHER, 
and RONALD M. GOULD, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION 
GOULD, Circuit Judge. 
Steve Harris and Dennis F. Ramos (collectively, " 
Plaintiffs") sued Amgen, Inc. ("Amgen") and several 
Amgen directors and officers, alleging that the defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") in their 
operation of two ERISA retirement plans. The district court 
dismissed Harris's claims on the ground that he lacked 
standing as an ERISA plan " participant" because he had 
withdrawn all of his assets from his plan. It also dismissed 
Ramos's claims, reasoning that although Ramos had 
standing, he did not allege any claims against defendants 
who were fiduciaries under the plan. The district court then 
denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. 
We reverse the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. We hold 
that Harris has standing as an ERISA plan participant to 
seek relief under ERISA § 502(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ I l32(a)(2), despite having withdrawn all of his assets 
from his plan. We also conclude that the district court 
improperly denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint 
to add more factual allegations where necessary and to 
identify proper fiduciaries of the Plaintiffs' ERISA plans. 
Amgen is a publicly traded biotechnology company that 
operates Amgen Manufacturing, Ltd. ("Amgen 
Manufacturing") as a wholly owned subsidiary. Employees 
of Amgen are entitled to participate in the Amgen 
Retirement and Savings Plan (the " Amgen Plan"), and 
Amgen Manufacturing employees may participate in the 
Retirement and Savings Plan for Amgen Manufacturing, 
Ltd. (the " Manufacturing Plan"). Each Plan is a " defined 
contribution plan," defined as " a pension plan which 
provides for an individual account for each participant and 
for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the 
participant's account." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34).[l] 
Amgen is a " named fiduciary" only of the Amgen Plan,[2] 
and Amgen Manufacturing is a named fiduciary only of the 
Manufacturing Plan. The Amgen Plan allows the Amgen 
Board of Directors (the " Board") to delegate management 
and administration of the Plan to a" Fiduciary Committee." 
During the time relevant to this appeal, fiduciary 
responsibilities for both Plans were delegated to the 
Fiduciary Committee. 
Steve Harris worked at Amgen until January 2007 and 
participated in the Amgen Plan. His Amgen Plan holdings 
sometimes included Amgen stock. Harris withdrew his 
assets from his Amgen Plan account in July 2007. Dennis F. 
Ramos worked at Amgen Manufacturing until March 2007, 
participating in the Manufacturing Plan. His Manufacturing 
Plan holdings also sometimes included Amgen Stock. 
Ramos still has assets in the Manufacturing Plan. 
In August 2007 Harris and Ramos filed a class action 
complaint (the " Complaint"), alleging that during a 
22-month class period 
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the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing 
the Plans to purchase and hold Amgen stock while knowing 
that the stock price was artificially inflated because of 
improper off-label drug marketing and sales. The Complaint 
asserts that the Amgen stock price declined significantly 
once the off-label activity became public, and Harris and 
Ramos claim that the defendants are liable for the resulting 
losses suffered by the class members. The Complaint 
sought relief under ERISA § 502(a)(2) ("Section 
502(a)(2)"), codified at 29 U.S.C. § l 132(a)(2), which 
authorizes a suit by a plan participant " for appropriate 
relief' against a plan fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Complaint names as defendants Amgen, Amgen's 
chief financial officer, and nine Amgen Board members 
( \;Uiit:Nti vcly, D'3f.::ndauts"). 1-"Jcithcr .l\ ... T,.gen 
Manufacturing nor the Fiduciary Committee is named as a 
defendant. However, the Complaint does assert claims 
against a " Retirement Benefits Committee of the Board of 
Directors of Amgen," which it claims has fiduciary 
responsibilities over both Plans. 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
("Rule") 12(bXl), and for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(bX6). The district court granted the motion and 
dismissed with prejudice all of Harris's claims, concluding 
that Harris did not have statutory standing as a " 
participant" in the Amgen Plan because he had already 
cashed out of his Plan account. The district court 
determined that Ramos had standing because he still had 
assets in the Manufacturing Plan, but it dismissed with 
prejudice all of Ramos's claims on the ground that neither 
Amgen, the alleged retirement committee, nor the named 
defendants were fiduciaries of the Manufacturing Plan. 
The district court also denied Plaintiffs' request for leave to 
amend their Complaint. The district court reasoned that 
Harris could not cure his lack of standing through 
amendment and that Ramos did not " have a viable claim 
against the named defendants." The district court expressly 
made " no determination as to whether Plaintiffs have a 
viable claim against Amgen Manufacturing or the members 
of the Fiduciary Committee." Harris and Ramos appeal the 
dismissal of their claims and the denial of leave to amend. 
II 
A 
We first consider whether the district court properly 
determined that Harris lacked standing under Section 
502(a)(2) because he had withdrawn his assets from the 
Amgen Plan. We review questions of standing under 
ERISA de nova.Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit 
Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.2000).[3] 
" To establish standing to sue under ERISA, [plaintiffs] 
must show that they are plan ' participants.' " Poore v. 
Simpson Paper Co., 566 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.2009). 
Plaintiffs seek relief under Section 502(a)(2), which grants 
standing to a plan participant to bring an action against a 
defendant who breaches a fiduciary duty 
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with respect to that plan. See 29 U.S.C. § l 132(a)(2). An 
ERISA plan participant is " any employee or former 
employee of an employer ... who is or may become eligible 
to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit 
plan which covers employees of such employer .... " 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(7). This definition encompasses " former 
employees who have ... a colorable claim to vested 
benefits.'' Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 117, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) (internal 
quotation omitted). " In contrast, former employees do not 
have standing if a successful suit would result in a damage 
award that was not for benefits due under the plan.'' Vaughn 
v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th 
Cir.2009) (citing Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th 
Cir.1986) (per curiam)). 
The district court relied on Kuntz in concluding that Harris 
was not a " participant" in the Amgen Plan. In Kuntz, we 
held that a plaintiff who alleges that a former employer 
misrepresented the benefits due under a defined benefit 
ERISA plan does not have standing if that plaintiff already 
received all benefits that were due before filing suit and 
seeks only a damage award. Kuntz, 785 F.2d at 141 l. The 
district court reasoned that because Harris had cashed out of 
the Amgen Plan, any recovery he receives would be a 
damage recovery, and he would not have prevailed in a " 
suit for benefits," Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117, 109 S.Ct. 948, 
because" a damage claim is not a plan benefit." Kuntz, 785 
F.2d at 141 l. 
When it dismissed Harris's claims, the district court did not 
have the benefit of the reasoning and holding in our 
subsequent decision in Vaughn, in which we distinguished 
Kuntz and held that " former employees who have received 
a full distribution of their account balances under a defined 
contribution pension plan have standing as plan participants 
under ERISA to recover losses occasioned by a breach of 
fiduciary duty that allegedly reduced the amount of their 
benefits." Vaughn, 567 F.3d at 1030. In Vaughn the plaintiff 
sued fiduciaries of his employer's defined contribution 
ERISA plans, alleging that the fiduciaries breached their 
fiduciary duties with respect to the plans when they did not 
take certain actions despite knowing the plans would be 
terminated. The plaintiff claimed that " he has not received 
all of the benefits due to him under the Plans .... because his 
accounts contained less than they would have if the 
fiduciaries had not breached their duty of prudent 
investment" Id. at 1026. 
The district court in Vaughn had granted the defendants' 
motion to dismiss based on Kuntz, but on the appeal we 
distinguished Kuntz because there the plaintiffs had " 
conceded that they had received all of the benefits due to 
them under the plan [and] alleged only that they would not 
have participated in the plan but-for the defendant's 
misrepresentations about the amount of benefits they would 
receive." Id. We held in Vaughn that " [b]ecause [the 
plaintiff] alleges that he did not receive everything that was 
due to him under the Plan, he has standing, even under 
Kuntz. " Id. We also noted that every other circuit to have 
considered this issue has held that a defined contribution 
plan plaintiff has ERISA standing. Seeid. at 1023 & n. 1 
(citing cases). 
Despite the marked similarity between this case and 
Vaughn, Defendants contend that we should distinguish 
Vaughn on two grounds. First, Defendants argue that 
Vaughn is not controlling because there the employer 
terminated the ERISA plans, but here Harris voluntarily 
withdrew his assets from the still existing Amgen Plan. 
However, our reasoning in Vaughn does not turn on a 
distinction 
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between employer termination and voluntary withdrawal. 
Also, other circuits have granted plaintiffs ERISA standing 
to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims even when the 
plaintiffs had voluntarily cashed out of their ERISA plans. 
See, e.g.,Jn re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 529 F.3d 207, 210 
(4th Cir.2008); Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 
804 (7th Cir.2007). When employees withdraw their funds 
from a benefit plan, but claim that they would have had 
more to withdraw absent breach of fiduciary duty by those 
managing the plan, it is not difficult to see a common sense 
loss of benefits in their plan caused by the alleged fiduciary 
breach. Relying on Vaughn, which we conclude is not 
distinguishable in any material way, we hold that 
employees who cash out of a defined contribution ERISA 
plan are still " participants" in that plan, as defined by 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(7), regardless of whether they withdrew their 
assets voluntarily. Thus the district court's conclusion on 
standing, reached without the benefit of our subsequently 
decided Vaughn precedent, must be reversed. Harris had 
standing to complain about his retirement benefits plan. 
Second, at oral argument, Defendants conceded that Harris 
was a participant in the Amgen Plan, but for the first time 
argued that Harris should have statutory standing only 
under ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B) ("Section 502(a)(l)(B)"), and 
not Section 502(a)(2).[4] Defendants rely on Chief Justice 
Roberts's concurrence in LaRue v. DeWoljf Boberg & 
Assocs., Inc.,_ U.S._, 128 S.Ct. 1020, 169 L.Ed.2d 847 
(2008). In LaRue the Supreme Court held that an ERISA 
plan participant may recover monetary losses to his or her 
individual plan account due to an alleged fiduciary breach. 
Id. at l 026. In his concurrence, which was joined only by 
Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts said that " [i]t is at 
least arguable that a claim of this nature properly lies only 
under§ 502(a)(l)(B) ofERISA," id, and he concluded that 
" other courts in other cases remain free to consider what 
we have not-what effect the availability of relief under § 
502(a)(l)(B) may have on a plan participant's ability to 
proceed under § 502(a)(2)," id at I 028. Defendants argue 
that because Harris could bring a claim under Section 
502(a)(l)(B), he lacks standing to bring a claim under 
Section 502(a)(2). 
We reject Defendants' attempt to create a distinction on 
standing between two similar ERISA causes of action. 
Although Defendants are correct that in Vaughn a Section 
502(a)(IXB) remedy was unavailable,[5] nothing in Vaughn 
indicates that its decision depended on the unavailability of 
this remedy. Also, at least two circuits that have analyzed 
whether a distinction on standing exists between Sections 
502(a)(l)(B) and 502(a)(2) have concluded that " [t]his 
dichotomy is untenable." Evans v. Akers, 534 F.3d 65, 
72-73 (1st Cir.2008) ("The chief difference between an 
action brought 
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under § 502(a)(l)(B) and § 502(a)(2) is the proper 
defendant, not the proper plaintiff ... Bringing the suit under 
§ 502(a)(2) does not change the underlying nature of the 
plaintiffs' claim as one for benefits." (quotation and citation 
omitted)); Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 4% F.3d 291, 301 
(3d Cir.2007) (stating that even when plaintiffs " could 
demand a full benefit payment from the plan itself under § 
I 132(a)(l)(B) .... for most plaintiffs the sensible route is to 
use § I 132(a)(2) to get the money in the first instance from 
a solvent party liable to make good on the loss, not from the 
plan itself'). We agree with the reasoning of the First and 
Third Circuits, and we join them in holding that an ERISA 
plan participant who no longer has assets in the plan has 
statutory standing to assert fiduciary duty claims under 
Section 502(a)(2), even when relief is also available under 
Section 502(a)(l)(B). 
B 
Defendants next argue that even if Harris has statutory 
standing, we still must dismiss his claims for lack of 
standing under Article III of the United States Constitution 
because Harris has not sustained an injury that is 
redressable by a favorable decision of this court. SeeLujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that Article III standing 
requires that " it must be ' likely,' as opposed to merely ' 
speculative,' that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision" (quotation omitted)). Defendants contend that any 
benefit to Harris is " merely speculative" because any 
recovery from Harris's suit would go to the Amgen Plan, 
and plan administrators have discretion in allocating plan 
assets. SeePaulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th 
Cir.2009) ("The Supreme Court has held that recovery for a 
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1109 for breach of fiduciary duty 
inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole, and not to an 
individual beneficiary." (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-42, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 
96 (1985))). 
Defendants are not the first ERISA defendants to make this 
redressability argument, and to our knowledge their asserted 
reasoning has been rejected by every circuit to consider the 
issue with respect to defined contribution plans. SeeEvans, 
534 F.3d at 74-75 ("[1lhe [ERISA] plaintiffs' allegation of 
fiduciary mismanagement ... identifies a concrete injury that 
is redressable by a court and falls within the scope of 
Article Ill standing."); Mutual Funds, 529 F.3d at 210 
("[B]ecause the plans at issue are defined contribution 
plans, rather than defined benefit plans, we reject the 
defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' injuries are not 
redressable and therefore that they lack Article Ill 
standing."); Harzewski, 489 F.3d at 803 ("Obviously the 
named plaintiffs have[Article III] standing to sue ... because 
if they win they will obtain a tangible benefit."). With a 
favorable ruling, a defined contribution plan plaintiff 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty claims under Section 
502(a)(2) can gain redress by" su[ing] for an adjustment in 
the benefits designed to give him what he would have 
received had the formula been honored,• Harzewski, 489 
F.3d at 804-05. 
Our previous decisions dismissing ERISA suits for lack of 
redressability involved fundamentally different facts. 
Paulsen concerned a Section 502(a)(2) suit on a defined 
benefit plan, but " the redressability problem that arises in 
defined benefit plans does not exist with respect to defined 
contribution plans" because in defined contribution plans a 
successful suit leads to restoration of individual accounts. 
Mutual Funds, 529 F.3d at 218; see also 
Page 736 
Vaughn, 561 F.3d at 1028 n. 9 ("[P]recedent from cases 
involving defined benefit plans is not automatically 
applicable in cases involving defined contribution plans." 
(citing LaRue, 128 S.Ct. at 1025)). Also, in Paulsen the 
plaintiffs' ERISA plan was " distress terminated" and had 
fallen under the management of the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") acting as a trustee. 
Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 1066. We noted that the PBGC was 
controlled by a " complex priority scheme" in paying 
benefits, and it was under no obligation to pay the plaintiffs 
any money above a statutory minimum. Id. at 1073. 
In Glanton ex rel. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan v. 
AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.2006), the 
plaintiffs, who were prescription drug plan participants, 
claimed that their success in an ERISA lawsuit regarding 
drug costs would cause the plan administrators to lower 
co-payment or contribution amounts. Id at 1125. The link 
between the plaintiffs' claims and possible recovery in 
Glanton was more attenuated than are Harris's claims here, 
because the Glanton plaintiffs relied not directly on 
fiduciary recovery but on the assumption that the 
defendants would voluntarily change co-payment 
requirements. Seeid. 
We agree with the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits that 
there is no lack of redressability merely because a plaintiff's 
recovery under Section 502(a)(2) might first go to the 
defined contribution plan rather than directly to the 
plaintiff. We hold that a plaintiff who has cashed out of a 
defined contribution ERISA plan has standing under Article 
III to assert Section 502(a)(2) claims relating to that plan. 
In summary, we reject Defendants' arguments that Harris 
lacks either statutory or constitutional standing. We follow 
our precedent in Vaughn and hold that a former employee 
who has voluntarily withdrawn his or her assets from a 
defined contribution ERISA plan has statutory standing as a 
" participant" of that plan. That employee has standing to 
assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty under section 
502(a)(2) of ERISA even if claims under Section § 
502(a)(l)(B) are also available. We also hold that Section 
502(a)(2) claims on a defined contribution plan to recover 
losses occasioned by a breach of fiduciary duty are 
redressable and meet the constitutional standing 
requirements of Article III. Accordingly, we reverse the 
district court's dismissal of Harris's claims on standing 
grounds. 
C 
Both plaintiffs challenge the district court's decision to 
deny them leave to amend their Complaint. Plaintiffs seek 
through amendment to cure any defects in their allegations 
against the individual defendants,[6] and properly to name 
the misidentified 
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fiduciaries of the Amgen and Manufacturing Plans. 
Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is " 
clear" that " the complaint could not be saved by any 
amendment." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 
(9th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted); see alsoChappel v. Lab. 
Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir.2000) (holding 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying an 
ERISA plaintiff leave to amend because " amendment 
would allow [the plaintifl] to state a legally cognizable 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty"). We agree with 
Plaintiffs that the district court erred by not granting leave 
to amend. 
We do not believe that it can be fairly said that the 
Complaint cannot be saved by amendment. The district 
court denied Harris leave to amend because it had 
determined that Harris lacked standing and thus could not 
allege a valid claim. Because we have held that Harris has 
statutory and constitutional standing, we also conclude that 
Harris should be allowed to amend his claims in the 
Complaint to challenge the proper defendants and to present 
any viable claim. Both plaintiffs also should be allowed to 
amend their claims against the individual defendants 
because it is not " clear" that Plaintiffs cannot save their 
Complaint by adding sufficient factual allegations 
supporting their claims that the individual defendants were 
fiduciaries of the Amgen or Manufacturing Plans. Lee, 250 
F.3d at 692. 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims were dismissed because they 
misidentified the proper fiduciary defendants. Although 
Plaintiffs did not name the Fiduciary Committee as a 
defendant, they did name a Retirement Benefits Committee, 
which they thought served the same fiduciary functions. 
Also, Plaintiffs identified Amgen as the named fiduciary of 
the Manufacturing Plan, when in fact Amgen 
Manufacturing is the named fiduciary of that plan. In both 
cases, Plaintiffs would have sued the proper fiduciary but 
for a misidentification of the correct defendant, and their 
claims against Amgen Manufacturing and the Fiduciary 
Committee can be saved by amendment. SeeBawles v. 
Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758-59 (9th Cir.1999) (reversing 
denial of leave to amend when the defendant to be added by 
the amendment " knew or should have known that, but for 
the mistaken identification, she would be a proper party 
defendant in the action"). 
We conclude that Plaintiffs are entitled by law to amend 
their Complaint to assert claims against the proper 
fiduciaries of the Amgen and Manufacturing Plans. A sound 
theory of pleading should normally permit at least one 
amendment of a complex ERlSA complaint that has failed 
to state a claim where, as here, the Plaintiffs might be 
expected to have less than complete information about the 
defendants' organization and ERISA responsibilities, where 
there is no meaningful evidence of bad faith on the part of 
the plaintiffs, and where there is no significant prejudice to 
the defendants. We reverse the district court's denial of 
leave to amend. 
III 
Fiduciaries of an ERlSA defined contribution plan who 
breach their fiduciary duty might cause employees to 
receive fewer benefits from their plans than they would 
have received absent the breach. This is true even if the 
employees later withdraw their assets from the plan. We 
conclude that former employees who have voluntarily 
withdrawn assets from their ERlSA defined contribution 
plans have 
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statutory and Article III standing to assert fiduciary claims 
against Plan fiduciaries under ERlSA § 502(a)(2), 
regardless of whether a separate remedy is available under 
ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B). We also conclude that any defects in 
Plaintiffs' Section 502(a)(2) Complaint possibly can be 
cured through amendment. We reverse the district court's 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, and we remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
Notes: 
[I] A defined contribution plan is distinct from a" defined 
benefit plan," which, with exceptions not relevant here, " 
means a pension plan other than an individual account 
plan." 29 U.S.C. § !002(35). 
[2] A named fiduciary is " a fiduciary who is named in the 
plan instrument" or by an authorized employer or employee 
organization. 29 U.S.C. § I I 02(a)(2). 
[3] Although the district court dismissed Harris's claims 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a dismissal for lack 
of statutory standing is properly viewed as a dismissal for 
failure to state a claim. SeeVaughn v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., 
Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, !024 (9th Cir.2009). However, " 
[b]ecause we review dismissals under both Rule 12(b)(l) 
and Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, the district court's error [in 
characterization] does not affect the result in this case." Id. 
( citation omitted). 
[4] Section 502(a)(I )(B) allows a plan participant " to 
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." 29 
U.S.C. § I 132(a)(l)(B). By contrast, Section 502(a)(2) 
encompasses claims based on breach of fiduciary duty and 
allows for the more expansive recovery of " appropriate 
relief:" including disgorgement of profits and equitable 
remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § § l 132(a)(2), 1109. 
[5] In Vaughn, the ERISA plans at issue " no longer 
exist[ed] and the allegedly imprudent investments were the 
result of actions by the trustees and investment advisors, not 
the plan administrator. As a result, Vaughn could not have 
brought an action under§ 502(a)(l)(B) because the proper 
defendants could not have been named under that 
subsection." Vaughn, 567 F.3d at 1029. 
[6] The district court determined that the Complaint made 
insufficient factual allegations that the individual 
defendants were fiduciaries of Ramos's ERISA plan. 
SeePegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226, 120 S.Ct 2143, 
147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000) ("In every case charging breach of 
ERISA fiduciary duty, then, the threshold question is ... 
whether [the defendant] was acting as a fiduciary (that is, 
was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action 
subject to complaint."). We agree with the district court that 
the Complaint does not contain factual allegations against 
the individual defendants sufficient " to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 
929 (2007); id. (stating that to survive a motion to dismiss, 
a plaintiff must provide " more than labels and conclusions, 
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do"); see alsoAshcroft v. Iqbal. _ U.S. _, 
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (holding that 
the pleading requirements stated in Twombly apply to " all 
civil actions"). 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court has before it Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
(Dkt. 8) and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt. 11 ). For the 
reasons explained below, the Court will grant Defendants' 
motion in part and deny it in part, and deny Plaintiffs 
motion to strike.[!] 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, a tenured associate professor in 
Idaho State University's (" ISU" ) Civil Engineering 
Department, was terminated by ISU through its president, 
Defendant Arthur V ailas, based upon a recommendation by 
Defendant Richard Jacobsen, Dean of the ISU's College of 
Engineering. Comp/. at ,r ,r 60, 77, Dkt. l. 
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Mr. Sadid has alleged that a number of events and 
circumstances culminated in his termination. First, Mr. 
Sadid publicly criticized ISU on various matters which he 
alleges are of public concern. Id at ,r ,r 15, 17, 19, 24-25, 
32, 37. In September 2008, Mr. Sadid initiated a state court 
action against ISU for declining to appoint him as Civil 
Engineering Department Chair, despite a faculty vote in his 
favor. Id. at ,r ,r 21-23, 30. Mr. Sadid engaged Defendant 
Jacobsen in a " private discussion at a public venue" on 
April 9, 2009, Id. at Intro. ,r, for which he was issued a 
letter ofreprimand by Defendant Jacobsen. Id. at ,r 40. At a 
College of Education faculty meeting on April 21, 2009, 
Mr. Sadid " engaged in the discussions during the meeting 
where he felt he had input" and allegedly " was very direct, 
very professional and not intimidated by others during this 
discourse." Id. at 47. As a result of his behavior in this 
meeting, Defendant Jacobsen issued a Notice of 
Contemplated Action to Mr. Sadid, stating his intent to 
recommend terminating Mr. Sadid because of his " 
continued pattern of behavior" at ISU. Id. at 50-51. Finally, 
Mr. Sadid " received a letter of reprimand in regard to 
purchases made," from ISU Provost, Gary Olson, dated July 
2, 2009. Id. at ,r 53. 
On July 17, 2009, Mr. Sadid and his counsel met with 
Defendant Jacobsen and ISU's counsel, allowing Mr. Sadid 
"to present [mitigating] evidence or information" on his " 
pattern of behavior." Id at ,r ,r 52, 56. Allegedly, the focus 
of this meeting was Mr. Sadid's behavior at the April 21 
College of Engineering meeting. Id. at ,r 58. On August 3, 
2009, Defendant Jacobsen recommended terminating Mr. 
Sadid for his behavior on April 9 and 21; "unprofessional 
behavior in past academic years" that adversely affected 
ISU, its fundraising efforts and " staff and administrator [ 
sic J that had left ISU" ; " [c]reating a hostile work 
environment ... which caused some faculty to leave and 
others to consider leaving ISU," " [n]on-conformance with 
purchasing policies" ; and " [c]onsistent disruptive 
behavior." Id. at ,r 61. Mr. Sadid alleges that the only 
ground for termination he was aware of was for his 
behavior on April 9 and 21, id. at 160, though it is clear he 
was also aware of the purchasing issues prior to the July 17 
conference. Id. at ,r 53. The next day, Defendant Vailas 
notified Mr. Sadid that he was being recommended for 
termination. Id. at 62. 
Mr. Sadid submitted a Notice of Grievance on August 18, 
2009. Id at ,r 63. ISU held a grievance hearing for Mr. 
Sadid, and he alleges that " during the hearing process, ISU 
raised issues in support of [his] termination that were never 
a part of the [Notice of Contemplated Action] issued to 
[him] and of which [he] never received notice." Id. at 65-66. 
Based on the hearing, ISU's Faculty Appeals Board found " 
insufficient evidence" warranting termination. Id. at 67. The 
4 to 1 majority was particularly concerned by what it 
termed a " lack of due process." Id. at 68. ISU's Faculty 
Senate- though not related or privy to the hearing- also 
pay any judgment obtained against it, the judgment creditor 
must bring his action in [Idaho Supreme Court] based upon 
such judgment, and ask for a recommendatory judgment to 
the Legislature." Moscow Hardware Co. v. Regents of Univ. 
of Idaho, l 9 Idaho 420, 113 P. 731 (1911 ).[5] Finally, ISU 
is more like the Stoner and Regents entities than the 
Beentjes entity because its largest source of funds is still the 
state. Presentation to: The Joint Finance-Appropriations 
Committee, slide 10. 
Moving to the second Mitchell factor, ISU serves the 
central government because it establishes and maintains " 
the intelligence of the people," crucial to " [t]he stability of 
a republican form of government." Idaho Const. Art. IX, § 
1. See alsoRounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 
F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.1999). 
Third, ISU is " a body politic and corporate, with its own 
seal and having power to sue and be sued in its own name." 
LC. § 33-3003. However, the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in College Savings Bank calls into question 
the prudence of giving any serious weight to this factor. 
Although discussing waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, it noted that an otherwise immune state agency 
does not " consent to suit in federal court merely by stating 
its intention to ' sue and be sued.' " College Savings Bank, 
527 U.S. at 669, 119 S.Ct. 2219. 
Fourth, although ISU has been given the power " [t]o 
acquire by purchase, gift or the exercise of the right of 
eminent domain and hold and dispose of real or personal 
property or rights or interests therein," LC. § 33-3804, " 
[ a]ll rights and title to property, real or personal, belonging 
to or vested in the Idaho State University are ... vested in its 
board of trustees and their successors." LC. § 33-3005. 
Finally, ISU's corporate status is that of " a body politic 
and corporate and a separate and independent legal entity." 
LC. § 33-3803. However, in the same breath the State " 
further confirm[s] [ISU] as a governmental instrumentality 
for the dissemination of knowledge and learning." Id. 
Although ISU is an entity that experiences a certain 
amount of autonomy deriving from its ability to generate 
non-state revenues and its designation as an " independent 
legal entity," the balance of the Mitchell factors demonstrate 
that it is an arm of the State of Idaho. As in Ferguson, this 
Court finds that ISU is immune from suit in federal court, 
particularly because of the " ' impact' on the State treasury" 
a judgment against it would have. Ferguson, 647 F.Supp. at 
192. 
B. ISU Has Not Waived Its Immunity 
A state consents to a suit, or waives its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, by (l) " voluntarily invok[ing] our 
jurisdiction" 
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or (2) " mak[ing] a clear declaration that it intends to 
submit itself to our jurisdiction.'' College Savings Bank, 527 
U.S. at 676, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
First," [a] state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
if it ' unequivocally evidence [s its] intention to subject 
itself to the jurisdiction of the federal court.' " Johnson v. 
Rancho Santiago Commty. College Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 
1021 (9th Cir.2010)(quoting Hill v. Blind Indus. & Svcs. of 
Md., 179 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir.1999)). Waiver occurred in 
Hill " when the state did not raise the defense until the 
opening day of trial, after it had filed two motions to 
dismiss and an answer that did not assert the defense, 
consented to have a magistrate judge try the case, conducted 
discovery, moved to compel discovery and for sanctions, 
participated in a pre-trial conference, and filed trial 
materials.'' Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1021-1022 (discussing 
Hill, 179 F.3d at 758); see alsoin re Bliemeister, 296 F.3d 
858, 862 (9th Cir.2002) (the state waived sovereign 
immunity when it filed a limited response, an answer, and a 
motion for summary judgment; attended an oral hearing and 
argued the merits; and heard the court announce its 
preliminary leanings, all without raising the sovereign 
immunity defense). The defendant in Johnson similarly 
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by " litigat[ing] 
the suit on its merits, participat[ing] in discovery, and 
fil[ing] a motion to dismiss and a summary judgment 
motion without pressing a sovereign immunity defense," 
even though it " baldly asserted" the defense in its answer. 
Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1022. 
ISU has only submitted this motion and disputed Mr. 
Sadid's motion to strike its reply. Such is insufficient to 
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Second, as discussed above, " a State does not consent to 
suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the 
courts of its own creation." College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 
at 676 (internal citations omitted). " Nor does it consent to 
suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ' sue 
and be sued,' or even by authorizing suits against it' in any 
court of competent jurisdiction.' " Id (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). Accordingly, ISU's statutory 
authorization to " sue and be sued," I.C. § 33-3003, is 
insufficient to constitute a conscious waiver. 
C. Federal Law Has Not Abrogated ISU's Immunity 
Finally, ISU's Eleventh Amendment immunity has not 
been abrogated by congressional authorization. " We cannot 
conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the 
well-established immunity of a State from being sued 
without its consent." Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 67, 109 S.Ct 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). 
2. Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen 
A. Official Capacity 
Mr. Sadid has brought suit against Defendants V ailas and 
Jacobsen in their official capacities in all counts of his 
lawsuit. " [S]uits against state officials in their official 
capacity are no different from suits against the state itself." 
Krainski v. Nevada, 616 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.2010) 
(citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989)). There 
is, however, " [a] narrow exception ... ' where the relief 
sought is prospective in nature and is based on an ongoing 
violation of the plaintiffs federal constitutional or statutory 
rights.'" Id. at 967-968 (quoting Central Reserve Life of N. 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.1988)) 
( emphasis in original). Under this exception- termed the 
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Ex Parte Young doctrine [6]- " official-capacity actions 
for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the 
State." Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. IO, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
" In determining whether Ex Parte Young is applicable ... 
the relevant inquiry is only whether [Plaintift] has alleged 
an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective 
relief." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 
F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.2007). The " court need only 
conduct a straightforward inquiry." Verizon Md., Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 
1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). 
Mr. Sadid is seeking monetary damages, reinstatement, 
attorney fees and costs and removal of negative statements 
in his personnel file. Comp!. at 36, Dk:t. 1. But he has not 
alleged an ongoing violation of federal law, and these 
remedies are all retrospective. Accordingly, Defendants 
Vailas and Jacobsen are immune from suit in their official 
capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. 
B. Individual Capacity 
Mr. Sadid has also sued Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen in 
their individual capacities. Although Defendants seek 
dismissal of Mr. Sadid's Complaint in its entirety, the only 
asserted basis for dismissal is Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. However, Eleventh Amendment immunity does 
not apply to claims brought against defendants in their 
individual capacities. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss 
Mr. Sadid's claims against Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen 
in their individual capacities will be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The claims against ISU and against Defendants Vailas and 
Jacobsen in their official capacities cannot be cured and are 
therefore dismissed with prejudice. All other counts against 
Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen in their individual 
capacities remain. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED: 
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dk:t. 8) is GRANTED 
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. All counts against ISU 
and against Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen in their official 
capacities are dismissed. All charges against Defendants 
Vailas and Jacobsen in their individual capacities remain. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dk:t. I l) is DENIED as 
moot. 
Notes: 
[l] Plaintiff moved to strike Defendants' Reply for 
exceeding the ten-page limit. Dk:t. I l . The Court 
subsequently granted Defendants' Motion (Dk:t. 12) to 
Exceed the page limit Dk:t. 17. For that reason, and because 
the Court did not consider the excess pages in its decision 
here, Plaintiffs motion to strike will be denied as moot. 
[2] The Court has some concern about the continued 
vitality of the liberal amendment policy adopted in Harris 
v. Amgen, based as it is on language in Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), 
suggesting that " a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim .... " Given Twombly and Iqbal' s rejection of the 
liberal pleading standards adopted by Conley, a question 
arises whether the liberal amendment policy of Harris v. 
Amgen still exists. Nevertheless, the Circuit has continued 
to apply the liberal amendment policy even after dismissing 
claims for violating Iqbal and Twombly.SeeMarket Trading, 
Inc. v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 388 Fed.Appx. 707 (9th 
Cir.2010) (not for publication). Accordingly, the Court will 
continue to employ the liberal amendment policy. 
[3] These factors were first addressed by the Ninth Circuit 
in Mitchell v. Los Angeles Comm. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198 
(9th Cir.1988). 
[4] Though Stoner was a suit brought under 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a), it hinged on whether the state agencies being sued 
were a" person" under§ 3729. 502 F.3d at 1121. Because" 
Eleventh Amendment case law should guide [the] 
determination of whether an entity is a state agency and 
thus not a ' person' for purposes of§ 3729," id, its analysis 
is still pertinent here. 
[5] The University of Idaho's Board of Regents and ISU's 
Board of Trustees are the same: the Idaho State Board of 
Education, and the Idaho State Board of Education has the 
same general responsibilities over both institutions. LC. §§ 
33-2802, 33-3003. Accordingly, Moscow Hardware also 
establishes the State of Idaho's legal liability for ISU's 
debts. 
[6] The United States Supreme Court first conducted the 
analysis in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 
L.Ed. 714 (1908). 
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PERCURIAM: 
Appellant Cook, Perkiss & Liehe appeals the decision of a 
United States Magistrate acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 
636(c) granting appellees' motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim for false advertising under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. l 125(a). We agree with the 
magistrate that Cook's complaint does not state a claim for 
relief under the Lanham Act because, as a matter oflaw, the 
alleged misrepresentations contained in the appellees' 
advertisement are merely "puffery." We therefore affirm the 
magistrate's judgment dismissing the Lanham Act claim and 
dismissing without prejudice the pendent state claims. 
BACKGROUND 
Appellant, Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc., ("Cook") is a 
California law firm engaged primarily in commercial and 
consumer debt collection in Northern California Lawrence 
H. Cassidy, appellee, is chief executive officer of appellee, 
Northern California Collection Service ("NCC"), a 
California corporation that provides debt collection services 
for its clients. 
Giving rise to this suit was an advertisement placed by 
NCC in McCords Daily Notification Sheet, a San Francisco 
publication that provides credit information to subscribers. 
The advertisement stated: 
DO YOU PAY FOR AN AITORNEY TO DO YOUR 
COLLECTION WORK? And pay. And pay. And pay! 
Were you quoted a really low "collection fee" only to find 
that "costs" are eating you alive? Do you find that you are 
doing all the "leg work" for your lawyer? Then call 
us--we're the low cost commercial collection experts. 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA COLLECTION SERVICE, 
INC. 
SACRAMENTO VALLEY BOARD OF TRADE, INC. 
700 Leisure Lane, Sacramento, CA 95815 
(916) 929-7811 
Lawrence H. Cassidy, President 
Cook filed a complaint in the United States District Court, 
Northern District of California, on April 29, 1988 and an 
amended complaint on May 16, 1988, alleging five causes 
of action with regard to the advertisement. The first is a 
false advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. Sec. l 125(a). The remaining 
claims are state and common law causes of action for unfair 
competition, libel, defamation, and disparagement. 
The parties consented to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c). On August 2, 1988, 
Magistrate Claudia Wilken granted, without leave to 
amend, NCC's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under the Lanham Act. She then declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the pendent state claims in the absence of a 
cognizable claim under the Lanham Act, and dismissed 
them without prejudice. A judgment was entered by 
Magistrate Wilken on September 9, 1988. 
Magistrate Wilken found that false advertising under 
section 43(a) of the Act is limited to false representations 
with respect to a defendant's own product and services, so 
that to the extent NCC's advertisement made false 
representations about Cook's or collection attorneys' 
services, rather than its own, such representations are not 
actionable under the Lanham Act. Cook does not contest 
this legal finding on appeal. [l] 
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Magistrate Wilken granted the motion to dismiss because 
she found that the alleged implied misrepresentations 
concerning NCC's own services (that NCC's fees are lower 
than those of any attorney and that NCC performs the same 
services as attorneys at a better or more competitive price) 
were not actionable under the Act because they constituted 
mere "puffery" rather than factual claims upon which a 
reasonable consumer would rely. 
Cook contends that the dismissal was improper. It argues 
that its complaint sufficiently stated each element of a false 
advertising claim under the Lanham Act, and that the 
district court improperly made a factual determination in 
holding that the advertisement was puffery and therefore 
not actionable. Cook also asserts that it could have added 
other federal claims which would have saved the pendent 
claims from dismissal and that the district court therefore 
abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint without 
leave to amend. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Dismissal For Failure to State a Claim 
A. Standard of Review 
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6). Guillory v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 
1381 (9th Cir.1984). We must accept material allegations in 
the complaint as true and construe them in the light most 
favorable to the appellant, Cook. Ascon Properties, Inc. v. 
Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1989). We 
may affirm the district court's dismissal "only if it is clear 
that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that 
could be proved consistent with the allegations." Id. 
(quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 
S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). 
B. Analysis 
On appeal, the parties agree on the elements that must be 
alleged in order to state a false advertising claim under 
section 43(a) of the Act. These elements were set out in Ski! 
Corp. v. Rockwell Int'! Corp., 375 F.Supp. 777, 783 
(N.D.111.1974): 
1) in its .. . advertisements, defendant made false 
statements offact about its own product; [l l] 
2) those advertisements actually deceived or have the 
tendency to deceive a substantial segment of their audience; 
3) such deception is material, in that it is likely to 
influence the purchasing decision; 
4) defendant caused its falsely advertised goods to enter 
interstate commerce; and 
5) plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as the result 
of the foregoing either by direct diversion of sales from 
itself to defendant, or by lessening of the good will which 
its products enjoy with the buying public. 
Id. (footnote omitted). [2] See also Oil Heat Inst. of 
Oregon v. Northwest Natural Gas, 708 F.Supp. 1118, 1121 
(D.Or.1988). 
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The controversy in this case centers around elements one 
and two. NCC makes one overt statement about its own 
services in its advertisement: "[W]e're the low cost 
commercial collection experts." However, a false 
advertising cause of action under the Act is not limited to 
literal falsehoods; it extends to false representations made 
by implication or innuendo. In American Home Products 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1978), 
the Second Circuit stated: 
That Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more 
than literal falsehoods cannot be questioned. Were it 
otherwise, clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and 
ambiguous suggestions could shield the advertisement from 
scrutiny precisely when protection against such 
sophisticated deception is most needed. 
Id. at 165 (citations omitted). See also U-Haul Int1, Inc. v. 
Jartran, Inc., 522 F.Supp. 1238, 1247 (D.Ariz.1981), afl'd, 
681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.1982); cf. American Home Products 
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d 
Cir.1982). 
Therefore, Cook may allege--and we are willing to accept 
as true for the purposes of this appeal--that the 
advertisement as a whole can be read as implying that NCC 
offers the same collection services as lawyers at a lower or 
more competitive price. The dispositive issue, however, is 
whether this alleged misrepresentation is merely "puffery," 
as the lower court found, and thus not actionable under the 
act, or whether it is a statement of fact which has the 
tendency to deceive the reader. 
Cook does not refute the contention that puffing 
immunizes an advertisement from liability under the 
Lanham Act. Indeed, there is much support for this 
contention. See Stiffel Co. v. Westwood Lighting Group, 
658 F.Supp. I 103, 1115 (D.N.J.1987); Toro Co. v. Textron, 
Inc., 499 F.Supp. 241, 253 n. 23 (D.Del.1980); 
Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 242 
F.Supp. 302, 308-09 (N.D.Ill.1%5). Cook argues, however, 
that whether a statement in an advertisement constitutes 
"puffing" is a question of fact that may not be determined 
by a court in a 12(b)(6) motion. Cook contends that it 
should have been allowed to introduce evidence showing 
that these misrepresentations could have misled the public. 
It is well-established that questions of fact cannot be 
resolved or determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rennie & 
Laughlin, Inc. v. Chzysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 212 (9th 
Cir.1957). It is also well-established that a court must 
accept material allegations as true and construe them in the 
light most favorable to the appellant. Ascon, 866 F.2d at 
Il52. 
Here, we are willing to accept as true Cook's allegation 
that the advertisement implies that NCC offers the same 
collection services as lawyers at a lower price. However, we 
still may determine as a matter of law whether this alleged 
misrepresentation is a statement of fact, actionable under 
the Lanham Act, or mere puffezy. District courts often 
resolve whether a statement is puffezy when considering a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and we can think of no sound reason 
why they should not do so. See Cohen v. Prudential-Bache 
Sec., Inc., 713 F.Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y.1989) 
(considering whether a securities broker's statement 
constituted puffing in determining whether to grant a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for securities 
fraud); Metzner v. D.H. Blair & Co., 689 F.Supp. 262, 
263-64 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (dismissing a count alleging that 
brokerage firm's representatives made untrue satements of 
material facts because the alleged statements were "merely 
puffezy" and therefore not actionable under the securities 
laws); Radio Today, Inc. v. Westwood One, Inc., 684 
F.Supp. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (considering whether 
alleged misrepresentations were puffezy in determining 
whether a complaint stated a cause of action for false 
advertising under the Lanham Act); Testing Systems, Inc. v. 
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Magnaflux Corp., 251 F.Supp. 286, 288-89 
(E.D.Penn.1966) (considering whether statements were 
"puffs" in determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim for trade libel or disparagement). 
In determining that NCC's advertisement was not 
actionable, Magistrate Wilken compared it to a statement 
found to be puffezy in Metro Mobile Cts, Inc. v. Newvector 
Communications, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 1289 (D.Ariz.1986) 
rev'd without opinion, 803 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.1986). [3] The 
district court in Metro Mobile stated that: " 'Puffing' has 
been described by most courts as involving outrageous 
generalized statements, not making specific claims, that are 
so exaggerated as to preclude reliance by consumers." Id. at 
1292. It found the following statement to be puffery, and 
therefore not actionable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act: "We ask you: Would you prefer to do business with the 
phone company with the best technology, lower rates, and 
better customer service?" Id. at 1293. Magistrate Wilken 
found NCC's advertisement to be similar to this 
advertisement in that they both imply lower rates and better 
services than those of a competitor. She stated that "Here, 
the implication of the advertisement is an exaggerated claim 
that defendants' costs are lower than any competing 
attorney's. It is beyond the realm of reason to assert, as 
plaintiffs do, that a reasonable consumer would interpret 
this as a factual claim upon which he or she could rely." 
We agree with the district court that any implication that 
can be drawn from NCC's advertisement regarding NCC's 
lower costs and superiority over collection attorneys 
constitutes puffezy and is not actionable as false advertising 
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
In the FTC context, we have recognized puffezy in 
advertising to be "claims [which] are either vague or highly 
subjective." Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 741 F.2d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir.1984), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1843, 85 L.Ed.2d 143 
(1985). The common theme that seems to run through cases 
considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer 
reliance will be induced by specific rather than general 
assertions. "[A]dvertising which merely states in general 
terms that one product is superior is not actionable." 
Smith-Victor, 242 F.Supp. at 308. "However, 
misdescriptions of specific or absolute characteristics of a 
product are actionable." Stiffel, 658 F.Supp. at 1115. In 
Smith-Victor, an advertiser's statement that its lamps were 
"far brighter than any lamp ever before offered for home 
movies" was ruled puffery. However, when the advertiser 
quantified numerically the alleged superior brightness with 
statements such as "35,000 candle power and IO-hour life," 
the court found a potential Lanham Act claim. 242 F.Supp. 
at 308-09. 
Here, the alleged misrepresentations in NCC's 
advertisement are merely general in nature. The statement 
that "we're the low cost commercial collection experts" and 
any implication that NCC has comparable services to 
attorneys at lower rates are general assertions of superiority 
rather than factual misrepresentations. The advertisement 
does not contain the kind of detailed or specific factual 
assertions that are necessazy to state a false advertising 
cause of action under the Act. We agree with Magistrate 
Wilken that "it is beyond the realm of reason to assert ... 
that a reasonable consumer would interpret this as a factual 
claim upon which he or she could rely." 
II. Denial of Leave to Amend 
Cook argues that the district court improperly denied its 
motion for leave to amend its complaint. NCC contends that 
Cook never made a motion to amend. In its reply brief, 
Cook points out that it requested leave to amend in its brief 
in opposition to the motion to dismiss. 
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We have held that in dismissals for failure to state a claim, 
a district court should grant leave to amend even if no 
request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by 
the allegation of other facts. Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 
320,322 (9th Cir.1962) (citing Sidebotham v. Robison, 216 
F.2d 816, 826 (9th Cir.1954); see also Erlich v. Glasner, 
352 F.2d 119, 122 (9th Cir.1965). Therefore, it is of no 
consequence that Cook did not file a formal motion, 
accompanied by a proposed amendment, requesting leave to 
amend. 
Here, it is apparent that the district court determined that 
the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other 
facts. Because it found that the advertisement was not a 
factual representation and therefore not actionable, no 
amendment would have been able to cure this defect. 
Cook also contends that it should have been granted leave 
to amend to add other federal claims so that its pendent 
state claims, which it asserts are now time barred, would not 
have been dismissed. In the lower court proceedings on the 
motion, however, Cook did not indicate in any way that it 
had other federal claims to bring when the court solicited 
arguments from the attorneys on the issue of dismissing the 
pendent claims. In addition, the federal causes of action that 
Cook lists in its reply brief that it contends could have been 
added to save the pleading are either incomprehensible or 
futile. Therefore, the district court's decision to grant the 
motion without leave to amend was proper. 
III. Dismissal of Pendent State Law Claims 
The lower court dismissed without prejudice Cook's 
pendent state claims. When federal claims are dismissed 
before trial, the question whether pendent state claims 
should still be entertained is within the discretion of the 
district court. Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th 
Cir.1985). We have held that the proper exercise of 
discretion is to dismiss the pendent state claims as well. 
Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 
646, 651 (9th Cir.1984) (citing United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 
218 (1966). Therefore, the district court's action in this 
regard was proper. 
AFFIRMED. 
Notes: 
[l]At the time of the magistrate's decision, section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a), applied only to 
misrepresentations about a defendants' own products or 
services. See U-Haul Int'!, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 
1159, 1160-62 (9th Cir.1982) ("False statements offact in a 
defendant's advertising concerning his product fit 
comfortably within the language of section 43(a)."); 
Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406 
(9th Cir.1988) ("Section 43( a) ... reaches false advertising 
about the goods or services of the advertiser."). Section 
43(a) then provided: 
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in 
connection with any goods or services, or any container or 
containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any 
false decription or representation, including words or other 
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, 
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into 
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the 
falsity of such designation of origin or description or 
representation cause or procure the same to be transported 
or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be 
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any 
person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as 
that of origin or in the region in which said locality is 
situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is 
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false 
description or representation. 
[15]U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a) (1982). 
This section was amended, effective November 16, 1989, 
and now encompasses statements made by a defendant 
about "his or her or another person's products." See 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-667, 
Sec. 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (1988), 15 U.S.C. Sec. l 125(a) 
( 1988) ( emphasis added). 
At no point during this appeal has appellant argued that the 
amended version of the Act should be applied to this appeal 
or that the district court erred in its legal conclusion that the 
alleged misrepresentions concerning Cook's or collection 
attorneys' services are not actionable. Therefore, we decline 
to address either of these issues. See International Union of 
Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20, 
AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th 
Cir.1985). 
[2]We note that under the newly amended version of 
section 43(a), the first element would also include 
statements about another person's products. See supra, at 
243. 
[3]In Metro Mobile the district court granted preliminary 
injunctive relief to ban the defendants' advertisements (it 
found defendants' other advertisements to be misleading 
and not puffery) and we reversed without opinion. 
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AGID, LAU, and LEACH, JJ. 
PERCURIAM. 
[150 Wn.App. 494] ,r I In guardianship proceedings, the 
superior court has broad and exclusive jurisdiction over the 
administration of the estate of an incapacitated individual. 
In hearing such matters, the court also has the authority to 
impose sanctions for civil contempt to coerce a party's 
compliance with a judgment or order. We have reviewed 
the record and affirm the trial court in all respects and 
award attorney fees on appeal. 
FACTS 
,r 2 Louise Laverne Wells, her adult children, and others, 
claimed various ownership interests in the family home in 
Seattle. Title to the home was the subject of dispute and 
then litigation when Wells and one of her daughters filed an 
action to quiet title against the claimed interests of Dirk 
Mayberry, his spouse, and one of his corporate entities, 
Response Capital Mortgage, Inc. (collectively referred to as 
Mayberry). Mayberry claimed a 50 percent interest in the 
home. During the litigation, Wells was determined to be 
incapacitated and guardians of her estate and person were 
appointed.[!] Wells moved out of the family home to live 
with the guardians of her person. Following the 
establishment of the guardianship, the guardian of the 
estate, its counsel, and counsel for Wells engaged in 
settlement negotiations with Mayberry. A settlement was 
reached and an agreement 
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drafted. Its execution was contingent on approval by the 
court, and the agreement was not considered fully executed 
until such approval was obtained. The agreement provided 
that upon execution, the quiet title action II shall be 
dismissed with prejudice in accordance with Civil Rule 41. 11 
The court approved the agreement, authorizing the guardian 
to take all actions necessary to carry out its provisions. The 
agreement allowed Wells' adult children who lived in the 
home to reside there as tenants for an additional 90 days, so 
long as they paid rent and all utilities. Response Capital 
Mortgage, Inc. (Response Capital), and Start Corporation of 
America (Start Corp.) were not to be responsible for repairs 
or maintenance of the home. 
,r 3 The agreement also set forth that Wells would receive 
funds within 60 days of its approval and a remaining 
balance to be paid into a Medicaid Pooled Trust for her 
benefit.[2] Mayberry, Response Capital, Start Corp., and 
Elizabeth Wilson [3] executed a [208 P.3d 1129] 
promissory note and deed of trust securing the note in favor 
of Wells and her attorney in the amount of$54,83I.27, due 
and payable April 29, 2007. In addition to its provision for 
interest, the promissory note also included a section 
providing for attorney fees and costs.[4] In return, all claims 
to the property were deeded to Response Capital and Start 
Corp. 
,r 4 Wells did not receive funds by the due date. Pursuant 
to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), 
chapter 11.96A RCW, the guardian petitioned for and 
obtained [150 Wn.App. 496] a citation directing Response 
Capital and Dick and Jane Doe Mayberry to appear Before 
the court to show cause why their obligations under the 
agreement had not been met.[5] 
,r 5 The scheduled hearing was continued a number of 
times at the request of counsel for Mayberry, with the 
eventual hearing set for October 5, 2007. [6] The day 
Before this hearing, Mayberry appeared unannounced at the 
office of counsel for the guardian requesting another 
continuance. He claimed the adult children of Wells caused 
considerable damage to the family home after the 
agreement was approved. The guardian did not agree to a 
continuance. 
,i 6 At the October 5 hearing, Mayberry did not dispute his 
breach of the agreements or provide a written response to 
the petition, but raised the claim of alleged damage to the 
home by Wells' adult children. Mayberry testified under 
oath that the sale of the house that was to provide the funds 
for distribution to Wells had occurred. He produced copies 
of two cashier's checks made out to Wells, but admitted he 
did not have the original checks. After review of these 
copies, the commissioner set the hearing over until 3:00 
p.m. and instructed Mayberry to prepare a written response 
to the petition, set forth any claims about the damage to the 
house, and bring the originals of the cashier's checks to the 
court. The court specifically stated to counsel: 
Your client is not going to scam this Court with " I don't 
have possession of the checks." ... He's invited to bring the 
checks to 
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Court as I've advised him, and I told him we would discuss 
what's going to happen. I'll hear from you by a written 
presentation from him as to what his issues are, but if I don't 
see those checks at 3:00, counsel, I will be issuing a citation 
for his arrest and incarceration until the checks are 
produced. Very clear. All right? 
,i 7 At the 3 :00 p.m. hearing, counsel for Mayberry 
appeared, but Mayberry did not. Mayberry failed to provide 
a written response or produce the original cashier's checks 
as ordered by the court. Counsel for the guardian requested 
judgment against Mayberry, authority to foreclose on the 
home property, and authority to intervene in any bankruptcy 
action if necessary. Counsel for the guardian asked the court 
to amend the judgment to include Start Corp., the entity that 
owned the house sold to provide the (208 P .3d 1130) funds 
due, as well as being a party to the settlement agreement. 
,i 8 The commissioner granted the relief sought in the 
petition for citation. Then, acting on its own motion, the 
court imposed sanctions on Mayberry, Start Corp. and 
Response Capital, totaling $100 a day, to begin 
immediately, until the judgments were satisfied. The court 
entered judgment of $9,000 to secure payment of the 
sanction. At the end of 90 days, if the judgment was not yet 
satisfied, the guardian could seek renewal of the sanction 
and extend it. The sanction was to be lifted once the 
judgment was paid.[7] 
,i 9 The comm1ss10ner found that Mayberry and his 
corporate entities were attempting to avoid paying the 
money due under the agreement. After Mayberry's earlier 
testimony, the commissioner gave little credence to 
Mayberry's damage claim but told him to make his 
argument at the afternoon hearing, which he did not do.[8] 
[150 Wn.App. 498) ,i 10 The commissioner fully explained 
to counsel for Mayberry that if the original cashier's checks 
were proffered to the court, it would rescind the order and 
quash the bench warrant. The commissioner reiterated that 
the court was required to act as a " super guardian" to 
protect the disabled citizens of the state who are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court. The commissioner encouraged 
counsel for the guardian to consider a number of additional 
options to persuade Mayberry to pay off the judgment. [9] 
,i 11 On October 18, 2007, counsel for the guardian and 
Mayberry appeared to present the judgment underlying the 
sanctions imposed and additional relief suggested by the 
court. The commissioner inquired how counsel for the 
guardian was planning to proceed, as the commissioner was 
concerned about the cost to the parties, including Mayberry. 
Counsel for Mayberry stated, " I can't say I'm absolutely 
sure, but I'm somewhat sure that my client is willing to pay 
like $35,000 now towards this judgment, which would then 
leave 20-some-odd thousand or so owning." Counsel also 
said he could understand that the guardian might have some 
difficulty with that, given the history of the case. The 
commissioner told counsel that when Mayberry deposited 
that amount of money with the court and provided title 
reports on other properties, over which he clearly had 
ownership or control, and for which he could sign a note 
and deed of trust, then the court might be willing to proceed 
with the plan. The court indicated that the transaction would 
have to be handled by a title company so there would be no 
question of any interim transfers of the property used. And 
Mayberry would have to pay for all the expenses due to 
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the delay. Additionally, the commissioner indicated he 
would be willing to reduce the sanctions and simply charge 
Mayberry for attorney fees that he caused counsel for the 
guardian to incur, so long as at least $35,000 was paid from 
a local bank, not a foreign bank, and other security for the 
guardianship was in place. [10] 
,i 12 The commissioner signed the order imposing further 
relief and judgment against Mayberry, Response Capital 
and Start Corp. The court also issued an order authorizing 
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of [208 P.3d 1131] 
Mayberry, which included the steps he needed to take to 
gain release following arrest. 
,i 13 Mayberry, Response Capital and Start Corp. moved to 
revise the October 18 order and judgment. Before action 
was taken on these motions, Mayberry filed a notice of 
appeal. Thereafter, this court granted permission for the 
superior court to hear the motion to revise. On December 
13, 2007, the superior court granted Start Corp.'s motion to 
revise and ordered that only the judgment entered against 
Start Corp. was vacated. The appeal follows.[11] 
DECISION 
1 14 Mayberry first argues the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and to 
determine liability. The question of subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question oflaw that we review de novo.[12] 
Subject matter jurisdiction is " the authority of the court to 
hear and determine the class of actions to which the case 
belongs." [13] Because Washington courts are courts of 
general 
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jurisdiction, they lack subject matter jurisdiction only in 
compelling circumstances. 
1 15 Mayberry claims the court sitting in guardianship 
proceedings did not have jurisdiction because the 
underlying action was one of quiet title. Mayberry is 
incorrect. The court was not being asked to determine title, 
but was presented with a controversy relating to property of 
the estate being held by the appellants. 
'If 16 TEDRA mandates using nonjudicial resolution in 
trust and estate cases, but permits judicial resolution if other 
methods are unsuccessful.[14] Under TEDRA, " [t]he 
superior court of every county has original subject matter 
jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration 
of estates of incapacitated, missing, and deceased 
individuals in all instances." [15] The guardian filed a 
petition invoking TEDRA, which gives superior courts 
broad and exclusive jurisdiction over the estates of 
incapacitated individuals. Here Mayberry and Response 
Capital were served with process and were parties to the 
settlement agreement with others, including the guardian of 
the estate of Wells, and thus the court had subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
'If 1 7 In any event, Mayberry and Response Capital failed 
to preserve this defense as they did not initially assert the 
claim in a responsive pleading or by timely motion. CR 
12(b ); 12(h)(l )(B). 
1 18 Next, Mayberry argues the commissioner improperly 
entered an order imposing sanctions against him and his 
corporate entities because there was no requisite finding by 
the court that he had the current means to satisfy the 
judgment to permit the court to impose sanctions for civil 
contempt. (16] 
[150 Wn.App. 501] 1 19 RCW 7.21.020 provides the 
authority to impose sanctions for contempt.[17] Sanctions 
for civil contempt are remedial, i.e., intended to coerce a 
party's compliance with a judgment or order while at the 
same time [208 P .3d 1132] permitting the contemnor to 
avoid the sanction by doing something to purge the 
contempt.[18] Where a remedial sanction has been 
imposed, the contemnor effectively " ' carries the keys of 
his prison in his own pocket.' " [19] 
1 20 Here, Mayberry does not dispute that he failed to 
comply with the court's judgment. He claims for the first 
time on appeal that the court failed to enter the requisite 
finding that he had the current ability to comply with the 
order of civil contempt. While the court did not enter 
specific numbered findings regarding Mayberry's ability to 
currently comply with the sanction, review of the transcript 
of the hearing and the order imposing contempt reveals that 
Mayberry, under oath, represented to the court that he had 
the ability to pay and never argued that he did not. The 
court specifically acknowledged Mayberry's testimony that 
he obtained cashier's checks to satisfy the amounts due. 
Mayberry was directed to bring those checks to the court. 
The court imposed sanctions only after Mayberry failed to 
appear, respond to the petition, or produce the original 
cashier's checks. In summary, the evidence was undisputed 
that Mayberry had the current ability to comply with the 
terms of the order and judgment. Under the circumstances, 
the court's order recognizing Mayberry's ability to pay was 
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a sufficient determination to support the court's order of 
contempt. 
1 21 This case is distinguishable from those cases where 
there was no evidence of a current ability to pay the order or 
judgment. Mayberry had the burden to show he was unable 
to comply with the trial court's order.[20] Given his 
testimony, he could not meet this burden. 
1 22 Whether contempt is warranted is a matter within the 
court's discretion.[21] The court's order will not be 
disturbed unless the court abused its discretion.[22] 
Discretion is abused if its exercise was manifestly 
unreasonable or was based on untenable grounds. [23] The 
court did not abuse its discretion. 
1 23 Mayberry next contends the commissioner displayed 
bias toward him and violated the appearance of fairness 
doctrine. He claims the commissioner made a number of 
statements throughout the course of the proceedings 
showing animosity toward him and that those statements 
alone indicate a lack of fairness. In addition to the 
statements, Mayberry contends the commissioner's 
imposition of sanctions and the order for a bench warrant 
also showed the court's bias and unfairness. Given the 
nature of the statements and orders, Mayberry asserts that 
the orders should be reversed and any further proceedings 
should occur in front of a different judge or commissioner. 
We disagree. 
,r 24 " ' Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a 
judicial proceeding is valid only if a reasonably prudent and 
disinterested observer would conclude that all parties 
obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.'" [24] 
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Evidence of a judge or commissioner's actual or potential 
bias is required Before the appearance of fairness doctrine 
will be applied.[25] A party claiming bias or prejudice must 
support the claim.[26] 
[208 p .3d 1133] 'I[ 25 The record reveals that the guardian 
sought to bring Mayberry and others Before the 
guardianship court in order to obtain direction and authority 
to procure payment of the funds owed under the settlement 
agreement. Mayberry filed no written response but appeared 
at the initial hearing. During the hearing, while under oath, 
he admitted breaching the settlement agreement, the 
subsequent agreement with the guardian for payment of the 
amounts owed in exchange for a continuance, and further 
admitted he had the cashier's checks to satisfy the 
outstanding obligation to Wells. When Mayberry raised an 
issue regarding alleged damage to the house, the 
commissioner afforded him the opportunity to do so. 
Mayberry willfully disobeyed by failing to appear, file a 
written response, make the additional claims, or produce the 
cashier's checks. Our review of the record reveals that the 
comments and actions of the commissioner show 
understandable frustration with Mayberry and his corporate 
entities, but do not rise to a level of bias or violation of an 
appearance of fairness. 
,r 26 The guardian seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Reasonable attorney fees are recoverable on appeal if 
allowed by statute, rule, or contract, and the request is made 
pursuant to RAP 18.l(a).[27] The claim for fees is based on 
the attorney fees and costs paragraph of the promissory note 
executed by the appellants. Fees and costs on appeal are 
hereby granted in an amount to be set by a commissioner of 
this court upon compliance with RAP 18.1. 
[150 Wn.App. 504] ,i 27 Citing RAP 18.9(c), the guardian 
seeks dismissal of the appeal, arguing the appeal is 
frivolous. An appeal is deemed frivolous if, considering the 
entire record, no debatable issues are presented upon which 
reasonable minds might differ and it is so devoid of merit 
that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal. [28] While 
there is little merit to Mayberry's claims on appeal, we do 
not find it to be entirely frivolous. 
,i 28 Affirmed. 
Notes: 
[l] Care Planning Associates was appointed Guardian of 
the Estate of Louise L. Wells; Horace and Gloria Wells 
were appointed as Guardian of the Person of Louise L. 
Wells. 
[2] Additional amounts were due to the Wells children, 
payable initially and at later dates. Funds paid later were to 
be used to fund a family trust. 
[3] Elizabeth T. Wilson was a successor in the interest of 
Carolyn Wells, the daughter of Louise Wells. Eventually 
Wilson's interest was transferred to Start Corp. 
[4] Paragraph 10 of the promissory note provided: 
Maker shall pay all costs incurred by Holder in collecting 
sums due under this Note after a default, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or not suit is brought. If 
Maker or Holder sues to enforce this Note or obtain a 
declaration of its rights hereunder, the prevailing party in 
any such proceeding shall be entitled to recover its 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the 
proceeding (including those incurred in any bankruptcy 
proceeding or appeal) from the non-prevailing party. 
[ 5] Specifically the citation directed Response Capital and 
Mr. and Mrs. Mayberry to appear and show cause why they 
should not be found to have breached a portion of the 
settlement agreement, why judgment should not be entered 
against them for the breach, why the guardian should not be 
authorized to file a /is pendens on any real property owned 
by any of them, why the guardian should not be authorized 
to foreclose on the real property that was the subject of the 
settlement agreement, why the guardian should not be 
authorized to intervene on behalf of Wells in any 
bankruptcy action commenced by either of them, and why 
they should not be directed to pay fees and costs. 
[6] After negotiation, Mayberry entered into an agreement 
providing that the funds owed to Wells, including additional 
fees and costs to the attorney and guardian, would be paid 
through an escrow account following the sale of a home 
owned by Mayberry or one of his corporate entities. 
Thereafter, counsel for the guardian agreed to continue the 
hearing until October 5, 2007. 
[7] Start Corp. signed the settlement agreement. However, 
it was never served with process on the petition for citation. 
The guardian argued that Start Corp. was part of Mayberry's 
enterprises and sought to have Start Corp. added to the 
judgment. The commissioner agreed and included Start 
Corp. in the judgment 
[8] While the commissioner believed that damage may 
have occurred, the court noted that the property was titled in 
the name of Mayberry and his corporate entities for a long 
time, and if Mayberry and the entities did not bother to evict 
the tenants who damaged property, the problem was not 
likely one for Wells. 
[9] These suggestions included the possible foreclosure of 
the deed of trust, calling the elder fraud division of the 
Seattle and Tacoma police departments and/or the King 
County Prosecutor, checking SCOMIS for other litigation 
to alert counsel, preparing a letter of complaint to the Office 
of the Attorney General to encourage it to enter a cease and 
desist order for any ofMayberry's corporations, and further, 
checking to see if Mayberry was a principal with the escrow 
company that failed to properly pay off the judgment, as 
well as looking for any interrelationship between other 
businesses involved. 
[!OJ The record does not disclose that any of these 
suggestions actually occurred. 
[I I] Appellant's argument about the judgment against, or 
the sanctions imposed on, appellant Start Corp. is moot. 
The judgment against Start Corp. was vacated by order of 
the superior court over six months Before the filing of the 
appellant's brief. 
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